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 This study examines the effect of responsibility center management (RCM), a 
decentralized budget model, on total operating costs at the University of New Hampshire 
(UNH) and the University of Arizona (UofA). Both universities in the study implemented 
RCM with the primary goal of controlling costs, among other goals. To address the 
research question, this study draws from extant literature on RCM and higher education 
cost and is theoretically framed using the principal-agent theory and the revenue theory 
of cost. The synthetic control method (SCM) – an econometric technique used to estimate 
the causal effects of policies, programs, interventions, and idiosyncratic events – is 
employed to conduct the analysis. The main findings of the study indicate that RCM 
positively impacted total operating costs at UNH and the UofA. However, with regard to 
UNH, further analysis did not reveal a significant causal effect with respect to RCM’s 
impact on total operating costs. Additionally, as it relates to the UofA, the results 
revealed that RCM had a significant causal effect on total operating costs after the first 
year of implementation but not thereafter.  
 
 
 The findings of this study contribute to research and practice. With regard to 
research, this study is the first to bridge the gap between the RCM literature and the 
higher education cost literature by providing empirical insight regarding RCM’s effect on 
total operating costs. Additionally, this study contributes to the use of theory in the RCM 
literature by using two theoretical frameworks to guide the inquiry. As it relates to 
practice, the results of this study – specifically that RCM positively impacted total 
operating costs – balance previous anecdotal claims regarding RCM’s utility by 
providing empirical insight on RCM at UNH and UofA to guide future decision-making.  
 This study outlines several recommendations for future research to further 
develop empirical studies on RCM. Specifically, the study recommends the use of mixed 
methodologies to elucidate a fuller picture of RCM and ultimately help university leaders 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction 
The ever-changing financial landscape of public higher education has challenged 
many college and university operations as it relates to securing funding (i.e., how and 
from where institutions receive and generate revenue) (Jaquette & Curs, 2015; Priest & 
St. John, 2006; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004) and managing costs (i.e., the cost of 
providing higher education) (Robst, 2001; Sav, 2004; Titus, Vamosiu, & McClure, 2017; 
Toutkoushian, 1999). As a consequence, several public universities have sought and 
implemented strategies to manage and adapt to this financial environment. One such 
strategy called Responsibility Center Management (RCM) – also known as responsibility 
center budgeting, incentive-based budgeting, and revenue center budgeting – is a 
decentralized budget system and management tool that has been endorsed by its adopters 
as a way to manage complex university finances and strategic planning (Curry, Laws, & 
Strauss, 2013; Strauss & Curry, 2002; Whalen, 1991). Since the 1970s, over 45 
universities have fully implemented RCM (Curry et al., 2013). Moreover, since the Great 
Recession in 2008, more than 25 public research universities have adopted RCM (see 
Table A1).  
Given the ongoing challenges in public higher education regarding declining state 
financial support, escalating costs, and rising tuition prices, universities have employed 
RCM practices to achieve at least two broad goals: (1) to increase revenue, and (2) to 
minimize costs (Curry et al., 2013; Deering & Sá, 2014; Hanover Research Council, 
2008; Jaquette, Kramer, & Curs, 2018; Strauss & Curry, 2002; Whalen, 1991). However, 
empirical research examining RCM, specifically the impact of RCM on revenue and 
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costs is scant. Only one study (Jaquette, Kramer, & Curs, 2018) examined the extent to 
which RCM impacted revenue – specifically, tuition revenue at four public research 
universities. No research has considered if or to what extent RCM affects costs, despite a 
dramatic increase in the number of RCM adopters since the Great Recession in 2008. 
This study aimed to fill that gap in knowledge and to help inform administrators and state 
policymakers who may be considering RCM for their institutions. 
This study contributes to the literature by bridging the gap between RCM and 
higher education costs. Specifically, this study provides insight into RCM’s impact on 
costs at two public research universities in the United States: the University of New 
Hampshire (UNH) and the University of Arizona (UofA). The UNH and UofA, like 
many other public research universities, experienced significant declines in state funding 
and grappled with rising higher education costs. As a consequence, the leaders of UNH 
and UofA adopted RCM citing that their motivation to implement RCM was to 
incentivize cost minimization, among other goals. This study found that RCM positively 
impacted total operating costs at UNH and the UofA, however, causal evidence is not 
revealed for UNH, and is only revealed across one year of RCM implementation at UofA.  
 
Background and Context 
State Funding Declines 
Over the last three decades, public colleges and universities have experienced 
significant changes in their funding streams as a result of declining state financial support 
(Baum & Ma, 2012; Doyle & Delany, 2011; Layzell, 2007; SHEEO, 2018). These 
statewide funding declines are a result of nationwide downturns in the economy during 
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the early 1990s, early and mid-2000s, including the Great Recession in 2008, that 
negatively impacted tax revenues collected by state governments. Consequently, states 
have had fewer financial resources to allocate across competing budgetary priorities 
(including higher education), leaving officials with difficult choices (Harris & 
Shadunksy, 2013). For example, in 1995, the average state appropriations to higher 
education accounted for nearly 13% of the states’ general budgets but fell to less than 
10% by fiscal year 2017 (SHEEO, 2018). Additionally, on a per-student basis, state 
appropriations decreased by nearly 30% over the last 30 years at public universities 
(McFarland et al., 2018). Indeed, state appropriations per FTE in 2019 remained nearly 
2.4% below 2009 funding levels (SHEEO, 2020). Mitchell, Palacios, and Leachman 
(2015) noted that the “deep state funding cuts have major consequences for public 
colleges and universities” (p. 2). Specifically, these funding cuts to public higher 
education have had implications with regard to how universities budget and allocate 
resources.  
Escalating Higher Education Costs 
In addition to decreases in state financial support, higher education costs (i.e., the 
cost of providing higher education) have continued to rise. For example, public colleges 
and universities have continued to spend more to provide higher education each year. 
Desrochers and Hurlburt (2014) showed that the direct and indirect costs on a per full-
time equivalent (FTE) student basis increased dramatically at public research universities 
between 2003 and 2013. On the direct cost side, for example, spending on instruction 
increased by nearly 11% (Desrochers & Hurlburt, 2014). Instruction expenses include 
faculty and staff salaries, fringe benefits, supplies, and equipment (Desrochers & 
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Hurlburt, 2014). On the indirect cost side, per-FTE spending increased in several 
categories: on student services by 30%, on academic support by 25%, and on institutional 
support by 11.1% (Desrochers & Hurlburt, 2014). Student services expenses include non-
instructional services such as admissions, financial aid administration, career counseling, 
and student organizations, for example. Academic support costs include non-instructional 
expenses such as library resources, museums, deans’ offices and staff, and academic 
computing. Institutional support costs include expenditures on executive management, 
general administrative services, public relations, and fiscal operations (Desrochers & 
Hurlburt, 2014). 
Rising costs coupled with declining state support has left public colleges and 
universities with at least three options: increase tuition price, cut costs, or both (Mitchell 
et al., 2015). Many public institutions have attempted to do one or both – that is, raise 
tuition prices and implement ways to cut costs.  
Rising Tuition Prices 
 With regard to tuition, between academic years 1988-89 and 2018-19, the 
average published tuition and fee prices (also known as “sticker price”) at public four-
year universities grew from $3,360 to $10,230 (in 2018 dollars) (Ma, Baum, Pender, & 
Libassi, 2018). Additionally, the average net tuition and fee prices (i.e., what students 
actually pay) increased from $1,870 in 1998-99 to $3,740 in 2018-19 (in 2018 dollars) 
(Ma et al., 2018). Student fees also increased by 95% between 1999 and 2012 at public 
colleges and universities (McFarland et al., 2018). 
Although tuition and fee pricing strategies have proved successful (as it relates to 
institutional finances), it shifted more higher education costs to students and families (Ma 
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et al., 2018; Sav, 2017; SHEEO, 2018; Webber, 2017). In a study on the relationship 
between FTE-state appropriations and net tuition paid by students, Webber (2017) found 
that for every $1,000 decrease in FTE-state appropriations, the average student pays $257 
more per year. These financial changes (i.e., rising costs and rising tuition prices) have 
prompted public outcry (Heller, 2001; Zumeta, Brenneman, Callan, & Finney, 2012). 
Consequently, state legislators have called for greater accountability and cost efficiency 
among all public colleges and universities (Heller, 2001; Massy & Zemsky, 1990; Sav, 
2017; Zumeta, 2001; Zumeta et al., 2012).  
Given the changing financial circumstances of public higher education, at least 
two empirical studies (Deering & Sá, 2014; Jaquette et al., 2018) and several non-
empirical publications (Curry et al., 2013; Strauss & Curry, 2002; Whalen, 1991) have 
argued that RCM has been adopted primarily as a means to increase revenues and 
decrease (or control) costs. Among public research universities specifically, RCM has 
been adopted in reaction to declining state appropriations to higher education (Deering & 
Sá, 2014; Jaquette et al., 2018; Lang, 2002). Since the Great Recession in 2008, over 25 
public universities have implemented RCM as illustrated in Table A1 (Attis, Rosch, 
Jenkins, & Ho, 2016; Balough & Logue, 2013; Green, Jaschik, & Lederman, 2011; 
Hearn, Lewis, Kallsen, Holdsworth, & Jones, 2006; Jaquette et al., 2018; West, Seidita, 
DiMattia, & Whalen, 1997). However, despite the recent attraction toward RCM, the 
impact and performance of RCM with regard to cost remains unexplored. This study fills 
the gap regarding RCM’s effect on costs.  
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An Overview of RCM 
Responsibility center management (RCM) was introduced into higher education 
by the University of Pennsylvania (UPenn) in 1974. RCM, as implemented by UPenn 
(and subsequently several other institutions), consists of a sharing of financial 
responsibility between central administration (i.e., offices of the president, provost, or 
vice presidents), and the leader of each respective responsibility center (e.g., the colleges 
and schools within the university). Specifically, under RCM, the sharing of financial 
responsibility is brokered using funding formulas and allocation rules allowing 
responsibility centers (i.e., colleges and schools) to generate revenues to pay for their 
expenses. These funding formulas also allow central administrators to steer the university 
in achieving its mission. Specifically, central administrators allocate funds responsibility 
centers to incent the achievement of mission-critical goals and objectives (Curry et al., 
2013; Whalen, 1991). (A more robust description of RCM funding formulas, including a 
discussion on how RCM is structured and executed, is discussed below.) 
Several RCM publications (e.g., Curry et al., 2013; Strauss & Curry, 2002; 
Whalen, 1991) have suggested that RCM is an effective tool for managing complex 
university finances and increasing efficiency. Specifically, Curry et al. (2013), Strauss 
and Curry (2002), and Whalen (1991) attribute RCM’s success to at least two key 
features: the decentralization of budget authority; and the embedded incentives within 
RCM to promote financial responsibility.  
Decentralization of Budget Authority 
Prior to the implementation of RCM, most colleges and universities employed a 
central budgeting system, known as incremental budgeting (Curry et al., 2013; Goldstein, 
7 
 
2005, 2012; Hearn et al., 2006; Jaquette et al., 2018; Vonasek, 2011; Whalen, 1991). 
Under the incremental budget model, central administrators maintained complete budget 
authority (i.e., complete discretion over budget allocation decisions). However, under the 
RCM budget model, budget authority is devolved from central administration to the 
responsibility centers. Specifically, this is done by dividing the university into one of 
three parts: (1) as a responsibility center; (2) as a part of central administration; or (3) as a 
support center (sometimes referred to as cost centers) (Curry et al., 2013; Goldstein, 
2005, 2012; Hearn et al., 2006; Jaquette et al., 2018; Vonasek, 2011; Whalen, 1991).  
Responsibility Centers. In most RCM models, the academic units (e.g., schools, 
colleges, and departments) and some self-supporting auxiliaries (i.e., revenue-generating 
operations such as residential halls, dining services, and bookstores) are designated as 
responsibility centers. The heads of responsibility centers, typically deans, are 
responsible for generating revenue to pay for the direct and indirect expenses of their 
college or school’s operations. For example, revenues to the university come from several 
sources including state appropriations, tuition and fees, research grants, federal and state 
contracts, private gifts, and auxiliary enterprises (e.g., self-supporting activities such as 
residence halls, student unions, bookstores, and dining services). In academic 
responsibility centers, revenues are driven by student enrollment. For example, some 
RCM funding formulas (i.e., revenue attribution and cost allocation guidelines) allocate 
all or some of the tuition dollars generated from student enrollment to the academic unit 
(i.e., responsibility center) that houses the student’s major. The remaining tuition dollars 
are allocated to the academic units that provide instruction to students but are outside of 
their home college or school. For example, if a student’s major is in the Business School, 
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a percentage of his/her/their tuition dollars will be allocated to the Business School. 
However, if the student takes a course in the history department, a portion of the 
student’s tuition dollars will be allocated to the college that houses the history department 
(e.g., College of Humanities). (Further description regarding revenue allocations is 
below.) 
Under RCM, deans are also encouraged to find other opportunities to generate 
revenue such as research grants and alumni giving. These funds could be used at the 
discretion of the responsibility centers to enhance their academic programs, recruit 
faculty/staff, support students, and pay for their colleges’ direct and indirect expenses. 
However, a portion of all additional revenues generated by responsibility centers are 
subject to taxation by central administration (further described below). These tax funds 
are used to pay for overhead costs (indirect expenses) incurred by the responsibility 
centers and support centers (e.g., non-instructional units such as the office of financial 
aid, registrar’s office, and student affairs). Indirect expenses are expenses that are 
incurred by the support centers for providing non-instructional services to students such 
as student support services, counseling, financial aid, information technology, and student 
activities. Direct expenses come from faculty and staff salaries, fringe benefits, supplies, 
equipment, and travel. 
Because RCM provides deans with financial authority over revenues, direct-, and 
indirect expenses, proponents of RCM argue that deans are thereby incentivized to 
maximize profits and minimize costs (Curry et al., 2013; Strauss & Curry, 2002; Whalen, 
1991). These RCM incentives will be described further below. 
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Central Administration. Central administration typically refers to the offices of 
the president, provost, and chief financial officer. Under the RCM model, the primary 
responsibility for central administration is to ensure that the responsibility centers and 
support centers move in the direction that central administration intends (i.e., in achieving 
the university’s mission and strategic objectives). This is accomplished through the use of 
funding incentives around revenue attribution and cost allocation. For example, as noted 
previously, revenues to the university come from several sources including state 
appropriations, tuition and fees, research grants, federal and state contracts, private gifts, 
and auxiliary enterprises (e.g., self-supporting activities such as residence halls, student 
unions, bookstores, and dining services). Under the RCM model, the central 
administration imposes a tax on all revenues generated by the responsibility centers. The 
“tax” imposed and collected by the central administration is called participation. These 
taxes are collected and then placed into a fund called the subvention pool. The subvention 
pool is used to steer the institution by (1) covering any overhead costs incurred by central 
administration, responsibility centers, and the support centers (e.g., non-instructional 
units such as the office of financial aid, registrar’s office, student activities, etc.); (2) 
providing funding for responsibility centers that may be experiencing financial shortfalls; 
and (3) creating incentives around institutional goals and priorities (Curry et al., 2013; 
Hearn et al., 2006; Strauss & Curry, 2002). 
For example, with regard to institutional goals, if a university sought to increase 
research production while using RCM as a budget model, the institution may develop 
incentives around research grants. The guidelines of revenue allocation would be 
negotiated by the central administration, deans, and faculty. For example, an institution 
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may operate under the rule that all research grant revenues be divided among the central 
administration, responsibility center, and the principal investigator (PI) (i.e., the faculty 
member who awarded the grant). Specifically, this means that a portion of a research 
grant is taxed and allocated to the central administration (e.g., the Vice President of 
Research’s Office) to cover any overhead expenses for grant administration. Another 
portion of the research grant may be allocated to the responsibility center (i.e., a college 
or school) in which the PI’s department is located. Finally, the remaining portion of the 
research grant would be allocated to the PI to conduct research, hire research staff, and/or 
buy supplies and equipment. Critical in the above example is an illustration of how the 
taxation system would work to cover the overhead expenses of a support center (e.g., the 
Vice President of Research’s Office) based on revenue generated through non-enrollment 
means (i.e., through external research grants). Support centers will be described next.  
  Support Centers. Under an RCM model, support centers are typically non-
instructional administrative units such as the office of research, the office of information 
technology, student counseling, and support services, academic advising, admissions, and 
financial aid. Although support centers do not provide instruction to students, these 
centers still incur expenses to provide services to students. Salaries and benefits, 
equipment, and supplies are among some of their expenses. However, because support 
centers are non-revenue generating units, their expenses are paid for by central 
administration using the subvention pool, which is funded, in part, by the responsibility 
centers. This illustrates that RCM works in a system to fund the university’s operations.  
Embedded Incentives in RCM 
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The use of funding formulas and allocation rules in RCM provides responsibility 
center leaders with the structure, information, and incentives necessary to generate 
revenues and minimize costs within their units (Curry et al., 2013; Hanover Research 
Council, 2008; Lang, 2002; Leslie & Slaughter, 1997; Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2017; 
Whalen, 1991). In a scholarly paper describing the ways in which universities are 
changing their management structures, Leslie and Slaughter (1997) noted that “getting 
incentives and disincentives right will mean the devolution of budgets so that units are 
stimulated to increase competitive revenue and to control their expenditures” (p. 249).  
Generate Additional Revenue. On the revenue side, RCM funding formulas 
determine how revenue sources are allocated to responsibility centers to cover the 
expenses of their activities. For example, under RCM, tuition and fee revenues typically 
flow directly to the academic units and are generated by student enrollment (Curry et al., 
2013; Hanover Research Council, 2008; Hearn et al., 2006; Jaquette et al., 2018; Lang, 
2002; Whalen, 1991). Specifically, revenues are allocated to responsibility centers in at 
least three ways: based on student credit hours (SCH), based on program enrollment, and 
based on graduation rates (i.e., completion rates) (Attis et al., 2016; Balough & Logue, 
2013; Curry et al., 2013; Jaquette et al., 2018; Vonasek, 2011; Whalen, 1991). 
 Under an RCM model, each of these bases for revenue allocation incentivizes 
revenue growth differently. For example, revenue allocation based on SCH incentivizes 
course enrollment. Specifically, as course enrollment increases, the amount of tuition 
revenue allocated to the department teaching the course increases. Additionally, revenue 
allocation based on academic program enrollment incentivizes enrollment in specific 
academic majors. For example, as the number of students majoring in education 
12 
 
increases, the amount of tuition revenue allocated to the College of Education increases. 
Lastly, revenue allocation based on graduation rates incentivizes higher graduation rates. 
Specifically, central administration may provide more revenue to academic units that 
have increased the graduation rates in their programs (Attis et al., 2016; Balough & 
Logue, 2013; Curry et al., 2013; Vonasek, 2011).  
These allocation rules differ by institution and revenue source (e.g., state 
appropriations are allocated differently than undergraduate tuition and fees). For 
example, in a consulting report on RCM implementation, Attis et al. (2016) illustrate that 
three major forms of revenue (e.g., undergraduate tuition revenue, graduate tuition 
revenue, and state appropriations) are allocated differently. For example, undergraduate 
revenue is allocated to responsibility centers at Iowa State University in a 75/25 fashion. 
This means that 75% of revenue is allocated based on SCH and the remaining 25% is 
allocated based on program enrollment. Undergraduate tuition revenue at the University 
of Michigan is allocated in a 50/50 fashion (i.e., it is split based on SCH and program 
enrollment). Additionally, undergraduate tuition revenue at the University of Minnesota 
is divided in a 25/75 way – with 25% of revenue allocated based on SCH and 75% based 
on program enrollment. This suggests that deans are encouraged to increase student 
enrollment (and revenue by extension) by enhancing their academic programs and course 
offerings to entice students to enroll. However, researchers have not yet considered the 
extent to which enrollment is affected by the implementation of RCM.  
As noted previously, the revenues generated by responsibility centers are subject 
to a tax imposed by the central administration. However, after a responsibility center’s 
direct and indirect expenses are paid, deans are allowed to carry over unused funds year-
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to-year. This practice is a departure from the centralized incremental budgeting system. 
Specifically, under the centralized budget system, all unexpended funds are required to be 
sent back to central administration, and in some cases back to a state’s budget office 
(Whalen, 1991).  
RCM also permits deans to reallocate unexpended funds, so long as they spend 
those funds within the parameters of university policy (Curry et al., 2013; Whalen, 1991). 
These incentives (i.e., the ability to carryover and reallocate unexpended funds), in 
theory, allow deans to plan for future expenses, including recruiting new faculty and 
staff, enhancing the quality of their academic programs, as well as planning for future 
budgetary shortfalls. 
Only one empirical study (Jaquette et al., 2018) has investigated RCM’s effect on 
revenue – specifically tuition revenue. The scholars found that three of the four public 
research universities in their study increased tuition revenue after RCM had been 
implemented. This study (Jaquette et al., 2018) will be discussed in more detail below 
and in Chapter 2: Literature Review.  
Cost Minimization. RCM additionally contains cost-minimization incentives. As 
stated above, deans are allowed to carry forward unused funds year over year. This 
incentive also has implications for costs – specifically, unexpended funds could be a 
result of cost-savings, which in theory creates an additional incentive for responsibility 
center leaders to be cost-conscious and perhaps frugal.  
A second RCM cost minimization incentive provides responsibility center leaders 
(i.e., deans) with information on the full costs (i.e., direct costs and indirect costs) of their 
activities (i.e., academic programs, research, and service) (Curry et al., 2013; Hanover 
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Research Council, 2008; Jaquette et al., 2018; Strauss & Curry, 2002; Whalen, 1991). In 
their text on RCM, Curry et al. (2013) note that deans were limited in their ability to 
make prudent academic and financial decisions prior to the creation of RCM. 
Specifically, Curry et al. (2013) argue that deans were not incentivized to understand the 
full costs associated with academic programs, including the cost of non-instructional 
services. Under RCM, however, as described above, deans (responsibility centers) are not 
only required to understand the full costs of their activities, but they are also required to 
pay for their college’s activities – both direct- and indirect costs. 
For example, on the direct cost side, if a college (i.e., a responsibility center) 
expects to realize an increase in income and enrollment, then the dean or department 
chair may be inclined to hire additional faculty and open more course sections to meet the 
demand. Conversely, if a responsibility center expects a budget shortfall or a decrease in 
enrollment, then the dean or department chair might be inclined to scale back and reduce 
the number of sections, adjunct faculty, and teaching assistants (Curry et al., 2013). 
Additionally, on the indirect costs side (i.e., the costs associated with non-
instructional support), there are various ways that promote cost minimization. For 
example, Attis et al. (2016) list 10 different indirect costs that some universities use in 
their RCM models. These indirect costs can be allocated to responsibility centers based 
on FTE students, FTE faculty, FTE staff, net assignable square footage (i.e., the building 
space occupied by the unit), and the share of student credit hours taught in the unit.  
The bases for allocating indirect costs, similar to how revenues are allocated, 
incentivize cost minimization in different ways (Attis et al., 2016; Curry et al., 2013; 
Whalen, 1991). For example, indirect cost allocation based on net assignable square 
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footage incentivizes the efficient use of office and classroom space; whereas, cost 
allocation based on the shares of student, faculty, and staff FTEs promotes equity among 
responsibility centers based on a unit’s size. Under this cost allocation rule, smaller units 
would not have to pay a higher share of expenses than larger units, for example. These 
cost allocation rules and incentives vary across institutions, however. As will be 
described in the next section, researchers have not yet considered the effect of RCM on 
costs. This study addresses that gap in the literature.  
 
Summary of the Literature 
This study draws from two literature domains (i.e., the literature on RCM and 
literature on costs in higher education) to provide context around the topic and address 
the research question. 
Summary of the Literature on RCM 
The scholarly literature on RCM is scant and disconnected from any systematic 
investigation on RCM’s impact on the institutions that have implemented it. Specifically, 
scholars have mostly examined RCM using qualitative case study research designs. As a 
consequence, most research findings on RCM are institution- and context-specific (i.e., 
not generalizable). Additionally, as a consequence, the extant literature has only revealed 
two broad findings regarding RCM: (1) colleges and universities have primarily 
implemented RCM to enhance their financial positions (i.e., to generate additional 
revenue and minimize costs) (Deering & Sá, 2014; Jaquette et al., 2018); and (2) many 
institutions that use RCM have realized positive and negative experiences regarding 
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RCM’s implementation and operation (Courant & Knepp, 2002; Deering & Sá, 2018; 
Gros Louis & Thompson, 2002; Hearn et al., 2006; Lang, 2002).  
Colleges and universities have used RCM to improve their financial positions. For 
example, Jaquette et al. (2018) explored RCM at four public research universities: to 
identify why the administrators at each of these institutions sought to implement RCM; 
and to reveal the extent to which RCM impacted tuition revenue. Jaquette and associates 
found that administrators at the four universities cited the need to increase revenue and 
minimize costs as a result of declining state funding. Additionally, the authors found a 
positive relationship between RCM and tuition revenue at Iowa State University (ISU), 
Kent State University (KSU), and the University of Cincinnati (UC) but did not find an 
increase at the University of Florida (UF). Deering and Sá (2014) investigated 
institutions’ motivations for adopting RCM at three public Canadian universities: the 
University of Toronto (UT), the University of Lethbridge (UL), and Queen’s University 
(QU). Overall, the authors found that the adoption of RCM was a strategic decision in 
response to declining government funding and years of financial constraints experienced 
by the institutions in the study (Deering & Sá, 2014).  
With regard to institutions’ mixed experiences with RCM, Lang (2002) examined 
RCM at the University of Toronto (UT). The researcher revealed that UT developed 
several self-funded programs after RCM was implemented, including an executive 
masters of business administration program, a doctor of pharmacy program, and an 
elementary school. However, Lang (2002) noted that one of UT’s campuses had 
accumulated a $5.5 million debt after RCM was implemented. Hearn, Lewis, Kallsen, 
Holdsworth, and Jones (2006) explored the impact of RCM at the University of 
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Minnesota-Twin Cities (UMTC) and found mixed results. Hearn and associates found 
that some colleges and schools within UMTC experienced increases in enrollment, and 
the number of credit hours taught; however, some colleges and schools did not realize the 
same benefits after RCM was implemented (Hearn et al., 2006).  
Additionally, due to the dearth of RCM scholarship, other findings regarding 
RCM have been institution-specific and unconnected to any systematic investigation. 
These findings include (a) perceptions of RCM budgeting as a structural process (Cekic, 
2010); (b) RCM’s impact on faculty workload (McBride, Neiman, & Johnson, 2000); and 
(c) RCM’s effect on graduation rates (Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2017). 
Cekic (2010) investigated RCM at Indiana University-Bloomington (IUB) to 
identify how faculty and administrators’ decision-making processes for budgeting 
changed after the implementation of RCM. The researcher used Bolman and Deal’s 
(2003) four organizational frames (i.e., structural frame, human resource frame, political 
frame, and symbolic frame). He found that interviewees aligned more closely with the 
structural frame, suggesting that RCM was more bureaucratic and policy-driven than 
driven by political and competitive considerations.  
McBride et al. (2000) investigated RCM at an academic-unit level (i.e., within a 
college/school), specifically to examine RCM in relation to faculty time and effort at 
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis’ (IUPUI) School of Nursing. They 
found that faculty allocated their time differently after RCM had been implemented 
(McBride et al., 2000). Finally, using panel data, Rutherford and Rabovsky (2017) 
examined the relationship between utilizing RCM on two outcomes: graduation rates and 
degree production at four-year public and private institutions. They found a positive 
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significant relationship between graduation rates and the use of RCM but did not find a 
significant relationship for degree production (Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2017).  
Despite inroads made by the aforementioned research studies, an examination of 
how, if at all, the utilization of RCM impacted costs at public research universities was 
still absent from the empirical literature. The results of this study provide insight into this 
inquiry.    
Summary of the Literature on Higher Education Costs 
 Unlike the paucity of empirical literature on RCM, the body of scholarship on 
higher education costs is vast and voluminous (Agasisti & Salerno, 2007; Brinkman & 
Leslie, 1986; Cohn, Rhine, & Santos, 1989; deGroot, McMahon, Volkwein, 1991; Doyle, 
2015; Johnes & Schwarzenberger, 2011; Koshal & Koshal, 1999; Laband & Lentz, 2003; 
Nelson & Hevert, 1992; Robst, 2001; Sav, 2004; Titus et al., 2017; Toutkoushian, 1999). 
Researchers have extensively theorized and empirically assessed the nature of costs in 
higher education (Baumol & Bowen, 1966; Bowen, 1980). Within these domains, 
scholars have provided insight into three broad lines of inquiry: (1) to explain why higher 
education costs rise faster than costs in other industries; (2) to identify opportunities for 
efficiencies within and across colleges and universities; and (3) to understand the 
relationship between revenues and costs among higher education institutions.  
The literature has revealed four major theories that undergird research into why 
higher education costs rise faster relative to costs in other industries: Cost Disease Theory 
(Baumol & Bowen, 1966), Revenue Theory of Costs (RTC) (Bowen, 1980), the 
Positional Arms Race Theory, and Principal-Agent Theory (PAT). Although each of 
these theories provides insight into cost increases in higher education, debates remain 
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ongoing regarding which one of these theories most closely describes why higher 
education costs continue to rise.  
In addition to the theoretical perspectives used to explain why higher education 
costs rise, the empirical literature has identified factors that contribute to cost increases in 
colleges and universities. Those factors include institutions' size, scope, level of 
instruction, academic program mix, revenues, and geographical/regional locations. 
Specifically, empirical studies have explored these determinants of costs and have 
elucidated opportunities for efficiencies in higher education by (a) identifying economies 
of scale, which are present if an increase in any output such as enrollment would result in 
a decrease in costs; (b) identifying economies of scope, which are present if producing 
two or more products (e.g. undergraduate and graduate education) jointly would decrease 
costs; and (c) assessing the extent to which colleges and universities are cost efficient, 
which estimates the minimum cost for producing a given level of outputs (Agasisti & 
Salerno, 2007; Brinkman, 1981; Brinkman & Leslie, 1986; Cohn et al., 1989; deGroot et 
al., 1991; Doyle, 2015; Johnes & Schwarzenberger, 2011; Koshal & Koshal, 1999; 
Koshal et al., 2001; Kuo & Ho, 2007; Laband & Lentz, 2003, 2004; Mamun, 2012; 
Nelson & Hevert, 1992; Robst, 2001; Sav, 2004; Titus, et al., 2017; Toutkoushian, 1999). 
Researchers (Cohn et al., 1989; deGroot et al., 1991; Koshal & Koshal, 1999; 
Koshal et al., 2001; Laband & Lentz, 2003; Nelson & Hevert, 1992; Sav, 2004; Titus et 
al., 2017; Toutkoushian, 1999) have generally found positive returns to scale, which 
suggests that colleges and universities could lower unit costs by increasing enrollment, 
for example. Additionally, researchers have also generally found positive returns to scope 
– that is, whether there are lower costs per unit when institutions increase the production 
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of multiple outputs simultaneously, such as research and undergraduate education (Cohn 
et al., 1989; Koshal & Koshal, 1999; Koshal et al., 2001; Laband & Lentz, 2003; Sav, 
2004; Toutkoushian, 1999).  
Scholars have also shown that costs vary by academic discipline (Agasisti & 
Salerno, 2007; Brinkman, 2000; deGroot et al., 1991; Johnes & Schwarzenberger, 2011; 
Kuo & Ho, 2007; Mamun, 2012; Sav, 2004), level of instruction (Brinkman, 1981; 
deGroot et al., 1991; Koshal & Koshal, 1999; Koshal et al., 2001; Laband & Lentz, 2003; 
Nelson & Hevert, 1992), revenue allocations (Leslie et al., 2012; Robst, 2001), and 
geographical location (Sav, 2004; Titus et al., 2017; Toutkoushian, 1999).  
Although scholars have provided significant insight into higher education costs, 
they have not explored how specific colleges and universities have responded to cost 
escalation via new policies or practices, such as RCM. Specifically, the extant literature 
examines costs broadly across hundreds of colleges and universities, such that few 
studies have explored institution-specific costs using smaller sample sizes. Small-sample 
studies may enable researchers to provide additional context around institutional practices 
such as RCM to show how specific colleges and universities have responded to rising 
costs. Only one study (Nelson & Hevert, 1992) investigated cost at a single institution 
(i.e., the University of Delaware). However, the scholars (Nelson & Hevert, 1992) did not 
provide significant context around the institution’s financial circumstances. Additionally, 
the scholars did not indicate how the university responded – for example, by 
implementing new policies – to address cost escalation. Several scholars (Cheslock, 
Ortagus, Umbricht, & Wymore, 2016; Titus et al., 2017; Toutkoushian, 1999) have noted 
that an investigation into decentralized budget models, such as RCM, is warranted given 
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RCM’s perceived implications on higher education costs. This study addressed this gap 
in the literature, specifically by examining RCM’s impact on total operating costs at two 
public research universities. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
Several national organizations and associations have encouraged more research 
on effective ways for universities to manage their financial resources. For example, the 
Lumina Foundation commissioned a series of papers that examined ways that colleges 
and universities could leverage and align their internal finances to incentivize and 
promote student success. Among the papers commissioned by the Lumina Foundation, 
Kosten (2016) explored the ways in which RCM could be used by colleges and 
universities to achieve the shared goals of their states, the institutions, and their students.  
Additionally, Askin and Shea (2016) of the National Association of College and 
University Business Officers (NACUBO) provided a comprehensive review of the 
financial constraints faced by many institutions. Askin and Shea (2016) called on the 
higher education community to consider new methods to manage their financial 
resources. Specifically, they noted: “If colleges and universities are to thrive, change 
must be proactive and strategic and match the pace of the rapidly evolving world around 
them” (Askin & Shea, 2016, p. 17). They indicated that some universities have 
considered RCM as a means to adapt to the changing financial picture (Askin & Shea, 
2016). However, an empirical investigation regarding whether RCM could positively 
impact an institution’s finances had not yet been conducted.  
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Given the financial landscape of public higher education regarding declining state 
support, escalating costs, rising tuition prices, as well as the recent attention and adoption 
of RCM as a strategy to minimize costs (among other goals), more empirical evidence is 
warranted. Therefore, in order to provide public policymakers and college and university 
administrators with insight regarding RCM’s effect on costs, research on the topic must 
be developed.  
 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of RCM on total operating costs 
at two public research universities in the United States. Specifically, this study is 
designed to uncover if, and to what extent, RCM as a budget model and management tool 
impacted operating costs at the University of New Hampshire and the University of 
Arizona. This study is guided by the following research question: 
- What is the impact of RCM on total operating costs at two public research 
universities in the United States?  
  
 Summary of the Research Design 
Summary of the Methodological Approach 
 This study utilizes a method called the synthetic control methodology (SCM) to 
address the research question. Specifically, SCM is a quantitative, data-driven method 
developed in economics (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie, Diamond, & 
Hainmueller, 2010, 2015) to estimate the causal effects of policies, programs, 
idiosyncratic events, or interventions. SCM was introduced into research by Abadie and 
23 
 
Gardeazabal (2003) to assess the effect of terrorism on economic growth in Basque 
Country. Since 2003, SCM has been used in several other economic studies (e.g., Abadie, 
Diamond, & Hainmueller, 2010, 2015; Adhikari, Duval, Hu, & Loungani, 2018; Barone 
& Moceti, 2014; Becker & Klobner, 2016; Biagi, Brandano, & Pulina, 2016) to 
investigate the economic impact of various policies. Additionally, SCM has been 
employed in public health (Krief, Grieve, Hangartner, Turner, Nikolova, & Sutton, 2016), 
criminal justice (Rydberg, McGarrell, Noris, & Circo, 2018), and higher education 
(Bonander, Jakobsson, Podesta, & Svensson, 2016; Hinrichs, 2012; Liu, 2015; Jaquette et 
al., 2018). A robust discussion and description of the methodology are contained in 
Chapter 3: Methodology. However, a brief summary of SCM is provided below. 
Generally, SCM aims to approximate the treatment effect of a given policy, 
program, or event using a data-driven statistical process. Specifically, the statistical 
process is first used to construct a control group (i.e., the group that did not experience or 
receive the policy, program, or intervention – known as the synthetic control unit). Next, 
the SCM statistical process estimates the treatment effects, if any, by comparing the post-
treatment outcome of the synthetic control unit to the post-treatment outcome of the 
treated unit (i.e., the unit that experienced the policy, program, or intervention). The 
purpose of the synthetic control unit varies between the pretreatment period of the study 
(i.e., the period before the treatment occurred) and the post-treatment period of the study 
(i.e., the period after the treatment occurred). Specifically, in the pretreatment period, the 
synthetic control unit is used primarily to resemble the treated unit (i.e., possess nearly 
the same characteristics). In the post-treatment period of the study, the purpose of the 
synthetic control unit is to estimate the post-treatment counterfactual. The counterfactual 
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is defined as the post-treatment outcome of the treated unit in the absence of the 
treatment (Krief et al., 2016). The counterfactual is used to assess treatment effects (if 
any) by subtracting the post-treatment outcome (i.e., the outcome variable) of the treated 
unit from the post-treatment outcome of the counterfactual. If there is a difference 
between the outcome of the treated unit and the estimated outcome of the synthetic 
control unit (i.e., the post-treatment counterfactual), then there is a treatment effect. 
However, if there is no difference between the outcome of the treated unit and the 
estimated outcome of the synthetic control unit, then there is no treatment effect. An 
illustrative example from a prior study on RCM using SCM is described next to put SCM 
in context. 
Jaquette et al. (2018) utilized SCM to examine the impact (i.e., treatment effect) 
of RCM on tuition revenue at four public research universities: Kent State University, 
University of Florida, Iowa State University, and the University of Cincinnati. 
Specifically, Jaquette et al. (2018) estimated a synthetic control unit (i.e., control group) 
and counterfactual for each of the four universities in the study. For example, using the 
SCM statistical procedure (discussed further in Chapter 3: Methodology), the authors 
generated a synthetic control unit for Kent State University (hereafter called synthetic 
Kent State) by first identifying a pool of similar universities that had not implemented 
RCM and then by choosing which of those non-treated universities best resembled Kent 
State University in the pretreatment period of the study (i.e., prior to Kent State’s 
implementation of RCM in the academic year 2008-09). Synthetic Kent State was 
composed of five universities that had not implemented RCM: Ohio University, Western 
Michigan University, University of North Texas, Miami University-Oxford, and Purdue 
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University-Main Campus. After Jaquette et al. (2018) estimated synthetic Kent State, 
they approximated the post-treatment counterfactual on tuition revenue (i.e., the 
estimation of what would have occurred at Kent State University in the absence of 
implementing RCM) to determine the treatment effects. The authors revealed that tuition 
revenue had significantly increased each year after RCM had been implemented at Kent 
State. The process for assessing the treatment effects was done by comparing the tuition 
revenue of Kent State to the estimated tuition revenue of synthetic Kent State. This 
procedure was conducted for the remaining three universities in Jaquette et al.’s (2018) 
study.  
SCM was employed in this study in a similar manner as it was used by Jaquette 
and associates (2018). However, this study focused on total operating costs at two public 
research universities. SCM was deemed the most appropriate method because it allows 
researchers to estimate a post-treatment counterfactual in small-sample studies when 
other quasi-experimental methods fall short (Abadie et al., 2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 
2015; Jaquette et al., 2018). Researchers have used other techniques to estimate policy 
effects, including the difference-in-differences (DID) approach, ordinary least squares 
regression, propensity score matching, and instrumental variables regression. The 
limitations of these methods will be discussed in Chapter 3: Methodology. However, 
generally, these methods are inappropriate for a study on RCM for several reasons. For 
example, each of these methods estimates an average treatment effect across several 
units. In contrast, the SCM can estimate actual treatment effects across one unit at a time. 
This is beneficial for small-sample studies that examine policies, programs, and 
interventions that may not be widespread across multiple units (e.g., institutions, 
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organizations, states, etc.). Additionally, DID (and the other methods listed above) are 
limited (among other reasons noted in Chapter 3: Methodology) because they do not 
provide the researcher with an indication of the extent to which the estimated control 
group resembles the treated unit (in the pretreatment period). The SCM, however, 
provides the researcher with information on the extent to which the estimated control 
group (i.e., the synthetic control unit) resembles the treated unit. Additionally, SCM 
provides the researcher with data on how well each of the variables in the study help to 
predict the outcome variable under investigation. These features of SCM are important 
from a methodological perspective because they provide greater clarity and confidence 
when assessing treatment effects. (A more robust discussion on the appropriateness of 
SCM is discussed in Chapter 3: Methodology.) 
Summary Descriptions of the Institutions in the Study 
 This study examines the effect of RCM on total operating costs at two public 
research universities: the University of New Hampshire (UNH) and the University of 
Arizona (UofA).  These public research universities were selected for several reasons: 
First, as will be described below, leaders of each of these institutions cited (among 
others) that their motivation to implement RCM was to incentivize cost minimization 
across their respective institutions. Because universities that use RCM have cited 
different reasons for implementing it, the intent of university leaders at UNH and UofA 
to implement RCM as a means to minimize costs was a key factor in selecting them for 
this study. Secondly, these institutions were selected because there was adequate public 
data available with regard to how UNH and UofA operate their RCM models. 
Additionally, there was sufficient public record available on each of the institutions’ 
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websites (e.g., downloadable reports, manuals, and personal communications) to 
understand the context in which these universities operated when they implemented 
RCM. An adequate public record was not available on the websites or in the records of 
other universities that were considered for this study. Third, as illustrated in Table A2, 
each of these institutions has different levels of experience with RCM – specifically, 
UNH adopted RCM in the year 2000 and UofA adopted RCM in 2015. Fourth, UNH and 
UofA implement RCM differently – that is, they employ different funding formulas and 
allocation rules. An investigation of RCM at two very different universities was 
important because it would create more knowledge of how RCM manifests itself across 
multiple campuses. Finally, the synthetic control method (the method used in this study) 
allows the researcher to assess the treatment effects of one unit (i.e., university) at a time. 
Therefore, the number of cases that are selected by the researcher is inconsequential (i.e., 
there is no minimum or maximum number required). 
University of New Hampshire 
The University of New Hampshire (UNH) is a public research university located 
in Durham, New Hampshire. UNH is the state flagship institution – enrolling over 13,000 
undergraduates and over 2,000 graduate students across 13 colleges and schools in 2018 
(UNH Facts and Figures, 2019). Additionally, UNH manages a nearly $600 million 
operating budget and offers associate’s degrees, baccalaureate degrees, and graduate 
degrees across 200 academic programs (UNH Facts and Figures, 2019). 
With regard to RCM, after an 18-month exploration study was conducted by the 
RCM Steering Committee, President Joan Leitzel furnished a memo on January 14, 2000, 
to the campus community announcing her decision to implement RCM by July 1, 2000.  
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President Leitzel cited five reasons for deciding to move the campus to RCM. Among 
them, she noted, “[t]here will be stronger incentives for cost effectiveness and revenue 
generation” (Joan Leitzel, personal communication, January 14, 2000). Indeed, between 
1980 and 1999 (the year prior to RCM implementation), total operating costs increased 
by 71% (after adjusting for inflation in 1999 dollars). Thus, the leaders of UNH sought, 
in part, to control costs as the institution became more reliant on tuition revenue versus 
public funding from the state.  
 Since year one of RCM implementation (i.e., the year 2000), the UNH’s RCM 
model and funding formulas have been reviewed and modified at least three times: in 
2006, 2009, and 2015. This study focuses on UNH’s original funding formula to analyze 
RCM’s effect on total operating costs (see Table A2). (Further discussion regarding the 
decision to focus on UNH’s original RCM model is contained in Chapter 3: 
Methodology). On the revenue side, the UNH’s original RCM funding formula allocated 
the majority of undergraduate tuition revenue to the academic units (83%). Fifteen 
percent of undergraduate tuition revenue was allocated to the Division of Continuing 
Education and two percent was distributed to the library. Graduate tuition revenue was 
similarly allocated with 98% going to the academic unit and two percent to the library. 
Finally, revenue from state appropriations were used to fully fund the support units first 
and the remaining funds were distributed to the library (20%), to the academic and 
research units (30%), and the remaining funds were used to support the “hold harmless” 
fund.  
As it relates to costs, academic units at UNH were responsible for their own 
(direct) expenses (e.g., faculty/staff salaries, fringe benefits, equipment, travel, etc.) under 
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the original RCM formula. The indirect expenses incurred by the academic units were 
paid using two assessments: an academic affairs assessment “tax” and a general 
assessment “tax” to central administration. These assessments were based on 50% of 
personnel expenses and 50% of overall revenue. Lastly, the direct and indirect expenses 
of the support centers were paid for using revenue from state appropriations, as noted 
previously.  
University of Arizona 
The University of Arizona (UofA) is a public research university established in 
1885 and serves as the state of Arizona’s flagship university. In 2018, UofA enrolled over 
45,000 undergraduate and graduate students across 40 colleges and schools, including 
two hospitals (University of Arizona, 2019). Moreover, in 2018, the campus managed a 
nearly $2.4 billion operating budget (University of Arizona, 2019).  
The changing financial picture at UofA prompted administrators to consider 
RCM. Specifically, between 2003 and 2014 (the year before RCM was implemented), 
UofA experienced a 34% decline in state appropriations (after adjusting for inflation in 
2014 dollars). Despite the decline in state appropriations, undergraduate enrollment 
increased by 16% and graduate enrollment rose by eight percent between 2003 and 2014. 
Moreover, total expenses rose by nearly 30% between 2003 and 2014 – pacing at nearly 
the same rate as revenue growth during this period. In the fall of 2012, the UofA provost 
convened a steering committee to investigate the feasibility of implementing RCM. 
Between fall 2012 and fall 2013, the steering committee met to develop the guiding 
principles for RCM and identify key personnel and campus units to ensure RCM’s 
success. By the spring of 2014, the UofA began testing components of RCM on a small 
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scale. In the fall of 2014, UofA operated concurrent budgets – one using the old system 
and the other using a prototype of RCM. After testing had been completed, the steering 
committee formally recommended to the president of UofA that RCM be fully 
implemented beginning July 1, 2015.  
 The UofA’s RCM funding formulas regarding revenue are standard. 
Undergraduate tuition revenue is pooled and then allocated based on credit hours taught 
(i.e., 75% of all undergraduate tuition revenue is allocated to the academic units based on 
how many credit hours are taught). The remaining 25% of undergraduate tuition revenue 
is allocated to the academic units based on the number of students enrolled in academic 
majors housed by those units. Graduate tuition revenue follows the student – specifically, 
it is allocated based on credit hours (i.e., 75% of a graduate student’s tuition dollars are 
allocated to the academic units that provide instruction to that student) and major (i.e., the 
remaining 25% of a graduate student’s tuition dollars are allocated to the academic unit 
that houses the student’s major). Lastly regarding revenues, state appropriations are the 
primary source of the subvention pool and is used to cover the expenses of responsibility 
centers that may experience a shortfall.  
 On the cost side, responsibility centers at the UofA are also fully responsible for 
their expenses. Nearly 31% of undergraduate tuition revenue is used to pay the costs of 
support centers, 12.38% of graduate tuition is used to pay for support center expenses, 
and 2.75% is taken from both graduate and undergraduate tuition to pay for the Strategic 
Initiative Fund and facilities fees.  
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Summary of the Theoretical Frameworks 
This study is guided by two theoretical frameworks: Principal-Agent Theory 
(PAT) and Bowen’s (1980) Revenue Theory of Cost (RTC). PAT has been used by 
economists, political scientists, and higher education researchers to explain the 
contractual relationship between two or more entities (Cheslock et al., 2016; Jaquette et 
al., 2018; Lane & Kivisto, 2008; Martin, 2011; Tandberg et al., 2017; Titus, 2009). 
Specifically, PAT posits that a principal contracts the services of one or multiple agents 
to perform duties in which the principal does not have the time, knowledge, skill, or 
desire to perform him/her/itself (Lane & Kivisto, 2008). PAT is used to provide a 
conceptual framework on the principal-agent relationship between central administration 
(i.e., the principal) and deans (i.e., the agents) at two public research universities that 
adopted RCM – consistent with previous research by Jaquette et al. (2018). This 
dissertation study, unlike Jaquette et al. (2018), used PAT to explain the principal-agent 
relationship between central administration and deans with regard to RCM’s impact on 
costs.  
RTC posits that colleges and universities function with the goal of maximizing 
their prestige, excellence, and influence (Bowen, 1980). To carry out their goals with 
regard to prestige maximization, RTC suggests that institutions of higher education raise 
as much money as they can, and then spend all of the money they raise (Bowen, 1980). 
Moreover, because there is no discernable way to identify when an institution has 
maximized its prestige, excellence, or influence, Bowen (1980) further posits that 
spending is incessant. This further suggests two notions: (a) colleges and universities are 
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not cost minimizers; and (b) cost escalation in higher education is the result of 
institutional choice 
RTC is utilized in this study to theoretically frame the impact of revenues on costs 
as shown by previous research (Leslie, Slaughter, Taylor, & Zhang, 2012). Specifically, 
this study incorporated variables on college and university revenue sources because RTC 
suggests that there is a positive relationship between revenues and costs.  
PAT and RTC were selected for at least two reasons. First, previous research on 
RCM by Jaquette et al. (2018) has shown that PAT is an effective perspective to explain 
the relationship between central administration and responsibility center leaders (i.e., 
deans). Secondly, previous research on RTC (e.g., Leslie et al., 2012) illustrates that 
college and university revenues can impact costs (i.e., how colleges and universities 
spend their money). Therefore, PAT is used to theoretically frame the central 
administration-dean relationship and RTC provides a framework for the inclusion of 
revenue variables in this study. 
Description of the Data and Variables 
  The data and variables in this study are adopted from the extant literature on 
higher education costs which will be further described in Chapter 3: Methodology. To 
address the research question, I developed and used two institution-level panel datasets 
(one for each university in the study). Data were extracted from the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). As illustrated in Table A3, the outcome 
variable is total operating costs and is defined as the sum of expenditures on academic 
administration, institutional administration, instruction, and student services. Total 
operating costs was selected as the outcome variable for at least two reasons: (1) it 
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represents the finances over which university administrators possess the greatest control 
year-over-year (i.e., long-term expenses, such as the payment of debt, are not included 
because such agreements do not fluctuate annually nor do administrators possess 
significant control over them); and (2) RCM seeks to incentivize cost minimization 
among administrators. Thus, total operating costs is an appropriate variable to illustrate 
if, or to what extent, RCM affected the costs in which college and university 
administrators possessed the most control.   
The predictor variables in the study have been adopted from previous research on 
higher education costs. Specifically, these empirical studies (Archibald & Feldman, 2018; 
Brinkman, 1981, 2000, 2006; Cohn, et al., 1989; deGroot et al., 1991; Doyle, 2015; 
Laband & Lentz, 2003; Robst, 2001; Sav, 2004; Titus et al., 2017) have revealed several 
determinants of costs (e.g., institutional size, institution scope, undergraduate versus 
graduate education costs, academic program mix, and revenues) that were used in this 
study. (Further discussion regarding determinants of costs in higher education is in 
Chapter 2: Literature Review.) Specifically, to represent scale (size), scope, and level of 
instruction, the following variables were gleaned from previous research: full-time 
equivalent undergraduate enrollment, graduate headcount, the number of full-time 
faculty, research expenditures, and the average faculty salary. To represent academic 
program mix, the proportion of students graduating with degrees in science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) out of the total number of graduates was included. 
Additionally, to theoretically frame the RTC, the following revenue variables were 
included: tuition and fee revenue, state appropriations, private gifts, grants, and contracts, 
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the proportion of tuition and fee revenue out of total revenue, and the proportion of state 
appropriation revenue out of total revenue.  
The choice of predictor variables was motivated by two factors: (1) the existing 
literature on higher education cost as described in Chapter 2: Literature Review 
(Archibald & Feldman, 2018; Brinkman, 1981, 2000, 2006; Cohn, Rhine, & Santos, 
1989; deGroot, McMahon, & Volkwein, 1991; Doyle, 2001; Hillman, 2012; Jaquette et 
al., 2018; Laband & Lentz, 2003; Robst, 2001; Sav, 2007; Titus, et al., 2017); and (2) the 
SCM allows the researcher to select predictors of the outcome variable (i.e., in this case, 
total operating costs). Specifically, variables that do not possess strong predictive power 
are assigned a lower weight by the SCM. This feature of SCM will be further discussed 
in Chapter 3: Methodology.   
Sample Period 
 The data and variables listed above and in Table A3 were used to generate one 
synthetic control unit for each institution in this study. In order to generate a synthetic 
control unit, Abadie et al. (2015) suggest using a long pre-treatment period for two 
reasons: (1) to estimate a synthetic control unit that closely resembles the treated unit 
during the pretreatment period; (2) to estimate a reliable counterfactual in the 
posttreatment period.  
With regard to generating a synthetic control unit for UNH (i.e., called 
“Synthetic” UNH), data were analyzed across a sample period between 1989-90 and 
2004-05. The pre-treatment period begins in 1989-90 (the first year of consistent and 
available data) and ends in 1998-1999 (i.e., the year prior to RCM implementation at 
UNH). The post-treatment period (i.e., each year after RCM implementation) is five 
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years. I selected a five-year post-treatment period for two reasons. First, it is consistent 
with prior research (Hearn et al., 2006; Jaquette et al., 2018). Hearn et al. (2006) and 
Jaquette et al. (2018) examined the impact of RCM between one and five years after it 
had been implemented at the institutions in their respective studies. Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, the UNH reviewed and modified its original RCM formulas 
and policies after the fifth year. Therefore, in order to capture the initial impact of RCM 
on costs, I evaluated the post-treatment effects of RCM on total operating costs in 2000-
01, 2001-02, 2002-03, 2003-04, and 2004-05. 
The University of Arizona implemented RCM in 2015. Thus, the RCM model is 
relatively new and does not have many post-treatment observations due to data 
availability. The overall sample period begins in 1989-90 (the first year of consistent and 
available data) and ends in 2017-18 (the most recent and available data in IPEDS). The 
pre-treatment period extends from 1989-90 and ends in 2013-14 (i.e., the year prior to 
RCM implementation). The treatment effects were evaluated for three years: in 2015-16, 
2016-17, and 2017-18. Three years of post-treatment analysis was sufficient to generate 
robust results.   
Limitations 
Although this study sheds light on RCM’s effect on total operating costs at two 
public research universities in the United States, there are at least three limitations worth 
noting. First, RCM incentivizes (among other goals) cost minimization at the academic 
unit level (e.g., schools, colleges, and departments) through the use of funding formulas 
and devolved financial responsibility (Curry et al., 2013; Strauss & Curry, 2002; Whalen, 
1991). However, data at this level are unavailable. Therefore, this study is limited in that 
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it cannot discern how RCM might have impacted costs at the individual colleges or 
schools within the universities in the study because data are reported in the aggregate 
(i.e., at the institution level). Thus, I assumed implicitly that the impact of RCM on costs 
is in the aggregate as well. However, the results (as will be discussed in Chapter 4: 
Results) show that this may have not been the case.  
In addition to data availability, this study is limited by its definition of RCM 
implementation. Specifically, I refer to institutions that have fully implemented RCM 
under a formal review process commissioned by the president or provost of the university 
– several of which are listed in Table A1. However, as described above, the SCM 
technique requires the researcher to identify a donor pool of untreated units in order to 
generate a viable synthetic control unit. Because there is no central database of 
institutions that use RCM, it is possible that the donor pools that were used to generate a 
synthetic control unit for each of the universities in this study included some institutions 
that use RCM. To mitigate the possibility of including institutions that have adopted 
RCM in the donor pool, I used the list of RCM universities developed by Curry et al. 
(2013), adopted by Jaquette et al. (2018), and supplemented with reports and websites for 
universities that have adopted RCM (see Table A1).  
Third, this study is limited because it only examined total operating costs at two 
public research universities. There are a number of other public and private universities 
that have not received scholarly attention (Hearn et al., 2006; Lang, 2002; Jaquette et al., 
2018). Thus, there is considerable opportunity for research across more universities – 
public and private – to better generalize the findings on RCM’s impact. Due to this 
limitation, the results are not generalized beyond the institutions in the study.  
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Significance of the Study 
Summary of the Results 
The results of this study show that RCM positively impacted total operating costs 
at both the UNH and UofA. With regard to UNH, the results of the synthetic control 
analysis reveal that RCM positively impacted total operating costs between 2001 and 
2005. However, the estimated p-values across the post-treatment period were not low 
enough to infer causality (p-value ≤ 0.10). Additionally, with regard to the UofA, the 
results causally infer that RCM increased total operating costs after the first year of 
implementation. Specifically, total operating costs were $108.51 million higher than they 
would have been if RCM had not been implemented (p-value ≤ 0.10). Additionally, the 
results show that RCM positively impacted costs in the second and third years after RCM 
had been implemented but the p-values did not conclude that RCM had a causal effect on 
total operating costs in those years (p-value ≤ 0.10).  
Summary of the Contributions to Research  
Despite the limitations described above, this study contributes to research in 
several ways worth noting. First, this study is the first to bridge the gap between the RCM 
literature and the higher education cost literature by providing empirical insight regarding 
RCM’s effect on total operating costs. Second, this study contributes to the use of theory 
in the RCM literature because it incorporates two theoretical frameworks to guide the 
research question: the principal-agent theory (PAT) and Bowen's (1980) revenue theory 
of cost (RTC). Only two previous studies (Cekic, 2010; Jaquette et al., 2018) from the 
RCM literature were theoretically grounded. Third, this study contributes to the literature 
because it overcame several methodological limitations of previous research (Lang, 2002; 
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Hearn et al., 2006; Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2017) by employing SCM to assess causal 
effects of RCM’s impact. Specifically, the use of SCM in this study did not rely on 
qualitative methods to describe the quantitative effects of RCM (this notion is further 
described in Chapter 2: Literature Review). Additionally, the use of SCM in this study 
went beyond descriptive statistics (Hearn et al., 2006) and regression analysis 
(Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2017) which inferred correlation rather than causality to draw 
conclusions.  
Summary of the Contributions to Practice 
In addition to research contributions, this study contributes to practice. Prior to 
this study, no such research existed regarding RCM’s impact on costs, and several pro-
RCM publications (Curry et al., 2013; Hanover Research, 2008; Strauss & Curry, 2002; 
Whalen, 1991) relied heavily on descriptive statistics and anecdotal evidence to make 
claims about RCM’s utility. The results of this study – specifically that RCM positively 
impacted total operating costs – balance previous anecdotal claims by providing 
empirical insight on RCM at UNH and UofA to guide future decision-making. More 
broadly, this study provides insight regarding RCM’s effect on total operating costs using 
two examples (i.e., UNH and UofA) to public policymakers and university administrators 
that may be considering RCM. This is especially important given substantial declines in 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of Responsibility Center 
Management (RCM) on total operating costs at two public research universities in the 
United States. Specifically, this study was designed to uncover if RCM as a budget model 
and management approach helped college administrators at two public research 
universities achieve one of RCM’s core goals of minimizing costs. This study is guided 
by the following research question: What is the impact of RCM on costs at two public 
research universities in the United States?  
To address the research question, this study draws from two literature domains: 
literature on RCM and literature on costs in higher education and uses two theoretical 
frameworks: principal-agent theory and Bowen’s (1980) revenue theory of cost. 
Additionally, this study employs a quantitative technique known as the synthetic control 
methodology (SCM) to address the research question and provide causal inference. This 
chapter discusses and critiques the extant literature on RCM and higher education costs 
and describes how the theoretical frameworks are used to address the research question. 
This chapter is divided into four major sections: (1) Scholarship on RCM; (2) Scholarship 
on Higher Education Cost; (3) Gaps and Limitations in Prior Research; and (4) 




Scholarship on RCM 
Empirical Literature on RCM 
The scholarly literature on RCM is scant and unconnected to any systematic 
investigation. Specifically, scholars have not yet developed a comprehensive research 
agenda to examine RCM’s impact. As a consequence, only two broad findings exist: (1) 
colleges and universities have primarily implemented RCM to enhance their financial 
positions (i.e., to generate additional revenue and minimize costs); and (2) institutions 
have realized mixed experiences (i.e., positive and negative) with RCM. Additionally, 
due to the dearth of RCM scholarship, other findings regarding RCM have been 
institution-specific and unconnected to any systematic investigation of its impact. These 
findings include perceptions of RCM budgeting as a structural process (Cekic, 2010); 
RCM’s impact on faculty workload (McBride et al., 2000); and RCM’s impact on 
graduation rates (Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2017). The various research findings regarding 
RCM’s impact will be discussed below.  
Motivations for Adopting RCM: Generate Revenue and Minimize Costs 
At least two empirical studies (i.e., Deering & Sá, 2014; Jaquette et al., 2018) and 
several non-empirical publications (Curry et al., 2013; Strauss & Curry, 2002; Whalen, 
1991) have indicated that RCM has been adopted primarily as a means to increase 
revenues and decrease (or control) costs. Among public research universities specifically, 
RCM has been adopted in reaction to declining state appropriations to higher education 
(Deering & Sá, 2014; Jaquette et al., 2018; Lang, 2002). For example, in a recent 
empirical study, Jaquette et al. (2018) examined the effect of RCM on tuition revenue at 
four public research universities: Kent State University (KSU), Iowa State University 
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(ISU), University of Florida (UF), and University of Cincinnati (UC). The scholars 
sought to address at least two research objectives: first, to identify why the administrators 
at each of these institutions intended to implement RCM; and second, to reveal the extent 
to which RCM impacted tuition revenue (Jaquette et al., 2018).  
Using publicly available documents, reports, and website content, the scholars 
found that RCM was adopted for similar reasons at each of the institutions in the study. 
Specifically, administrators at these universities cited the need to increase revenue and 
minimize costs as a result of declining state funding. ISU adopted RCM in 2008-09 after 
several years of declining state appropriations, decreased enrollment, and lower tuition 
revenue. The university president at ISU stated that the aim of RCM was to incentivize 
revenue generation and cost reduction (Jaquette et al., 2018). KSU adopted RCM in 
2008-09 also as a result of state budget cuts, declining enrollment (Jaquette et al., 2018). 
Among other goals, such as to improve decision making, the president of UC noted that a 
primary goal for implementing RCM was to generate revenue as a consequence of state 
and federal funding decreases. UC adopted RCM in 2009-10. Lastly, the president at UF 
indicated that UF needed to become more self-sustaining since the state had experienced 
several years of declining funding. UF fully adopted RCM by 2010-11.  
Further analysis was conducted by Jaquette et al. (2018) to uncover the extent to 
which RCM impacted tuition revenue at each of the four institutions. The scholars 
utilized the synthetic control methodology (SCM) to conduct this analysis. The SCM has 
been used in small-sample case studies to quantitatively assess the effect, if any, of an 
event, policy, or treatment. (This method will be described briefly below and in greater 
detail in Chapter 3: Methodology.)  
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Using the SCM procedure, Jaquette et al. (2018) constructed a panel dataset using 
data extracted from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). 
Tuition revenue was the outcome variable. The independent variables included data on 
known research variables that affect tuition revenue, including undergraduate full-time 
enrollment, graduate headcount, undergraduate resident tuition price, and revenue from 
various sources (e.g., state appropriations, state grants, and contracts revenue, private 
grants and contracts, and auxiliary enterprises). Additionally, the researchers included 
cost variables (i.e., instructional expenditures, research expenditures, academic affairs 
and student support, institutional support, and auxiliary expenditures). Lastly, Jaquette 
and associates included variables to account for institution selectivity (e.g., 2004 Barron’s 
selectivity and institutional discount rate), and nonresident tuition revenue using 
undergraduate nonresident tuition price and the percent of nonresident freshmen. 
 Jaquette et al. (2018) found a positive relationship between RCM and tuition 
revenue at ISU, KSU, and UC. The scholars showed that by 2013-14, RCM had increased 
tuition revenue by nearly $44 million at ISU. Similarly, the researchers found that KSU 
had increased tuition revenue by $34 million - three years after implementing RCM. UC 
increased tuition revenue by $45 million by 2013-14. However, the authors did not find 
that RCM had significantly impacted tuition revenue at UF.  
Jaquette et al. 's (2018) study not only documented institutions’ motivations for 
adopting RCM but also became the first study to evidence that RCM can have a positive 
impact on tuition revenue. Previous studies (as will be described below) have either failed 
to use appropriate methods, such as SCM or have not causally analyzed RCM’s effect on 
other financial outcomes. The results associated with this study, while not generalizable, 
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have provided significant insight into RCM across multiple cases – specifically, the four 
universities in the study. Additional merits regarding this study will be discussed below.  
Deering and Sá (2014) investigated institutions’ motivations for adopting RCM at 
three public, Canadian universities: the University of Toronto (UT), the University of 
Lethbridge (UL), and Queen’s University (QU). The scholars analyzed institutional 
documents and interviewed 31 senior university leaders and faculty. Overall, the authors 
revealed that the adoption of RCM was a strategic decision at these universities. 
Specifically, several interviewees indicated that RCM was adopted in response to years 
of financial constraints experienced by the institutions in the study (Deering & Sá, 2014).  
For example, QU – which enrolled over 20,000 students and oversaw an operating 
budget greater than $400 million – experienced enrollment growth between 2001 and 
2011. Specifically, enrollment grew by 32% during that period (Deering & Sá, 2014). As 
a result, QU’s student aid expenditures had grown by 40% between 2001 and 2011. 
However, government support to QU had only grown by eight percent. Thus, the 
administrators at QU noted that they implemented RCM in 2013 in an effort to 
incentivize cost containment and revenue growth since government support continued to 
decline (Deering & Sá, 2014). 
Similarly, a senior administrator at UT – which operated three campuses and 
enrolled over 80,000 undergraduate and graduate students in 2006 – indicated that RCM 
was necessary to incentivize discipline with regard to financial responsibility. This was 
also due to declining government resources (Deering & Sá, 2014).   
Lastly, UL maintained a $162 million budget, managed three campuses, and 
enrolled approximately 8,200 graduate and undergraduate students by 2012-13. UL 
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adopted RCM in 1994 after the provincial government of Alberta cut university budgets.  
A senior leader at UL discussed that RCM was adopted to generate revenue and to 
increase efficiency. One academic dean indicated the future of UL would have been 
doubtful if RCM had not been implemented (Deering & Sá, 2014). 
Despite evidence showing that these Canadian universities selected RCM in 
response to financial funding pressures, Deering and Sá (2014) did not investigate if 
RCM made a difference in revenue growth or cost containment. Several senior university 
leaders and deans believed that RCM helped to improve each of their institutions’ 
financial footing. However, the study would have been strengthened if the authors 
analyzed whether RCM had positively impacted each institutions’ finances.    
Mixed Experiences with RCM  
Although some senior university leaders have sought and successfully 
implemented RCM to improve their institutions’ financial positions (Deering & Sá, 2014; 
Jaquette et al., 2018), some universities have realized mixed experiences with RCM.  
For example, in an earlier study on RCM at the University of Toronto (UT), Lang 
(2002) provided a comprehensive historical account of UT’s experience with RCM. By 
the late 1990s, UT operated three campuses, enrolled nearly 52,000 students, and 
employed 3,100 faculty and 3,600 staff members. In his analysis of university documents, 
reports, and internal reviews, Lang concluded that UT’s experience with RCM was 
mixed.  
On one hand, the university experienced several successes with regard to RCM. 
For example, by the year 2000, UT had implemented RCM to operate many self-funded 
programs (Lang, 2002). These programs included: an executive masters of business 
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administration program, a doctor of pharmacy program, a social work diploma program, 
and two graduate-level accounting and financial mathematics programs (Lang, 2002). 
Lang (2002) also noted that UT also was able to operate an elementary and high school 
after RCM was implemented.  
On the other hand, despite these successes, there were examples where RCM was 
unsuccessful at UT. For example, Lang (2002) indicated that UT had deployed RCM to 
UT-Scarborough (UTS) – one of UT’s three campuses. UT administrators sought for 
UTS to operate independently – that is, to be self-sustaining similar to the master’s 
programs mentioned above. UTS began the process of transitioning to RCM in 1993 and 
fully adopted RCM by 1997. As noted by Lang, “success would be measured in UT-
Scarborough’s ability to continue to break even and to generate net revenue, either by 
reducing costs or by increasing income” (Lang, 2002, p. 124). In an effort to generate 
more revenue, Lang found that UTS had expanded enrollment in several of its programs. 
Based on the RCM funding formulas, UTS received more tuition revenue as enrollment 
increased. However, by the end of the 1999-2000 fiscal year – two years after RCM had 
been fully implemented – UTS had accumulated a $5.5 million debt (Lang, 2002).  
Lang (2002) offered at least two reasons why UTS experienced the $5.5 million 
debt after RCM had been implemented. First, UTS’s budget projections were solely 
based on increases in enrollment – specifically, UTS administrators assumed that the 
increases in enrollment in certain programs would be coupled with additional tuition 
revenue and government revenue. However, the campus received a smaller share of 
government appropriations in the fiscal years following RCM adoption, although the 
scholar did not quantify the decrease in government support. He surmised that UTS’s 
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budget forecast for additional government revenue was too generous. However, it is 
difficult to discern the variance between what UTS had budgeted with regard to revenue 
and what was actually received since these data points are not provided.    
 Secondly, Lang (2002) speculated that UTS administrators, in pursuit of more 
revenue via increases in enrollment, may have underestimated the costs (direct and 
indirect) associated with expanding their programs. Specifically, the author suggested 
that the accumulation of debt at UTS was a consequence of not accounting for cost 
increases related to program expansion. He concluded the study with several implications 
for policy and practice. Chiefly among them, he noted the need for administrators to 
understand the cost implications of enrollment increases (Lang, 2002). 
Despite revealing both positive and negative aspects of RCM at UT and UTS, 
Lang’s (2002) study is limited in at least one critical way worth noting. Specifically, 
Lang (2002) noted that UTS had accumulated a $5.5 million debt two years after RCM 
had been fully implemented. However, Lang did not conduct a quantitative or causal 
analysis to show that the $5.5 million debt was a result of implementing RCM. This casts 
doubt on whether, and to what extent, RCM negatively impacted UTS. The study would 
have been strengthened if the author used an appropriate method to support that finding.  
Hearn, Lewis, Kallsen, Holdsworth, and Jones (2006) explored the impact of 
RCM at the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities (UMTC), a large public research 
university that implemented RCM in 1997. This study incorporated qualitative and 
quantitative data and analysis to address at least three research objectives. First, Hearn et 
al. (2006) sought to elucidate the extent to which college-level enrollment changed post-
RCM implementation. Second, the authors explored the extent to which the number of 
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credit hours taught by each college changed after RCM was implemented. Third, the 
researchers investigated how academic deans viewed RCM after it was implemented.  
With regard to the first two research objectives, Hearn et al. (2006) analyzed the 
percentage changes in college-level enrollment and credit hours taught between 1997-98 
and 2000-01. The scholars concluded that RCM impacted academic units differently and 
revealed several results worth noting. First, regarding college-level enrollment, the 
researchers showed that some colleges within UMTC realized increases in enrollment 
after RCM was implemented (e.g., the College of Agriculture, College of Public Affairs, 
and the College of Education); however, some other academic units did not increase 
enrollment after RCM was implemented. Thus, Hearn et al. (2006) noted that RCM 
created “winners” and “losers.”  
Second, consistent with enrollment increases, some colleges experienced 
increases in the number of credit hours taught while other colleges experienced declines 
in credit hours taught (Hearn et al., 2006). For example, the number of credit hours taught 
by the College of Agriculture increased by nearly 98% between 1997-98 and 2000-01 
while the number of credit hours taught by the medical school decreased by 
approximately 18% during the same period of time (Hearn et al., 2006).  
Third, Hearn et al., (2006) estimated the average bivariate correlation of 
enrollment and operating revenue between 1993-94 and 1996-97 (i.e., pre-RCM 
implementation) and compared it to the average bivariate correlation of enrollment and 
operating revenue between 1997-98 and 1999-2000 (i.e., post-RCM implementation). 
The researchers found that the average bivariate correlation had increased from 0.92 
(before RCM implementation) to 0.95 (after RCM implementation) (Hearn et al., 2006). 
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While this finding suggests that there is a very high correlation between enrollment and 
revenue, it does not conclusively signify that RCM caused revenue or enrollment to 
increase. The scholars appropriately addressed this concern by cautioning readers 
regarding its interpretation. 
Lastly, with regard to the third research objective, Hearn et al. (2006) found that 
deans generally favored RCM. Indeed, each of the three deans noted that they favored 
RCM over the incremental budget model UMTC maintained previously. Additionally, the 
deans indicated that RCM provided a clear accounting of budgetary issues regarding 
revenues and cost, which helped them implement academic reforms (Hearn et al., 2006). 
Deans also reported that RCM created awareness of the cost implications of their 
colleges’ activities (Hearn et al., 2006). However, despite several successes, deans 
expressed concerns regarding RCM’s impact on the overall university’s mission. 
Additionally, the deans indicated that they were unaware of how or to what extent RCM 
impacted the university’s effectiveness and efficiency (Hearn et al., 2006). 
Hearn et al.’s (2006) study is limited in at least two ways worth noting. First, 
Hearn et al.’s (2006) use of descriptive analysis was inadequate to investigate the extent 
to which RCM impacted student enrollment and the number of credit hours taught across 
the colleges at UMTC. Specifically, the researchers did not employ a causal or quasi-
experimental method to appropriately attribute RCM to the changes in enrollment and 
credit hours taught. The findings regarding enrollment and credit hours taught would 
have been better supported if an appropriate technique such as synthetic control 
methodology (which will be discussed in Chapter 3: Methodology) had been used.  
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Secondly, Hearn et al.’s (2006) study documents deans’ mixed feelings regarding 
the effectiveness of  RCM at UMTC. However, Hearn et al. (2006) only interviewed 
three deans. At the time of the study, UMTC enrolled over 50,000 students within 21 
colleges. The findings would have been most robust if the scholars had interviewed more 
deans regarding their experiences with RCM.  
In another study, Gros Louis and Thompson (2002) conducted a secondary 
analysis of Indiana University-Bloomington’s (IUB) internal reviews of RCM and found 
that IUB’s experience with RCM over ten years was also mixed. Using internal 
institutional documents, budget reports, and the five-year and ten-year internal reviews of 
RCM, the researchers revealed that the RCM Review Committees’ (composed of faculty, 
staff, and administrators) perceptions of RCM were both positive and negative.  
For example, Gros Louis and Thompson (2002) indicated that some committee 
members perceived positively of RCM for at least three reasons: first, RCM provided 
financial flexibility for administrators to meet students’ needs; second, RCM created 
incentives for income generation and long-term planning; and third, RCM fostered 
partnerships between faculty and administrators – specifically, RCM helped units become 
more engaged in decision making because it encouraged collaboration.  
On the other hand, Gros Louis and Thompson (2002) noted that some RCM 
committee documents indicated that faculty and administrators believed that RCM 
reduced academic quality. Specifically, some faculty believed that when part-time 
instructors were employed to teach courses, the instructors would be less rigorous than 
full-time professors. Additionally, regarding academic quality, some IUB faculty felt 
RCM encouraged grade inflation because RCM promoted revenue growth through course 
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enrollment. Specifically, it was suggested by some IUB faculty that other faculty 
members would inflate grades in order to generate more student demand for their courses. 
The scholars noted that the academic quality and grade-inflation speculations were 
unsubstantiated. However, the authors did not indicate what analysis was done to test or 
negate those speculations. Thus, the extent to which RCM impacted academic quality 
remained inconclusive.  
In addition to academic quality and grade-inflation perceptions, faculty and 
administrators indicated that RCM did not provide a method for controlling costs (Gros 
Louis & Thompson, 2002). For example, in the 1999-2000 university review of RCM, 
the committee noted that deans struggled with controlling instruction costs (Gros Louis & 
Thompson, 2002). Specifically, it was difficult to discern when a permanent instructor 
should be hired versus hiring part-time instructors. At that time, the researchers noted that 
enrollment had fluctuated, and state funding was flat or declining in some years. 
Therefore, departments were reluctant to hire permanent faculty due to the uncertainty of 
student demand and financial resources. Additionally, Gros Louis and Thompson (2002) 
noted that some faculty and administrators perceived that RCM reduced collegiality 
between schools and colleges: RCM deemphasized cooperation and collaboration. The 
scholars suggested that this connection between RCM and cooperation was also 
unsubstantiated.  
Deering and Sá (2018) found evidence to support the claims made in Gros Louis 
and Thompson (2002) by IUB faculty regarding RCM’s impact on collegiality. 
Specifically, Deering explored the relationship between unit autonomy and coordination 
at four RCM universities: two in Canada and two in the United States. The two research-
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intensive universities were the University of Michigan (UM) and the University of 
Toronto (UT). The two comprehensive institutions were the University of Lethbridge 
(UL) and the University of New Hampshire (UNH).  
Deering and Sá (2018) found that RCM can negatively impact lateral coordination 
(i.e., the alignment between academic units to develop multidisciplinary programs, create 
joint appointments of faculty, etc.), and vertical coordination (i.e., the coordination 
among academic units in relationship to the university’s overall mission and goals). 
Deering and associates examined autonomy and coordination based on differences with 
regard to how each of the institutions operated RCM. In other words, the researchers 
sought to uncover how the various RCM funding formulas and revenue and cost 
allocation rules might have impacted how internal academic units interacted with each 
other and with central administrators. The scholars analyzed institutional documents (e.g., 
budget documents, documents from external debt rating agencies, state and federal higher 
education finance reports, national faculty association reports). They also interviewed 55 
senior administrators and faculty administrators at the four universities. Three findings 
are worth noting: first, the two research institutions (UM and UT) possessed high levels 
of coordination – lateral and vertical. Specifically, the RCM funding formulas and 
allocation rules at UM and UT allowed academic units to be autonomous (i.e., due to the 
devolution of budget authority to the deans) but also beholden to the goals of their 
institutions (i.e., due to the use of discretionary funds held by central administrators to 
incentivize collaboration). More specifically, the central administrators at UM and UT 
were described by interviewees as ‘hands-off’– meaning that deans were given wide 
latitude to lead their units. Despite giving deans wide latitude, the RCM funding formulas 
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allowed central administrators at UM and UT to generate and maintain a discretionary 
fund that was subsequently used to steer their respective institution (i.e., to incentivize 
behavior among the academic units through investment into new and innovative 
programs) (Deering & Sá, 2018).  
In contrast, Deering and Sá (2018) revealed that UL and UNH possessed low 
levels of coordination. Specifically, the authors described RCM at UL and UNH as 
overly decentralized. For example, deans at UL and UNH were given wide discretion in 
decision making. This was evidenced by their RCM funding formulas – specifically, the 
central administrations at UL and UNH did not retain a significant share of revenues (i.e., 
a discretionary fund like UT and UM) to steer the institution (Deering & Sá, 2018). 
Instead, the majority of revenues from government appropriations, tuition and fees, and 
research at UL and UNH were allocated to the academic units. As a consequence, central 
administrators at UL and UNH were unable to influence decision making among the 
academic units. Moreover, the lack of influence by central administrators also 
disincentivized academic units to work collaboratively with each other in the 
achievement of broader institutional goals (e.g., developing interdisciplinary programs, 
reducing the duplication of services, etc.). Deering and Sá (2018) concluded that RCM 
can negatively impact coordination at institutions. As shown in the cases of UL and 
UNH, poor coordination can result in conflict, competition, and inefficiencies.  
Despite revealing differences in autonomy and coordination between the two sets 
of universities in the study (i.e., UT and UM compared to UL and UNH), Deering and 
Sá’s (2018) study is limited in at least three ways. First, the study would have been more 
robust if the authors provided information on the RCM budgeting formulae and resource 
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allocation rules for each of the institutions in the study. For example, the study revealed 
that deans at UT and UM were autonomous – specifically, their autonomy was due to the 
RCM funding structures that allowed deans to make financial decisions and contribute to 
the overall mission of the institution. However, the question of “how” the RCM 
budgeting formulae and allocation rules were structured was not discussed.  
Secondly, Deering and colleagues’ (2018) study is limited because the scholars 
did not provide sufficient institutional contexts around each of the four universities in the 
study. For example, the authors indicated that large research universities (i.e., UT and 
UM) possessed similar characteristics as it relates to autonomy and coordination. 
However, it would have improved the study to know how and to what extent UT and UM 
may have differed. Similarly, for the other institutions in the study (i.e., UL and UNH), it 
would have strengthened the study to know how the institutions differed. Specifically, 
what allowed UL and UNH to become overly decentralized? Was the overly 
decentralized nature of UL and UNH by design or by accident? Conversely, what 
components of each institution’s background and context facilitated coordination at UT 
and UM? These questions were not addressed. 
Lastly, Deering and Sá’s (2018) study is limited because the reader is not made 
aware of when each institution adopted RCM, or if the people that were interviewed for 
the study were employed before each institution switched budget models. This 
information would have provided more clarity and credibility to how interviewees 
explained their experiences with regard to RCM, specifically, regarding how each of their 
universities may have changed as a result of RCM implementation.    
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Previously discussed studies (Gros Louis & Thompson, 2002; Hearn et al., 2006; 
Lang, 2002) revealed mixed experience regarding RCM within the institutions. However, 
Deering and Sá (2018) found mixed experiences regarding RCM across the institutions. 
UM and UT realized higher levels of coordination compared to UL and UNH. Higher 
levels of lateral and vertical coordination, as noted by Deering and Sá (2018), resulted in 
schools and colleges within UM and UT working collaboratively to achieve their 
respective university’s mission. However, Deering and Sá (2018) indicated that RCM 
negatively impacted coordination at UL and UNH. As a consequence, schools and 
colleges within UL and UNH were less inclined to achieve their respective university’s 
mission. Instead, Deering and his associate suggested that the lack of coordination 
resulted in competition and distrust. Thus, the authors concluded that central 
administrators must develop coordination mechanisms (i.e., similar to UM and UT) in 
order to minimize the risk of unintended consequences that were experienced at UL and 
UNH. 
Additional Empirical Findings Regarding RCM  
Other empirical studies on RCM have provided additional nuance to our 
knowledge of RCM; however, these studies (Cekic, 2010; McBride et al., 2000; 
Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2017) are not directly tied to the general lines of inquiry 
discussed above. Specifically, these studies (Cekic, 2010; McBride et al., 2000; 
Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2017) do not examine institutions’ motivations for adopting 
RCM nor do they document institutional experiences with RCM.  
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RCM Budgeting is a Structural Process  
Cekic (2010), in a 15-year case study, investigated how faculty and 
administrators’ decision-making processes for budgeting changed after the 
implementation of RCM at Indiana University-Bloomington (IUB). The researcher used 
Bolman and Deal’s (2003) four organizational frames (i.e., structural frame, human 
resource frame, political frame, and symbolic frame) to analyze 36 interviews (i.e., 15 
interviews in 1988-89, 13 interviews in 2001, and eight in 2006) and identify which 
frames, if any, were most prevalent in the budget and planning processes. The structural 
frame focuses on bureaucracies, rules/policies, and institutional goals (Bolman et al., 
2003 as cited in Cekic, 2010). The human resource frame centers around interpersonal 
relationships, needs, and skills of the people within the organization (Bolman et al., 2003 
as cited in Cekic, 2010). The political frame focuses on power, competition, and 
negotiation (Bolman et al., 2003 as cited in Cekic, 2010). Lastly, the symbolic frame 
revolves around ceremonies, traditions, and institutional stories (Bolman et al., 2003 as 
cited in Cekic, 2010). 
Cekic (2010) argued that RCM was a product of a market-interaction paradigm. 
This suggested that resource allocation decisions under RCM should be based on political 
interactions that result in the greatest good for the most people. Thus, the author 
hypothesized that RCM budgetary decision-making at IUB would be consistent with 
Bolman and Deal’s (2003) political frame. Cekic found that faculty and administrators 
predominantly used the structural frame in budgetary decision-making. To explain the 
salience of the structural frame in the findings, the researcher noted that the budgeting 
process at IUB was historically identified as a political process. Specifically, IUB’s old 
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budget model – the incremental model – created competition due to the scarcity of 
resources and central administration’s responsibility to allocate all resources across the 
entire campus. However, with the implementation of RCM – which emphasized 
information-rich and data-driven processes – resource allocation decisions became more 
consistent with Bolman and Deal’s structural frame (Cekic, 2010). That is, RCM 
provided deans with financial responsibility, incentives, and processes (i.e., funding 
formulas) to mitigate the need to exert power or engage in competition for resources. For 
example, one of the interviewees stated:  
One of the things I like about RCM is; the [formulas] drive [the budgeting 
process]; so much in RCM in this transparent way that I think it minimizes the 
contests. ... I mean, there are politics and there are contests, but ...these kinds of 
regulations, these models or the rules of RCM ... leave a lot less room to kind of 
argue over resources (Cekic, 2010, p. 94).  
 
This finding has at least two implications: first, RCM impacted how IUB faculty and 
administrators viewed the budgetary process; and second, faculty and administrators at 
IUB felt less inclined to compete for resources under RCM versus their need to compete 
for resources under the incremental model. Although the budgeting and planning 
processes at IUB were most consistent with the structural frame, other studies have not 
examined the change in the decision-making process under RCM using Bolman and 
Deal’s (2003) four frames of organization culture. Thus, the main result from this study is 
isolated. Perhaps a comparative examination of this phenomenon across multiple 
institutions would have strengthened this study and provided more insight regarding how 
faculty and administrators view their budget responsibilities under RCM.  
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RCM Impacts Faculty Workload 
McBride et al. (2000) examined RCM in relation to faculty time and effort at 
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis’ (IUPUI) School of Nursing. The goal 
of the project was to estimate how RCM impacted faculty time and effort. As a part of the 
project, faculty at the School of Nursing were surveyed in 1993-94 and again in 1997-98 
to assess how they allocated their time as a faculty member. Between the two survey 
periods (i.e., the first in 1993-94 and the second in 1997-98), McBride et al. (2000) 
analyzed differences in how faculty responded. For example, the average percent of 
faculty time spent on administration (e.g., program management, strategic planning, 
management of fiscal affairs, fundraising, faculty development, etc.) decreased from 
14.3% to 14% between 1993-94 and 1997-98. The average percent of the faculty’s time 
on instruction decreased from 54.6% to 48.8% between the same time frame. The average 
time spent on unfunded service (e.g., writing grant proposals, peer-reviewing articles, 
writing book chapters, etc.) decreased from 7.3% to 6.5%. However, the average percent 
of faculty time spent on research and faculty development increased between the same 
four years. Specifically, the average time spent on funded research increased from 18% to 
22.4%; and the average time spent on unfunded research rose from 3.5% to 5.8%.  
Although the findings from McBride et al. (2000) suggest that RCM impacted 
how faculty spent their time at IUPUI, the study is limited because the researchers did not 
conduct an analysis to show if (or to what extent) their results might have been changed 
in the absence of RCM. Specifically, the descriptive methods employed by the 
researchers do not causally link RCM to the changes in faculty time. Additionally, 
McBride et al. (2000) do not report the sample size of the survey respondents nor do the 
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authors specify if the same survey respondents were surveyed in 1993-94 and 1997-98. 
This casts doubt on how much, if any, faculty changed how they allocated their time 
since there could have been different respondents in each survey period. The study would 
have been enhanced if the scholars had relied on quantitative methods such as difference-
in-differences or synthetic control methodology (i.e., both methods will be described in 
Chapter 3: Methodology) to determine whether RCM impacted faculty time and effort at 
work. Moreover, the study could have been strengthened if the scholars included other 
schools/colleges within IUPUI for comparative purposes. This would have provided 
readers with a sense of magnitude regarding RCM’s potential impact across IUPUI’s 
campus versus its impact at one school/college. 
RCM Affects Graduation Rates  
Rutherford and Rabovsky (2017) examined the effect of RCM on two outcomes: 
undergraduate graduation rates and degree production at four-year public and private 
research universities. The sample consisted of 276 public and private research 
universities in the United States, 32 of which had implemented RCM by 2013. The 
authors defined graduation rates as the percentage of first-time freshmen who graduate 
within six years. They used a dummy variable to signify whether an institution used 
RCM. The panel data for graduation rates ranged from 1991 to 2009. Using fixed-effects 
regression, the authors found a positive significant relationship between graduation rates 
and the use of RCM. Further analysis revealed a statistically significant relationship 
between graduation rates for white students and the use of RCM (Rutherford & 
Rabovsky, 2017). However, no significant relationship was found for Black or Hispanic 
students’ graduation rates.  
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Regarding the second outcome, degree production, Rutherford and Rabovsky 
(2017) did not find a significant relationship between the use of RCM and degree 
production. This suggests that RCM institutions might be doing more to get students to 
graduation faster and perhaps more efficiently. While this may be the case, the finding 
regarding degree production evinces that RCM institutions are not necessarily producing 
more degrees than non-RCM universities, on average. This study is one of two that has 
employed an advanced quantitative technique to analyze RCM’s impact. However, 
Rutherford and associate’s study has several limitations that will be examined in a 
separate section. (see Gaps and Limitations further below.) 
Summary of Scholarship on RCM 
Researchers have not systematically investigated RCM, thus leaving the body of 
scholarship disparate and scant. Few general findings have emerged as a consequence. 
Specifically, the empirical literature on RCM has revealed only two broad findings and 
several disparate findings on RCM’s impact thus far. Moreover, most research findings 
on RCM are institution- and context-specific (i.e., not generalizable) because scholars 
have mostly examined RCM using small-sample case study research designs. Case study 
methods have been appropriate to explore the “how” and “why” questions regarding 
RCM – specifically to understand the contextual factors and stakeholders that are affected 
by RCM, such as the people (e.g., administrators, faculty, staff, and students) and the 
processes (e.g., budgeting processes, funding formulas, accounting systems). The use of 
document analysis and interviews within the qualitative case studies has been appropriate 
to assess how RCM impacts people and the processes. 
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However, few empirical studies have examined the “what” and “to what extent” 
questions regarding RCM’s effect on financial outcomes (i.e., revenues). Perhaps the 
most obvious omission in the literature, prior to this study, was an examination on the 
extent to which RCM impacts costs, given the emergence of RCM adopters since the 
Great Recession in 2008 and the number of institutions that have adopted RCM primarily 
to control costs (Deering & Sá, 2014; Jaquette et al., 2018). A synthesis of how scholars 
and economists have studied higher education costs is next. 
 
Scholarship on Higher Education Costs 
Unlike the paucity of the empirical literature on RCM, scholarship on higher 
education costs is voluminous. Researchers have extensively theorized and empirically 
assessed the nature of costs in higher education (Baumol & Bowen, 1966; Bowen, 1980; 
Winston, 1999). Within these domains, scholars have provided insight into three broad 
lines of inquiry: (1) to explain why higher education costs rise faster than costs in other 
industries; (2) to identify opportunities for efficiencies within and across colleges and 
universities; and (3) to understand the relationship between revenues and costs among 
higher education institutions.  
Theoretical Perspectives on Costs in Higher Education  
My review of the literature revealed four major theories that undergird research 
into why higher education costs rise faster relative to costs in other industries: Baumol 
and Bowen’s (1966) Cost Disease Theory, Bowen’s (1980) Revenue Theory of Costs 
(RTC), the Positional Arms Race Theory, and Principal-Agent Theory (PAT). Debates 
remain ongoing regarding which theory most closely describes why higher education 
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costs continue to rise (Archibald & Feldman, 2008, 2018; Cheslock et al., 2016; Kimball 
et al., 2018; Martin & Hill, 2014). A brief overview of each theory is presented below.  
Cost Disease Theory 
 The cost disease theory was developed by Baumol and Bowen (1966) seeking to 
explain cost escalation in the performing arts industry. Baumol and Bowen explained cost 
disease theory by drawing a distinction between two industries: goods-producing 
industries (e.g., manufacturing) and the personal services industry (e.g., performing arts, 
health care, and education). The fundamental distinction between the two industries is 
that goods-producing industries use labor to make a product – that is, labor is a 
component of what produces a good, such as a car for example. However, in the personal 
services industries, labor is the final product. For example, a flutist’s time (labor) playing 
the flute in an orchestra is the final product.  
Cost disease theory posits that costs in goods-producing industries rise slower 
than costs in personal services industries because personal services industries do not 
benefit from productivity increases (Baumol, Blackman, & Wolff, 1985; Baumol & 
Bowen, 1966). For example, technological advancements in goods-producing industries 
such as automobile manufacturing have increased productivity. These advancements, in 
turn, have allowed many goods-producing industries to save on labor costs. For example, 
with the procurement of a new piece of equipment (i.e. technological advancement), a car 
manufacturer may be able to produce ten times more vehicles with fewer staff. Thus, the 
manufacturer is able to become more productive and save on labor costs by leveraging 
technology. On the other hand, cost disease theory suggests that personal services 
industries like higher education have not realized the same experiences with regard to 
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productivity for at least three reasons. First, advancements in technology in the higher 
education sector have not been able to replace or substitute the need for highly educated 
instructors. Second, the time it takes for instructors to provide higher education has 
remained relatively the same – that is, it still takes an instructor three hours to teach a 
three-hour lecture. Lastly, the average class sizes (i.e., faculty-student ratios) have 
remained relatively the same as they were decades ago, thus faculty are not educating 
significantly more students than in previous decades (Archibald & Feldman, 2008, 2018; 
Cheslock et al., 2016). Because the price of labor grows year over year irrespective of 
productivity growth, labor costs in personal services industries, theoretically, rise faster 
than goods-producing industries because personal services industries do not benefit from 
productivity gains (Cheslock et al., 2016). Therefore, the cost disease is one that, in 
theory, cannot be ‘treated’ without productivity increases (Baumol et al., 1966).  
 Scholars (Archibald & Feldman, 2008, 2018; Kimball et al., 2018; Martin & Hill, 
2014) have debated whether the cost disease theory appropriately describes cost 
escalation in higher education. On one hand, researchers (Archibald & Feldman, 2008, 
2018) have found evidence to support cost disease theory. For example, Archibald and 
Feldman (2008) conducted a study to measure the differences between higher education 
costs relative to costs from other industries (i.e., other personal services industries as well 
as non-personal services industries). Archibald and Feldman (2008) sought to investigate 
cost disease theory compared to the revenue theory of cost to discern which theory better 
described cost fluctuations across industries. Using data from 1949-50 to 1995-96 to 
measure the absolute and average absolute deviations between prices of other industries 
and the corresponding costs of higher education, Archibald and Feldman (2008) found 
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that costs in higher education behaved much more similar to costs in industries providing 
services rather than goods-producing industries. Moreover, among the service industries, 
the scholars found that higher education costs were similar to the costs of services 
provided by highly-educated workers compared to the costs of the services provided by 
workers with lower levels of education (Archibald & Feldman, 2008). These findings 
were consistent with the cost disease theory for at least two reasons. First, higher 
education costs (and the costs of other personal services industries) rise faster than the 
costs in goods-producing industries. Second, within the personal services industries, 
higher education costs rise more consistently with other services industries that require 
highly educated labor (Archibald & Feldman, 2008). 
Other scholars (e.g., Kimball et al., 2018) maintained an opposing view with 
regard to cost disease theory. In a historical analysis and investigation on cost disease 
theory, Kimball et al. (2018) rejected Archibald and Feldman’s (2008) validation of cost 
disease theory for at least two reasons. First, Kimball et al. (2018) argued that Archibald 
and Feldman (2008) incorrectly dichotomized the distinctions between cost disease 
theory and the revenue theory of cost. For example, Archibald and Feldman (2008) 
hypothesized that if the revenue theory of cost better represented higher education cost 
escalation, then the analysis of higher education costs would follow an arbitrary path over 
time. However, if the results were better described by the cost disease theory, then the 
analysis would show that higher education costs follow a similar time path as other 
service industries. Because Archibald and Feldman (2008) found that higher education 
costs were similar to other service industries, they concluded that the cost disease theory 
better described cost escalation in higher education. Kimball et al. (2018) contend that 
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Archibald and Feldman’s (2008) analysis failed to consider whether the revenue theory of 
cost could be applied to other industries – specifically, Kimball et al. (2018) suggest that 
Archibald and Feldman’s (2008) study was weakened because they incorrectly imputed 
the revenue theory of cost.  
Secondly, Kimball et al. (2018) further concluded that the service industries – 
whose costs followed a consistent path as higher education costs in Archibald and 
Feldman’s (2008) analysis – did not conform to the personal services industries as 
described by cost disease theory. Of the 18 service industries in which Archibald and 
Feldman (2008) found to be consistent with higher education cost escalation, Kimball et 
al. (2018) identified nine that were not personal service industries. Some of the nine non-
personal services included: “water and other sanitary services, mass transit systems, [and] 
rent of tenant-occupied nonfarm dwellings” to name a few (Kimball et al., 2018, p.43). 
Therefore, Kimball et al. (2018) rejected cost disease theory as a viable perspective to 
describe higher education costs.  
Revenue Theory of Cost 
Unlike cost disease theory, which emphasizes how external market forces impact 
cost escalation in higher education, specifically labor costs, Bowen’s (1980) revenue 
theory of cost (RTC) contends that cost escalation is internal to higher education. 
Specifically, RTC posits that colleges and universities are not revenue maximizers, or 
cost minimizers like private-sector firms. Instead, RTC suggests that colleges and 
universities function with the goal of maximizing their prestige, excellence, and 
influence. Specifically, colleges and universities raise as much money as they can; and 
then spend all of the money they raised on factors that contribute to their prestige, 
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excellence, and influence (Bowen, 1980). However, there is no discernable way to 
identify when an institution has maximized its prestige, excellence, or influence. 
Therefore, an institution’s total costs are only bound by its total revenue. This means that 
institutions will incessantly spend on prestige-maximizing elements until revenues are 
depleted (Bowen, 1980). Therefore, RTC suggests that cost escalation in higher education 
is the result of institutional choice rather than a result of stagnant productivity as 
suggested by cost disease theory (Archibald & Feldman, 2008; Bowen, 1980; Martin, 
2011; Martin & Hill, 2014).  
Scholars (Archibald & Feldman, 2008; Martin & Hill, 2014) have found mixed 
evidence with regard to whether cost disease theory or RTC better describes higher 
education cost escalation. Archibald and Feldman (2008) concluded that the cost disease 
theory better illustrated why costs rise in higher education in their analysis of costs in 
other industries. In a different study that investigated cost disease theory compared to the 
revenue theory of cost, Martin and Hill (2014) found little evidence to conclude that cost 
disease theory better described cost increases in higher education. Instead, Martin and 
Hill (2014) concluded that the revenue theory of cost better represented cost escalation in 
higher education, arguing instead that higher education cost drivers were internal. 
Specifically, Martin and his associate estimated average cost functions for public and 
private research universities using data from two distinct periods: the first period was 
described as the “loose revenue constraints” period (i.e., 1987 to 2005); and the second 
period was described as the “tight revenue constraints” period (i.e., 2008 to 2011). To 
examine cost disease and RTC, the authors theoretically framed cost disease theory using 
average faculty salary and benefits (i.e., since the crux of cost disease theory focuses on 
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labor costs). The researchers included average faculty salary and benefits, in addition to 
variables that accounted for revenue sources (i.e., since RTC suggests that universities 
raise all the money they can and spend all the money they raise). The authors found that 
the effects explained by RTC were larger than those explained by the cost disease theory 
during both periods: the loose revenue constraints period and the tight revenue constraints 
period (Martin & Hill, 2014). Specifically, the researchers found that college and 
university costs in both periods were more consistent with what available revenue (i.e., 
RTC) versus costs being solely driven by labor costs (i.e., cost disease). 
Leslie, Slaughter, Taylor, and Zhang (2012) tested RTC when examining 
revenue-expenditure relationships at 96 research-extensive universities in the United 
States. Data were drawn for 24 years (1984-85 to 2007-08) to investigate how public and 
private institutions utilized their various sources of revenue to carry out their missions. 
For public universities, revenue variables included: tuition, state appropriations, grants 
and contracts, gifts, sales, and other revenues. Expenditures variables included: 
instruction, research, public service, academic support, student services, institutional 
support, and scholarships. Variables for private universities included the same revenue 
and expenditure variables as the public universities, with the exclusion of state 
appropriations as a source of revenue.  
Leslie et al. (2012) focused mostly on the revenue relationship with two key 
expenditures: instruction and research because these two expenditures most closely 
represented the mission of research universities. Using ordinary least squares regression 
with fixed effects, the authors found that public universities’ spending patterns behaved 
as would be expected – that is, a large proportion of tuition revenues were spent on 
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instruction. More specifically, for each dollar increase in tuition revenue received by 
public institutions, they spent almost 46 cents on instruction and 11 cents on scholarships 
(Leslie et al., 2012).  
Private universities, however, followed a different path. Leslie et al. (2012) found 
evidence to support RTC, specifically with regard to private universities but not public 
universities. Specifically, the authors suggested that private research universities’ 
spending conformed with RTC in two ways. First, the authors found that private 
universities spent a larger share of their largest source of revenue (i.e., tuition) on 
scholarships for students compared to public institutions. This suggests that private 
universities are intentionally raising and spending money to maximize their prestige by 
increasing the number of scholarships they could extend. Second, Leslie et al. (2012) 
found that for every dollar of grant and contract monies received by private institutions, 
they spent about 29 cents more of their own funds on research than did public research 
institutions. This finding is consistent with previous research on prestige maximization 
(that will be discussed in the next section), which suggests that institutions spend and 
invest in research to enhance their reputation, influence, and ranking (Melguizo & 
Strober, 2007; O’Meara, 2007).   
The Positional Arms Race Theory  
The positional arms race theory (Cheslock et al., 2016; Melguizo & Strober, 
2007; Winston, 1999) similar to RTC, suggests institutions seek to maximize their 
prestige.  Consequently, cost escalation is a matter of institutional choice. Specifically, 
the positional arms race theory posits that higher education costs increase rapidly as a 
result of colleges and universities engaging in a competitive race for higher rankings 
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(Cheslock et al., 2016). The college rankings in U.S. News & World Report (USNWR) – 
among other sources of college rankings – play a crucial role in the competition between 
institutions (Cheslock et al., 2016; O’Meara, 2007; Winston, 1999). For example, 
USNWR rankings take into account several measures to calculate an institution’s 
ranking, including academic reputation (25%); the retention rates of undergraduate 
students (25%); faculty resources, such as faculty compensation and average faculty-
student ratio (20%); student selectivity based on college admissions exams (15%); 
education expenditure per student (10%); and alumni giving (five percent) (Melguizo & 
Strober, 2007). Scholars argue that institutions make significant financial investments in 
each of the USNWR categories in pursuit of prestige and position. Put another way, 
colleges and universities spend more to attract the best faculty, students, and resources 
(e.g., research grants, campus amenities, student services, etc.) in order to climb the 
rankings (Melguizo & Strober, 2007; O’Meara, 2007; O’Meara & Meekins, 2012). As a 
consequence of the pressure placed on institutions to climb the rankings (and the 
incessant spending in the pursuit of prestige), higher education costs have risen, 
according to the positional arms race theory.   
 Winston (1999) suggests that institutions differentially engage in the positional 
arms race. For example, he notes that colleges and universities at the top of the rankings 
compete for the highest quality of students and faculty; and institutions at the bottom of 
the rankings compete for students who are willing to “buy” their product (i.e., enroll in 
their institution) because there is less demand (Winston, 1999). However, Winston (1999) 
argues that institutions’ ability to compete for positions is predicated on each of their 
donative resources (i.e., available revenue from private sources). Therefore, he contends 
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that most institutions are often at the beginning or at the end of fundraising campaigns so 
that they can recruit students (i.e., using institutional financial aid and state of the art 
amenities), faculty (i.e., through lucrative salaries and start-up packages), and additional 
resources that would increase the institutions’ excellence, prestige, and position 
(Winston, 1999).  
O’Meara (2007) identified and listed several “striving” characteristics to illustrate 
some of the financial and organizational changes made by institutions that are engaged in 
the positional arms race. In part, many of the characteristics showcased a need for 
increased spending for several purposes: to recruit academically talented students; to 
recruit and retain high-profile faculty members; to modify and enhance curriculum and 
program offerings; to increase the number of graduate programs, and to make 
external/structural changes on campus (O’Meara, 2007).  
Several scholars (Kim, 2018; Melguizo & Strober, 2007) have empirically tested 
components of the positional arms race theory. For example, Melguizo and Strober 
(2007) examined the relationship between prestige maximization and faculty salaries. 
The authors hypothesized that prestige-maximizing institutions would reward faculty 
through compensation increases for enhancing the institution's reputation through 
research. Moreover, because faculty compensation accounted for a portion of ranking 
calculations, the scholars suggested that if faculty spent more time publishing research, 
faculty would be rewarded financially while also helping the institution to rise in the 
rankings. Overall, the researchers found a positive significant relationship between 
faculty research activity (i.e., the prestige-maximizing construct) and faculty salary. 
These findings were consistently positive and significant across institution type (i.e., 
70 
 
research, doctoral, and liberal arts) and across disciplines (i.e., natural sciences, 
engineering, professional fields, social sciences, education, and humanities). The scholars 
found no evidence to show that faculty salaries had been impacted by the faculty’s time 
spent on teaching. Thus, the scholars found evidence to support a component of the 
positional arms race theory – specifically that institutions, in an effort to maximize their 
prestige (and ranking by extension), have rewarded faculty for contributing to activities 
that enhance prestige such as research.  
Kim (2018) examined how USNWR rankings impacted operating expenditures 
across two groups of institutions established by USNWR: the National Universities and 
National Liberal Arts Colleges. Kim revealed that USNWR rankings significantly 
impacted expenditures at National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges, 
however, the nature of spending across these groups was different. After moving from a 
non-ranked position to a ranked position in the top 25, 50, or 120, the National 
Universities increased instructional expenses by 3.1% within two years and 8.9% for 
three years and thereafter (Kim, 2018). The National Liberal Arts Colleges, on the other 
hand, significantly increased spending in education-related and non-instructional support 
(Kim, 2018). Kim did not find evidence that the National Liberal Arts Colleges increased 
spending on research. 
Principal-Agent Theory  
Principal-agent theory (PAT) is another perspective used to describe why costs 
rise in higher education. PAT originated in economics and has been applied to political 
science and higher education. PAT focuses on a contractual relationship between two or 
more entities, whereby the principal contracts the services of an agent to perform certain 
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functions (i.e., services that require specialized knowledge not possessed by the principal) 
that will improve the condition of the principal (Cheslock et al., 2016; Lane & Kivisto, 
2008). The nature of the contractual relationship can be explicit – where there is a formal 
agreement; or implicit – where there is a common understanding that the agent will 
perform certain functions in the interest of the principal. However, PAT posits that higher 
education costs rise because the goals of the principal will differ, in part, from the goals 
of the agent, such that the agent will work in his/her/its own self-interests and towards 
his/her/its own goals. This is defined as shirking (Kivisto, 2005, 2008; Lane & Kivisto, 
2008). PAT suggests that principals develop incentives to mitigate shirking. These 
incentives can be rewards-based – that is, to reward acceptable behavior. Additionally, 
the incentives can be punitive/sanctions-based, to disincentivize unacceptable behavior. 
Applied to higher education, Lane and Kivisto (2008) indicated that PAT can involve 
multiple principals and multiple agents. For example, Martin (2011) described the 
principal-agent relationship between students, parents, and taxpayers (i.e., the principals) 
and faculty, staff, and administrators (i.e., the agents).  
Martin (2011) suggests that costs in higher education rise because agents seek to 
achieve different goals than the principals. For example, faculty at a research institution 
may value research over teaching. However, students and families may value teaching 
over research. As faculty partake in more research projects, the institution may need to 
hire additional teaching staff. This, in turn, has cost implications for both the principals 
and the agents. Regarding the agents, as a result of focusing more on research, there may 
be additional administrative requirements and costs necessary to secure or maintain grant 
funding for the research projects. 
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Scholars (Jaquette et al., 2018; Tandberg et al., 2017; Titus, 2009) have used PAT 
to model various principal-agent relationships in higher education. Titus (2009) utilized 
PAT to examine the relationship between state governments (i.e., the principal) and 
institutions of higher education (i.e., the agents). Tandberg et al. (2017) used PAT to 
understand the relationship between governors (i.e., the principal) and the state higher 
education executive officers (i.e., the agents). Specifically, Tandberg and associates 
(2017) hypothesized that when a governor possesses significant institutional authority 
over the state higher education executive officer (SHEEO), the SHEEO would, in turn, 
align more closely with the governor’s higher education spending priorities. Tandberg et 
al. (2017) found that when a governor possesses the authority to appoint a SHEEO, state 
spending on higher education increases. Theoretically, such an appointment authority 
gives colleges and universities more revenue to spend, which intersects with RTC as 
described above (i.e., colleges and universities raise as much revenue as they can and 
spend all that they raise).    
Although Tandberg et al. (2017) did not use PAT to theoretically frame a 
principal-agent relationship within a college or university, the findings suggest that PAT, 
in combination with RTC, may be useful in explaining costs at the institutional level. For 
example, as noted above, the principal-agent relationship between governors and 
SHEEOs has implications on state spending for higher education. As state spending on 
higher education increases, public colleges and universities are theoretically given more 
revenue to spend. By possessing more revenue to spend, colleges and universities may be 
inclined to spend the additional revenue that they received – according to RTC. 
Specifically, RTC suggests that colleges and universities spend all the revenue they raise 
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(or receive from state sources). Therefore, a principal-agent relationship within an 
institutional context (i.e., within a college or university), may also impact revenue (and 
costs by extension) according to RTC. However, PAT in tandem with RTC has not been 
used to conceptually frame costs at the institutional level. This dissertation study uses 
PAT and RTC to fill this gap in the literature. (Further discussion on how PAT and RTC 
are used in this dissertation study is below in the Theoretical Framework section.) 
Researchers have also used PAT to explain the principal-agent relationships 
within universities. Jaquette et al. (2018) utilized PAT to explain the relationship between 
central administration (i.e., the principal) and the deans of the academic units (i.e., the 
agents) in a study investigating RCM’s impact on tuition revenue. The scholars suggested 
that RCM funding formulas and allocation rules were an incentive-based contract that 
bound the principal and agents in this context. Specifically, Jaquette et al. (2018) argued 
that central administrators cared most about generating additional tuition revenue, given 
the constrained financial reality of public higher education. Jaquette and associates 
asserted that the RCM funding formulas developed by central administrators would 
incentivize, and reward academic units to enroll more students, which would provide 
more tuition revenue by extension. They found that tuition revenue had significantly 
increased at three of the four institutions in the study and validated PAT’s ability to 
explain the relationship between central administrators and deans who oversee RCM 
(Jaquette et al., 2018).  
Despite revealing that PAT was a useful framework to elucidate RCM’s positive 
impact on tuition revenue at three of the four universities in their study, Jaquette et al. 
(2018) did not investigate the extent to which the additional revenue generated by these 
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institutions may have impacted costs. This dissertation study examines RCM’s impact on 
costs using PAT and RTC to account for the impact of revenue, including tuition revenue, 
on costs. (Further discussion on how PAT and RTC are used in this study is below in the 
Theoretical Framework section.)   
Empirical Literature on Higher Education Costs  
In addition to the theoretical perspectives used to explain why higher education 
costs rise, scholars have identified factors that contribute to cost increases in colleges and 
universities. Indeed, over the last three decades, much of the empirical literature on 
higher education costs has employed statistical methods to explore and find differences 
within and across college and university cost structures. Specifically, most of the higher 
education cost literature has been guided by Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982). Baumol 
and associates argued that universities differ in terms of mission, size, research intensity, 
etc. As a result, Baumol et al. (1982) proposed three functional forms that have allowed 
scholars to model the cost of producing higher education. These functional forms include 
the constant elasticity of substitution, the quadratic fixed-cost function, and the 
transcendental function. The use of these statistical models has enabled researchers to 
model the multiple outputs produced by colleges and universities (e.g., instruction and 
research). As a result, scholars have found that institutional characteristics and activities 
drive cost increases in higher education. Brinkman (1990) revealed five determinants of 
costs among colleges and universities: size, scope, level of instruction (undergraduate 
versus graduate education), academic discipline (i.e., academic program mix), and 
revenues. These cost determinants, in addition to institutions’ geographical/regional 
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locations, have been used to explain the cost of producing higher education (Cheslock et 
al., 2016).  
 
Determinants of Costs in Higher Education 
Empirical research has documented several determinants of costs in higher 
education. Specifically, these studies have elucidated opportunities for efficiencies in 
higher education by (a) identifying economies of scale, which are present if an increase in 
any output such as enrollment would result in a decrease in cost; (b) identifying 
economies of scope, which are present if producing two or more products jointly (e.g., 
offering graduate education and undergraduate education) would decrease cost; and (c) 
assessing the extent to which colleges and universities are cost efficient, which estimates 
the minimum cost for producing a given level of outputs (Agasisti & Salerno, 2007; 
Brinkman, 1981; Brinkman et al., 1986; Cohn et al., 1989; deGroot et al., 1991; Doyle, 
2010; Johnes & Schwarzenberger, 2011; Koshal & Koshal, 1999; Koshal et al., 2001; 
Kuo & Ho, 2007;  Laband & Lentz, 2003; Mamun, 2012; Nelson & Hevert, 1992; Robst, 
2001; Sav, 2004; Titus et al., 2017; Toutkoushian, 1999). 
Scale  
Institution size (i.e., scale) is seen by economists as its productive capacity and 
represents the level of outputs (e.g., number of students and class size) it produces 
(Brinkman et al., 1986). Researchers  (Cohn et al., 1989; deGroot et al., 1991; Koshal & 
Koshal, 1999; Koshal et al., 2001; Laband & Lentz, 2003; Nelson & Hevert, 1992; Sav, 
2004; Titus et al., 2017; Toutkoushian, 1999) have generally found positive returns to 
scale, which suggests that institutions of higher education, on average, could benefit from 
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modifying its scale (e.g., increasing enrollment or class size to reduce costs per student). 
For example, Cohn et al. (1989) investigated cost at 1,887 public and private institutions 
in the United States to identify economies of scale and scope. This study was the first to 
use a multi-product cost function to model the cost of producing higher education. The 
model assumed that higher education institutions’ core mission is teaching, research, or a 
combination of both. Therefore, the scholars modeled total costs as a product of full-time 
equivalent (FTE) undergraduate enrollment, FTE graduate enrollment, and research 
expenditures (as a proxy for research). Cohn and associates found positive returns to 
scale. However, the returns to scale varied between public and private institutions – 
specifically, the authors revealed that economies of scale existed for research 
expenditures at public institutions, not private institutions, for example.  
Although Cohn et al.’s (1989) study was among the first to model the cost of 
higher education as a multi-product function – which allowed the scholars to take into 
account the teaching and research components of institutions’ missions – the study has 
three limitations. First, Cohn et al. (1989) only used one year of data across public and 
private universities. Subsequent research (as will be noted below) has revealed the 
importance of taking into account more than one year of data to increase the reliability 
and robustness of the findings. Secondly, Cohn et al. (1989) did not include variables to 
account for other factors that contribute to cost escalation, including academic program 
mix, class size, and institutions’ locations. The inclusion of these additional factors would 
have strengthened the study and perhaps would have had implications on the results. 
Lastly, and perhaps most relevant to this dissertation, Cohn et al. (1989) did not consider 
if or to what extent institutions’ budget models may have impacted their cost structures.  
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Several other studies (deGroot et al., 1991; Koshal & Koshal, 1999; Koshal et al., 
2001; Laband & Lentz, 2003; Nelson & Hevert, 1992; Sav, 2004; Titus et al., 2017; 
Toutkoushian, 1999) have also found positive returns to scale but have not considered 
budget models in their analysis. For example, deGroot et al. (1991) investigated 
economies of scale and scope at 147 public and private research institutions in the United 
States. The scholars used one year of data from 1983. To model the cost of producing 
higher education, the researchers included total costs as the dependent variable and 
undergraduate FTE and graduate FTE as output measures for teaching. However, unlike 
Cohn et al. (1989) who included research expenditures as a proxy for research, deGroot et 
al. (1991) included the number of publications as a proxy for research. Additionally, 
deGroot et al. (1991) included average faculty and staff salaries as an additional input. 
deGroot et al. (1991) found positive returns to scale for all outputs (i.e., undergraduate 
enrollment, graduate enrollment, and research publications). Additionally, deGroot et al. 
(1991) found that graduate education was more costly than undergraduate education. 
Moreover, the authors revealed that institutions with a medical school had higher costs 
than those without. However, unlike Cohn et al. (1989), Koshal and Koshal (1999), and 
Sav (2004), deGroot (1991) did not find a significant difference in costs between public 
and private research universities. 
 Despite several contributions to research noted above, deGroot et al.’s (1991) 
study contains several limitations worth noting. For example, deGroot et al. (1991) 
include two questionable variables as proxies for research output and graduate education 
quality. Specifically, the authors use the number of publications as a proxy for research 
output at each of the institutions in the study. However, the researchers do not indicate 
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how publications were counted to generate the proxy for research output. Moreover, the 
scholars did not discuss the extent to which there may have been duplicate values in the 
number of publications. For example, if two faculty members at one institution co-
authored one publication, would the publication count once or twice (i.e., one for each 
author)? Additionally, were the definitions for counting publications consistent across the 
institutions in the study?   
With regard to the proxy for graduate education quality, deGroot et al. (1991) 
used a subjective five-point peer evaluation of graduate schools at each of the institutions 
in the study. This measure is perhaps problematic because it is not objective or consistent 
– specifically, the authors do not indicate how graduate schools were evaluated under the 
five-point system. Thus, the proxy for graduate education quality has external validity 
implications. 
Additionally, deGroot et al.’s (1991) study is limited in similar ways as Cohn et 
al. (1989): (i) it also only considered one year of data; and (ii) it did not consider budget 
models, including RCM, in their analysis of higher education costs. As noted previously 
(and described below), the inclusion of more than one year of data provides more 
stability to the study and the subsequent results. Moreover, an examination of how costs 
are impacted by budget models, specifically RCM, is an open inquiry in which deGroot et 
al. (1991) did not consider but this study seeks to examine.  
In a single-institution study, Nelson and Hevert (1992) analyzed economies of 
scale and scope at the University of Delaware. The authors used data from 31 
departments across five years to model the cost of producing higher education at the 
institution. Specifically, the dependent variable was education costs defined as the sum of 
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each department’s expenditures on professional, faculty, graduate teaching assistants, and 
staff salaries, including miscellaneous wages, supplies and expenses, occupancy and 
maintenance, equipment, and information processing (Nelson & Hevert, 1992). As a 
proxy for research, the researchers used faculty reports on the time they spent conducting 
research. Additionally, the authors included the outputs based on the credit hours taught 
across three categories: lower-level undergraduate teaching, upper-level undergraduate 
teaching, and graduate teaching. The researchers also included a control variable for 
average class size. In addition to several other findings that will be discussed below, the 
researchers revealed economies of scale – specifically, they found that marginal costs per 
student declined with increases in enrollment and with increases in class size (Nelson & 
Hevert, 1992).  
Unlike the previously discussed studies (i.e., Cohn et al., 1989; deGroot et al., 
1991), Nelson and Hevert (1992) analyzed data across five years versus one year. 
However, Nelson and Hevert’s (1991) study is limited, in part, because the researchers 
only considered one institution. While there was considerable insight gained from this 
approach (i.e., considering only one institution versus multiple institutions), especially 
because other studies considered hundreds of institutions, Nelson and Hevert (1992) 
made unsubstantiated claims regarding the findings of this study. Specifically, the authors 
indicated that previous research on higher education cost had been mis-specified. 
However, because Nelson and his associate only considered one institution, the 
conclusions and analytic approach the researchers should not be extrapolated beyond the 
University of Delaware – the institution in which they examined. Additionally, similar to 
Cohn et al. (1989) and dGroot et al. (1991), Nelson and Hevert (1992) did not consider 
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how the budget model at the University of Delaware, for example, may have impacted 
costs across the five years of the study.  
Koshal and Koshal (1999) analyzed economies of scale and scope at 329 public 
and private comprehensive universities in the United States using data from 1990-91. To 
model the cost of producing higher education, the authors used a statistical model where 
the dependent variable was total costs and the output variables were FTE undergraduate 
students, FTE graduate students, and research expenditures. Additionally, the scholars 
included control variables for institutions with Ph.D. students, the number of full-time 
faculty, average student-teacher ratio, average class size, and average faculty salary. The 
researchers also include a measure to account for the variation in the quality of the 
institutions – specifically, they use average SAT scores of the incoming freshmen class. 
Other researchers (Cohn et al., 1989; deGroot et al., 1991, etc.) had not used a measure 
for quality because they considered it difficult to measure. Koshal and Koshal (1999) 
found positive returns to scale for undergraduate FTE but diseconomies of scale for 
graduate FTE and research. Additionally, the researchers revealed that the cost of 
graduate education was higher than undergraduate education across public and private 
institutions. Moreover, the researchers evidenced that the marginal cost at private 
institutions was higher than at public institutions. Finally, the scholars revealed that class 
size impacted cost – that is, larger class sizes lower costs. All of these findings were 
mostly consistent with prior research. However, this study contains similar limitations as 
previously discussed studies (i.e., Cohn et al., 1989; deGroot et al., 1991). Specifically, 
Koshal and Koshal (1999) only considered one year of data across the institutions in the 
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study. Moreover, Koshal and Koshal (1999) did not examine how the budget models used 
across the universities in the study may have impacted costs.  
Koshal et al. (2001) also only considered one year of data and did not examine the 
effects of budget approaches on costs at the institutions in the study. Specifically, in a 
study on 184 Bible colleges in the United States, Koshal et al. (2001) explored costs  
using data from 1994-95. Total cost was used as the dependent variable. Since Bible 
Colleges do not have an explicit research function, the authors only included 
undergraduate FTE and graduate FTE as outputs. In addition, the authors included 
average faculty and staff salaries, faculty-student ratio, and the average expense for 
instructional material per faculty member as control variables. Koshal et al. (2001) found 
economies of scale for undergraduate FTE but not for graduate FTE. The researchers also 
revealed that class size impacted costs, similar to previous research by Koshal and Koshal 
(1999).  
Titus et al. (2017) examined cost efficiency at 252 public master’s institutions in 
the United States. Titus and associates (2017) employed a multi-product function to 
model the cost of producing higher education. The dependent variable was measured by 
education and general expenses. The scholars included independent variables for 
undergraduate enrollment, graduate enrollment, research expenditures, average faculty 
salaries, faculty-student ratio, and control variables for historically Black 
colleges/universities, institutions with medical programs and hospitals, as well as 
institutions that award doctoral degrees. Using stochastic frontier analysis, the researchers 
revealed several results. First, the authors revealed economies of scale in undergraduate 
education and diseconomies of scale in graduate education. Secondly, the scholars also 
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evidenced that costs are regionally clustered and that cost inefficiency at master’s 
institutions is long-term and persistent rather than short-term and residual. Lastly, and 
perhaps more generally, the scholars showed that few master’s institutions are cost 
inefficient, suggesting that most master’s colleges are cost efficient. However, the 
researchers did not consider if or to what extent budget approaches employed by the 
universities in the study may have contributed (or not) to their cost efficiency. The 
scholars noted, however, that future research should consider the effects of decentralized 
budget models such as RCM on cost. This study provides insight into this open inquiry – 
specifically in the context of RCM’s impact on cost at public research universities.  
Scope 
Researchers have also generally found positive returns to scope – that is, whether 
there are lower costs per unit when institutions increase the production of multiple 
outputs simultaneously, such as research and undergraduate education (Cohn et al., 1989; 
Koshal & Koshal, 1999; Koshal et al., 2001; Laband & Lentz, 2003; Sav, 2004; 
Toutkoushian, 1999).   
In a study on cost efficiency across 1,492 private and 1,450 public institutions, 
Laband and Lentz (2003) found economies of scope for undergraduate education, 
graduate education, and research for public institutions. However, across private 
institutions in the study, the researchers revealed economies of scope for undergraduate 
education up to 250% of the mean, graduate education up to 100% of the mean, and 
research up to 400% of the mean (Laband & Lentz, 2003). deGroot et al. (1991) also 
found economies of scope among research universities. Specifically, the authors revealed 
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economies of scope for undergraduate and graduate education across the institutions in 
the study (deGroot et al., 1991).  
Compared to the previously discussed studies, Laband and Lentz (2003) provided 
more insight regarding costs in relation to additional institutional characteristics such as: 
whether an institution is a land-grant institution, whether provides public service or has a 
medical school or hospital. However, the researchers, similar to the previously discussed 
studies, did not consider how budget approaches may have impacted costs at the 
institutions in the study.  
Similarly, Sav (2004) examined costs at 2,189 private and public institutions 
using cross-sectional data from the year 1995. However, the scholar did not investigate 
how budget approaches such as RCM may have influenced costs. For example, to model 
the cost of producing higher education, the researcher used the number of undergraduate 
and graduate credit hours taught on a twelve-month production cycle, nine-month faculty 
salary, Carnegie classification, and geographical region. In addition to finding economies 
of scale across public and private institutions, Sav found economies of scope for 
undergraduate education at private comprehensive and baccalaureate colleges and 
universities. However, Sav found minimal evidence of economies of scope for public 
institutions. Additionally, Sav did not find significant economies of scope for graduate 
education or research across the institutions in the study.  
Level of Instruction  
In addition to investigating and determining economies of scale and scope in 
higher education, researchers have shown that costs vary by level of instruction: 
undergraduate is less expensive to produce than graduate education (Brinkman, 1981; 
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deGroot et al., 1991; Koshal & Koshal, 1999; Koshal et al., 2001; Laband & Lentz, 2003; 
Nelson & Hevert, 1992). In an early study on research universities, Brinkman (1981) 
specifically examined factors that impacted instructional costs. Brinkman (1981) 
considered instructional costs at 50 institutions (29 public and 21 private) from one 
academic year, 1976-77. To model the cost of producing higher education, the researcher 
included instructional costs as the dependent variable. The author included the number of 
full-time faculty and the average faculty salary as input variables. Additional inputs 
included the number of non-faculty employees and a proxy for average salary. For 
outputs, the author used FTE enrollment for undergraduate and graduate students, the 
number of degree programs per FTE, and expenditures for sponsored research per full-
time faculty member. Brinkman (1981) found that undergraduate and graduate 
enrollment positively impacted instructional costs across the institutions in the study. 
Moreover, Brinkman (1981) revealed that the marginal cost of graduate education was 
higher than the marginal cost of producing undergraduate education across public and 
private research universities.  
However, despite showing early evidence that instructional costs vary by level 
instruction, Brinkman’s (1981) study is limited. First, the author only considered one year 
of data. Secondly, Brinkman (1981) only considered instructional costs at 50 research 
universities. However, during the period of the study, there were over 100 research 
universities, thus several were not included in the study. Lastly, and perhaps most 
relevant to this study, Brinkman (1981) did not consider how the budget models at each 
of the institutions in his study may have impacted costs.  
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Similarly, with regard to cost variation by level of instruction, deGroot et al. 
(1991) found that graduate education was four times more expensive than undergraduate 
education at research universities. This finding suggests that graduate education cross-
subsidized undergraduate education. Specifically, the cost of undergraduate education 
may have been lowered as a result of courses being instructed by graduate students and 
non-tenured faculty. Koshal and Koshal (1999) also revealed that the cost of graduate 
education is higher than undergraduate education at public and private comprehensive 
universities. However, the authors also revealed variations by institutional control (public 
v. private). Specifically, the researchers found that costs at private institutions were 
higher than public institutions and that graduate education was double the marginal cost 
at private universities compared to public universities (Koshal & Koshal, 1999). Nelson 
and Hevert (1992) elucidated cost variations both across graduate and undergraduate 
education, but also within undergraduate education. Specifically, in their study on the 
University of Delaware, Nelson and Hevert (1992) showed that lower-level 
undergraduate courses were lower cost than upper-level undergraduate courses; graduate-
level courses were the most costly, and all courses that possessed a lab component were 
more expensive than those that did not. Again, deGroot et al. (1991), Koshal and Koshal 
(1999), and Nelson and Hevert (1992) did not consider budget approaches, such as RCM, 
in their studies on higher education costs. 
Academic Program Mix 
Researchers have also noted academic program mixes (e.g., science versus non-
science programs) have cost implications. Specifically, the cost of teaching certain 
programs, typically science-based programs, are higher than non-science-based programs 
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(Agasisti & Salerno, 2007; Brinkman, 2000; deGroot et al., 1991; Johnes & 
Schwarzenberger, 2011; Kuo & Ho, 2007; Mamaun, 2012; Sav, 2004). 
In two previously discussed studies (deGroot et al., 1991; Sav, 2004), the 
researchers found cost variations between institutions with medical and professional 
schools compared to those that did not operate medical or professional (post-
baccalaureate) schools. Specifically, they revealed that institutions with medical and 
professional programs had higher costs than institutions without (deGroot et al., 1991; 
Sav, 2004).  
Similar findings regarding levels of instruction exist in the international context as 
well. Agasisti and Salerno (2007) examined cost efficiency at 52 public Italian 
universities. The authors used a multiproduct function to model the cost of producing 
higher education. Specifically, they included student enrollment for graduate and 
undergraduate programs and research expenditures as a proxy for research output. 
Additionally, Agasisti and his associate parsed out graduate students based on the 
percentage of students who were doctoral students and based on those in scientific 
courses and those in non-scientific courses. The researchers grouped medical school and 
veterinary school students separately. Using data envelopment analysis on one year of 
data (i.e., from 2002-2003), the researchers found several mixed results. Generally, the 
scholars revealed that the larger institutions in the study were scaled efficiently. This 
means that the average costs of producing higher education were minimized based on the 
average enrollment across the institutions. However, those universities with medical 
programs, veterinary programs, and those with higher levels of Ph.D. students were less 
cost efficient (Agasisti & Salerno, 2007). The authors indicated that controlling for the 
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presence of science-based Ph.D. students and professional programs (e.g., medical and 
veterinary) proved useful in understanding cost efficiency variations across the 
institutions in the study. However, the study is limited because the authors did not 
investigate how the budget models of each of the 52 institutions in their study may have 
affected costs.  
Kuo and Ho (2007) explored cost efficiency across 34 Taiwanese universities and 
sought to identify the effects of a new government funding system on cost efficiency. The 
scholars used data from 1992-93 through 1999-2000. Specifically, they included in their 
model: the number of enrolled undergraduates, graduate students, and research 
expenditures as the outputs. Additionally, the researchers included control variables to 
account for variations in academic programming at the institutions – specifically, they 
added a measure to capture the proportion of academic programs that were medicine, 
natural science, social science, engineering, as well as those with Ph.D. programs. They 
also included a control variable for the use of the new budget model. Generally, the 
scholars found that cost inefficiency had increased after the implementation of the new 
funding system. Additionally, the authors revealed diseconomies of scale for 
undergraduate enrollment and economies of scale for graduate enrollment and research. 
With regard to academic disciplines, Kuo and Ho (2007) discovered that institutions with 
a higher share of diverse programs realized higher costs.  
Although Kuo and Ho (2007) examined higher education costs in the context of a 
new government funding system, the study is limited such that it did not consider how 
each institution individually responded to the new budget system. Specifically, Kuo and 
Ho (2007) showed that, on average, cost efficiency declined at the 34 institutions in the 
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study after the Taiwanese government imposed a new funding system that provided more 
discretion to campus leaders.  
Johnes and Schwarzenberger (2011) examined cost efficiency at 72 German 
universities. The authors used stochastic frontier analysis to analyze the data. The 
dependent variable was total cost, which included personnel and other current 
expenditures. The output variables included: the total number of undergraduate and 
graduate students disaggregated by master’s degree students and Ph.D. students. The 
scholars further disaggregated the data by parsing out science and non-science 
undergraduate and master’s degree students. Research activity was measured by third-
party research funding. Generally, Johnes and Schwarzenberger found that German 
institutions were cost efficient; however, there were significant differences across 
institutions. Specifically, the researchers found that technical universities (i.e., those with 
large science programs) had higher fixed costs and were less cost efficient compared to 
universities without technical programs. Moreover, the scholars found that science 
courses were the most costly to teach, and doctoral education was more costly than 
master’s and bachelor’s education. Additionally, master’s education was more costly than 
undergraduate education. Lastly, the researchers found that institutions with specialized 
programs were less cost efficient than others with more diverse programs (Johnes & 
Schwarzenberger, 2011). The study is limited because it did not consider how budget 
approaches may have impacted costs at the institutions in the study.  
Revenues  
Research has provided evidence that revenues, and their various sources, impact 
costs (Robst, 2001; Leslie et al., 2012). For example, in a five-year study on cost 
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efficiency at 440 public four-year institutions, Robst (2001) sought primarily to elucidate 
whether institutions who receive a larger share of state appropriations were more or less 
efficient than those that did not. Consistent with previous research, the scholar modeled 
the cost of producing higher education as a multi-product function. Specifically, he 
included: undergraduate enrollment, graduate enrollment, research expenditures, and 
faculty salaries variables to model higher education production. In addition, the 
researcher included revenue variables for tuition revenue and state appropriations, as well 
as control variables for Carnegie classification. Using stochastic frontier analysis, the 
author revealed that four-year public institutions were generally inefficient, even across 
Carnegie classifications. More importantly, the scholar found no significant differences 
between institutions with a smaller share of state appropriations compared to those with a 
larger share – that is, institutions with a small share of state appropriations were no more 
inefficient than those with a larger share. Moreover, the author also revealed that 
institutions that increased tuition revenue over the five-year period became more 
inefficient, however, changes in state appropriations did not affect cost efficiency. The 
author concluded that institutions with the smallest tuition increases became more 
efficient than those with larger tuition revenue increases.  
 Additionally, Leslie et al. (2012) examined the relationship between sources of 
revenue and functional expenditures across 96 public and private research-extensive 
universities in the United States. The authors focused on how sources of revenue 
impacted expenditures on instruction and research. They found that public research 
universities expended the majority of tuition revenue and state appropriations on 
instruction. Additionally, public universities spent the plurality of grants and contracts 
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revenue on research expenditures. However, private universities – who do not receive 
state appropriations – spent approximately the same proportion of tuition revenue on 
instruction as public universities. But private universities spent a higher portion of tuition 
revenue to support scholarships and fellowships for students compared to public 
universities. Moreover, private universities used a higher share of other revenue 
categories to support their research expenditures (Leslie et al., 2012). Although Leslie et 
al. (2012) accounted for many known factors that impact higher education costs (e.g., 
institution size, scope, revenues, etc.), the authors did not consider differences in 
institutional budget models such as RCM. This dissertation study addresses the gap 
regarding RCM and costs.  
Location  
The literature has also examined the impact of colleges’ and universities’ 
locations on costs. For example, Toutkoushian (1999) studied economies of scale and 
scope in higher education. Specifically, he focused on 828 public and private four-year 
institutions that provided education to undergraduate and graduate students but did not 
operate a medical school. Using two different multi-product cost functions to model the 
cost of producing higher education, Toutkoushian developed one model that used total 
expenditures as the dependent variable and the second model that used expenditures per 
student as the dependent variable. Each model contained variables for undergraduate 
enrollment, graduate enrollment, research dollars received, the average full professor 
salary, student-faculty ratio, percentage of faculty who were full professors, percentage of 
expenditures for instruction, and a variable for public versus private control. Several of 
these variables were consistent with previously discussed studies. However, 
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Toutkoushian (1999) also included variables for geographic and urban location. Using 
multiple regression analysis, the author revealed several findings that were consistent 
with previous studies, including the existence of economies of scale for both public and 
private institutions; the cost of graduate education was higher than undergraduate 
education; private institutions have higher cost structures than public institutions; the 
average faculty salary had a positive significant relationship with expenditures, and the 
faculty-student ratio had a positive significant relationship with costs. This study also 
revealed cost variations by region – specifically, institutions in the New England and Far 
West regions had higher costs than those in other regions (Toutkoushian, 1999). Despite 
revealing the impact of institutional location on higher education costs, this study – 
consistent with all of the previously discussed studies on higher education costs – did not 
account for institutions’ budget models in his study. However, the author indicated that 
future researchers should consider investigating the impact of RCM on costs. This study 
addresses that gap in the literature.  
Finally, Sav (2004) examined costs at public and private comprehensive 
universities in the United States. Specifically, with regard to the impact of location on 
costs, Sav found evidence that comprehensive institutions have regional differences in the 
cost structure. These differences were based also on institutional control – specifically, 
public comprehensive universities in the Central West spent more to produce higher 
education than in other regions. Private comprehensive universities in the Southeast, 
Great Lakes, and Far West regions have higher cost structures than those in the North 
East – which includes the New England and Mid East regions (Sav, 2004). However, 
again, the study did not consider budget models.  
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Summary of Scholarship on Higher Education Costs 
Higher education researchers and economists have produced a vast body of 
scholarship on higher education costs. Indeed, scholars have theorized about, and 
empirically investigated several inquiries regarding cost escalation and determinants of 
cost in higher education. Generally, these theoretical and empirical investigations have 
provided insight to at least three questions: (1) why do higher education costs rise faster 
than costs in other industries; (2) to what extent are colleges and universities cost 
efficient; and (3) what is the relationship between revenues and costs across higher 
education institutions? As a result, scholars have illuminated many implications for 
policy, practice, and future research. Specifically, empirical research has identified cost 
variations across higher education; in doing so, scholarship has shown that colleges and 
universities could benefit from better understanding their institutional characteristics and 
activities.  
Although this large body of scholarship has been insightful, researchers have 
mostly investigated higher education costs broadly over time – specifically, most studies 
have used large sample sizes with hundreds of colleges and universities to investigate 
costs. However, researchers have not specifically investigated costs in small-sample 
studies to explore how colleges and universities have responded to cost escalation in 
higher education via new policies or practices, such as RCM. Several scholars (Cheslock, 
2016; Titus et al., 2017; Toutkoushian, 1999) have noted that an investigation into 
decentralized budget models, such as RCM, is warranted, given RCM’s perceived 
positive implications on higher education costs. This study fills this deficit in knowledge. 
A further discussion regarding the research gaps is below.  
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Gaps and Limitations of Prior Research 
This section identifies and discusses the gaps and methodological limitations in 
the extant literature on RCM and higher education costs. Overall, the limitations focus on 
the need for more quantitative methods to explore RCM. Additionally, the limitations in 
the cost literature suggest the use of more context-specific studies to investigate costs.  
Summary of the Research Gap 
  Perhaps the most glaring omission from the literature is an investigation of 
RCM’s impact on costs. Until this dissertations study, researchers had not considered 
RCM with regard to its effect on costs at colleges and universities that have implemented 
it, despite several college administrators noting that one of their primary reasons for 
adopting RCM was to control costs at their institutions (Deering & Sá, 2014; Jaquette et 
al., 2018).  
Methodological Limitations in the RCM Literature 
In addition to the research gap regarding RCM’s impact on costs, the RCM 
literature has methodological limitations worth noting. First, the majority of RCM studies 
utilize a single-institution case study research design (Cekic, 2010; Courant & Knepp, 
2002; Gros Louis & Thompson, 2002; Lang, 2002; Hearn et al., 2006; McBride et al., 
2000). While this approach has proven useful for researchers to examine and understand 
the contextual factors, organizational factors, as well as the stakeholders that have been 
affected by RCM, the use of single-institution case studies has limited our general 
knowledge of the budget model. Specifically, the research findings from these empirical 
studies are institution-specific (i.e., not generalizable). Moreover, because multiple 
scholars have employed single-case study designs (Courant & Knepp, 2002; Gros Louis 
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& Thompson, 2002; Lang, 2002; Hearn et al., 2006), only two general findings have 
emerged: RCM has been adopted primarily to generate revenue and control costs. 
Institutions have realized positive and negative experiences with RCM thus far, as noted 
by Lang (2002) and Hearn et al. (2006). Other findings from single-institution case 
studies have been unconnected and disparate, thus not providing researchers, 
policymakers, and college administrators with a holistic view of RCM’s general effects.  
The use of multi-institution studies, however, has improved the quality of 
research on RCM. For example, Deering & Sá (2014, 2018) and Jaquette et al. (2018) 
were able to draw similarities and distinctions between the colleges and universities in 
their respective studies on RCM. However, the findings from these studies are also not 
generalizable – although they have provided more general insight than the single-
institution case studies.  
The second limitation of research on RCM is the use of qualitative methods to 
describe the quantitative effects of RCM. For example, in a previously discussed 
qualitative case study on the University of Toronto-Scarborough's (UTS) experience with 
RCM, Lang (2002) noted that UTS had accumulated a $5.5 million debt two years after 
RCM had been fully implemented. However, the scholar did not conduct a quantitative or 
quasi-experimental analysis to attribute the $5.5 million debt to RCM. Deering and Sá 
(2014), in a multiple-case study, revealed that three Canadian institutions implemented 
RCM in response to dwindling government support to colleges and universities – that is, 
RCM was adopted to help these institutions generate additional revenue and reduce costs. 
While the study revealed perceptions that RCM was useful to achieve the financial goals, 
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the study would have been strengthened if the authors analyzed the extent to which RCM 
affected revenue and costs at the institutions in the study.  
The scholarship on RCM is again limited because several researchers have not 
applied appropriate quantitative techniques to reveal RCM’s impact on quantifiable 
outcomes (e.g., enrollment). For example, in a study of RCM at the University of 
Minnesota-Twin Cities (UMTC), Hearn et al. (2006) utilized qualitative and quantitative 
techniques. The qualitative technique (i.e., the use of interviews) appropriately addressed 
their objective to capture and analyze deans’ perceptions of RCM. However, the use of 
descriptive analysis was inadequate to investigate the extent to which RCM impacted 
student enrollment and the number of credit hours taught across the colleges at UMTC. 
Specifically, the researchers did not employ a causal or quasi-experimental research 
design to appropriately attribute RCM to the changes in enrollment and credit hours 
taught. Additionally, McBride et al. (2000), in a study on RCM at the School of Nursing 
at IUPUI, suggested that RCM impacted how faculty spent their time. However, the 
researchers also did not employ an appropriate technique to show if (or to what extent) 
their results might have been changed in the absence of RCM. Specifically, the 
descriptive methods employed by the researchers did not causally link RCM to the 
changes in how faculty reportedly spent their time. 
Rutherford and Rabovsky’s (2017) examination of RCM utilized a quasi-
experimental method; however, this study, too, is limited methodologically. Specifically, 
Rutherford and Rabovsky (2017) employed a two-way fixed-effects linear regression 
model to analyze RCM’s impact on two non-financial but quantitative outcomes: 
graduation rates and degree production. The authors found evidence that RCM positively 
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impacted graduation rates compared to institutions that had not adopted RCM 
(Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2017). However, the authors did not find evidence to show a 
significant difference in degree production between RCM institutions and non-RCM 
institutions.  
However, Rutherford and Rabovsky (2017) did not take into account the various 
RCM structures that exist across institutions. Specifically, the scholars used a 
dichotomous variable to indicate which institutions used RCM and which did not. As a 
consequence, they were unable to capture the additional variation between institutions 
with regard to how they operate RCM (i.e., funding formulas, revenue and cost allocation 
rules, length of time since adopting RCM, etc.). Moreover, the scholars’ use of linear 
regression analysis was limited because it could not account for the various years in 
which the institutions adopted RCM. Specifically, they used a two-way fixed-effects 
linear regression model with fixed effects on the institutions and on the years in which 
institutions adopted RCM. As a consequence, the analytic technique would not be able to 
account for institutions that may have changed their budget model from RCM to a 
centralized approach (or vice versa) during the sample period. This suggests that some 
RCM universities were perhaps not accounted for as RCM institutions, which would have 
biased the analysis. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the method used by Rutherford  
and Rabovsky (2017) was limited such that it could not estimate if, or to what extent, any 
continuous outcome (e.g., costs) may have been impacted by RCM. For example, in the 
context of the study, the researchers did not address whether RCM institutions would 
have had higher graduation rates than the non-RCM institution if RCM had not been 
implemented in the first place. In other words, if RCM had not been adopted by RCM 
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University X (i.e., any RCM university in the study), would RCM University X have had 
a higher graduation rate, on average, than non-RCM University Y (i.e., a non-RCM 
university) anyway? If this is true – that is, if RCM University X (without adopting RCM 
in the first place) would have realized higher graduation rates, on average, than non-RCM 
University Y, then it casts doubt on the study’s findings regarding RCM’s effect.  
A recent empirical study attempted to overcome several methodological 
limitations of previous studies. Jaquette et al. (2018), in a multi-institution design, used a 
quasi-experimental quantitative technique called the synthetic control methodology 
(SCM) to assess whether RCM impacted tuition revenue at four public research 
universities. The SCM has been used in small-sample quantitative case studies (Abadie & 
Gardeazabal; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015) to compare the outcomes of a unit that has 
experienced an event, policy, or treatment (e.g., the adoption of RCM) to the outcomes of 
one or more units that did not experience the same event, policy, or treatment (i.e., the 
control group composed of non-RCM universities). This method will be described in 
greater detail in Chapter 3: Methodology. 
The research design and analytic technique employed by Jaquette et al. (2018) 
addressed the limitations of previous literature on RCM. Specifically, the use of the 
synthetic control method enabled the researchers to (1) examine RCM within multiple 
cases; (2) provide context regarding each institution’s motivation for adopting RCM; and 
(3) analyze RCM’s impact on a quantitative measure (i.e., tuition revenue). The use of the 
synthetic control method addressed the need for more quantitative research on RCM. 
Additionally, the use of SCM allowed Jaquette et al. (2018) to overcome several 
limitations of the study by Rutherford and Rabovsky (2017). For example, Jaquette et al. 
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(2018) were able to account for variation across institutions – specifically, SCM 
accounted for the different years in which RCM was adopted and the different ways in 
which institutions operated RCM (i.e., funding formulas, allocation rules, etc.). As 
indicated above, Rutherford and Rabovsky (2017) were not able to account for this 
difference using a binary variable in their linear regression model. Additionally, the SCM 
analysis allowed Jaquette et al. (2018) to construct a viable control group to estimate and 
compare the use of RCM with what would have occurred at the institutions in the study if 
RCM had not been implemented. This specifically allowed the researchers to isolate 
RCM’s effect on tuition revenue.  
The results associated with the SCM strategy used by Jaquette et al. (2018), while 
not generalizable, have provided significant insight regarding RCM across multiple cases. 
This dissertation adopted the same strategy in an investigation of RCM’s impact on costs. 
(Further discussion regarding how this study implemented SCM is in Chapter 3: 
Methodology.) 
Methodological Limitations in Higher Education Cost Literature 
The literature on higher education cost, albeit vast, is limited methodologically 
because researchers have mostly conducted large-sample quantitative studies while 
neglecting the impact of institutional context on cost. Specifically, scholars have been 
limited in their ability to provide institution-specific context and implications for policy 
and practice. For example, several studies have examined cost across at least 50, and 
upwards of nearly 3,000 institutions (e.g., Agasisti & Salerno, 2007; Brinkman, 1981; 
Brinkman et al., 1986; Cohn et al., 1989; deGroot et al., 1991; Doyle, 2010; Johnes & 
Schwarzenberger, 2011; Koshal & Koshal, 1999; Koshal et al., 2001; Kuo & Ho, 2007; 
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Laband & Lentz, 2003; Mamun, 2012; Robst, 2001; Sav, 2004; Titus et al., 2017; 
Toutkoushian, 1999). Moreover, scholars have not been able to assess how, and to what 
extent institutions may have responded to issues related to cost escalation. As a 
consequence, several potential lessons learned from institution-specific cost structures 
have been, perhaps, missed. Instead, many of the implications for policy and practice that 
have been gleaned from the empirical literature have been far-reaching but general at 
best. Additionally, because there is so much variability within college and university cost 
structures, a more balanced research approach is warranted.  
For example, some scholars have focused on specific institution types to study 
costs and uncover policy-relevant recommendations. More specifically, deGroot et al. 
(1991) examined costs at research universities, Koshal et al. (2001) studied costs at Bible 
Colleges, and Titus et al. (2017) investigated cost efficiency across public master’s 
institutions. Only one study has examined costs at a single institution (Nelson & Hevert, 
1992). Specifically, Nelson and Hevert (1992) explored economies of scale and scope at 
the University of Delaware using data from 31 departments across five years. The authors 
documented the importance of class size with regard to costs, among other findings 
previously discussed above. However, the scholars missed an opportunity to provide 
institution-specific context regarding the University of Delaware – specifically why they 
chose to study it and to what extent the findings might have practical and policy 
implications.  
The Dearth of Theoretical Perspectives on RCM 
 In addition to the methodological limitations of prior research, the extant 
academic literature on RCM is atheoretical. Only two studies (Cekic, 2010; Jaquette et 
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al., 2018) have been theoretically grounded. Cekic (2010) used Bolman and Deal’s 
(2003) four frames of organizational culture (i.e., structural/rational, human resources, 
political, and symbolic) to elucidate how faculty and administrators perceived of the 
RCM budgeting and planning processes. Cekic found that perceptions among faculty and 
administrators had changed with regard to budgeting after RCM had been implemented. 
Specifically, after the institution replaced the incremental budgeting model with RCM, 
faculty, and administrators indicated that budgeting became less of a political/competitive 
process and instead became more structured. The author suggested that the RCM funding 
formulas and allocation rules perhaps allowed more transparency and structure in 
resource allocation decisions (Cekic, 2010).  
Jaquette et. al (2018) used principal-agent theory (PAT) to illustrate the principal-
agent relationship between central administration (i.e., the principal) and deans (i.e., the 
agents) within institutions that operate RCM. The authors argued that RCM provided the 
framework and incentives necessary to align the goals of the principals with the goals of 
the agents (i.e., to minimize shirking as described above). Specifically, the researchers 
suggested that central administrators were driven to increase tuition revenue as a result of 
declining state funding; and deans, through the use of RCM funding formulas and 
resource allocation rules, were given the incentives necessary (i.e., the ability to generate 
more revenue at the college-level through enrollment; and the ability to carryover unused 
funds year over year) to align their goals with those of central administration. The 
researchers hypothesized that the use of RCM would impact tuition revenue under the 
principal-agent relationship, and found that three of the four institutions in the study had 
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significantly increased the amount of tuition revenue after RCM had been implemented 
(Jaquette et al., 2018).  
Although the application of PAT and Bolman and Deal’s (2003) frameworks have 
proven useful, more theoretical perspectives are necessary to guide future research on 
RCM. This study addresses this limitation. A discussion of how this study incorporated 
theory is below.  
 
Addressing the Gaps and Limitations of Prior Research 
This section describes how this dissertation study overcame a series of limitations 
from previous literature on RCM. Specifically, this study addressed the following: (1) the 
gap in knowledge regarding RCM’s impact on institutional costs; (2)  the limited use of 
theoretical perspectives in the RCM literature; and (3) the methodological limitations of 
previous studies on RCM and higher education costs. 
Theoretical Framework 
 This study is guided by two theoretical frameworks: Principal-Agent Theory and 
Bowen’s (1980) Revenue Theory of Cost (RTC). PAT is used to theoretically frame the 
principal-agent relationship between central administration (i.e., the principal) and deans 
(i.e., the agents) at two public research universities that adopted RCM – consistent with 
previous research by Jaquette et al. (2018). However, this study, unlike Jaquette et al. 
(2018), attempts to illustrate that PAT is an appropriate framework to explain the 




RTC is utilized to theoretically frame the impact of revenues on costs. 
Specifically, this study incorporates variables on college and university revenue sources 
because RTC suggests that colleges and universities raise revenue and spend it all (i.e., 
revenues impact costs). Many scholars (e.g., Brinkman, 1990; Clotfelter, 1996; Martin, 
2011; Winston, 1999) including Bowen (1980) have argued that colleges and universities 
are not cost minimizers, and have instead suggested that colleges and universities seek to 
maximize their prestige and influence. Therefore, these scholars contend that colleges 
and universities, as a consequence of maximizing their prestige and influence, increase 
costs substantially. However, because RCM provides incentives for cost minimization – 
that is, deans are allowed to carryover unexpended revenue and are required to carryover 
budget deficits from year to year – this study seeks to uncover if, and to what extent, 
RCM might impact costs. Further discussion regarding the use of these theoretical 
perspectives is below.   
Principal-Agent Theory  
As described in the above section on theoretical perspectives in the higher 
education cost literature, PAT has been used by economists, political scientists, and 
higher education researchers to explain the contractual relationship between two or more 
entities (Cheslock et al., 2016; Jaquette et al., 2018; Lane & Kivisto, 2008; Martin, 2011; 
Tandberg et al., 2017; Titus, 2009). Specifically, PAT posits that a principal contracts the 
services of one or multiple agents to perform duties in which the principal does not have 
the time, knowledge, skill, or desire to perform him/her/itself (Lane & Kivisto, 2008). 
According to PAT, principal-agent relationships will possess misaligned goals, such that 
the goals of the principal may differ in part or in whole from the goals of the agent 
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(Kivisto, 2005, 2007; Lane & Kivisto, 2008). As a consequence, PAT suggests that 
agents will shirk by working towards their own self-interests versus the interests of the 
principal. Thus, PAT recommends that principals develop incentives to mitigate shirking 
to ensure the achievement of the principals’ goals (Lane & Kivisto, 2008).  
Applied to higher education, scholars have used PAT to model several different 
principal-agent relationships. For example, Titus (2009) used PAT to illustrate the 
principal-agent relationship between states and their respective public higher education 
institutions. He argued that the goal of states (i.e. the principals) with regard to higher 
education was to produce bachelor’s degrees. Moreover, the contract used by states to 
produce bachelor’s degrees was in the form of higher education appropriations to public 
colleges and universities. Titus (2009) revealed a positive significant relationship 
between state spending on higher education and the production of bachelor’s degrees and 
concluded that PAT was an appropriate framework from which to study the relationship 
between states and public higher education institutions. 
Tandberg et al. (2017) employed PAT to theoretically frame the relationship 
between governors (i.e., the principal) and state higher education executive officers 
(SHEEOs) – the agents. The researchers specifically sought to investigate how the 
relationship between governors and SHEEOs might influence higher education funding. 
The goal of the principal in this study was to influence funding to higher education. 
However, because there is variation across states, the authors suggested that the contract 
between governors and SHEEOs with regard to higher education funding was predicated 
on the authority that governors possessed over SHEEOs. Specifically, the authors 
hypothesized that if a governor had the authority to hire and fire a SHEEO, then it would 
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result in lower state spending on higher education. However, if the SHEEO was 
independent of the governor’s authority (i.e., appointed by the legislature) then it would 
result in higher state spending on higher education. Tandberg et al. (2017) found that 
state funding was lower, on average, when governors maintained strong authority over 
SHEEOs. The scholars also concluded that PAT was an effective conceptual lens through 
which to examine the governor’s influence over higher education. 
Finally, Jaquette et al. (2018) utilized PAT to frame the relationship between 
central administration (i.e., the principal) and the deans (i.e., the agents) in a study on 
RCM. The researchers argued that the goal of central administrators was to increase 
tuition revenue. Moreover, the authors argued that the RCM funding formulas served as 
the contract to incentivize deans to grow enrollment as a mechanism to increase tuition 
revenue. Specifically, through the devolution of budget authority to the deans, the authors 
argued that RCM incentivized deans by permitting the carryover of revenue surpluses 
from year to year. This, in turn, created goal alignment between central administrators 
and deans with regard to revenue growth. The scholars revealed that tuition revenue had 
significantly increased at three of the four universities in the study. Additionally, the 
scholars validated the use of PAT to explain the relationship between central 
administrators and deans (Jaquette et al., 2018).  
These studies (Jaquette et al., 2018; Robossi, 2017; Tandberg et al., 2017; Titus, 
2009) have explicitly and implicitly revealed three elements to identify when applying 
PAT as a theoretical perspective: (1) the principal-agent relationship; (2) the goal of the 
principal; and (3) the contract or mechanism used to bind the work of the agents to the 
goals of the principal.  
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In the context of this dissertation study, PAT is used to theoretically frame the 
principal-agent relationship between central administration and deans (i.e., the leaders of 
academic responsibility centers) at two public research universities that have adopted 
RCM. Specifically, I argue that under RCM, the goal of principals (i.e., central 
administration), in addition to increasing revenue (as has been explored by scholars), is 
also to minimize costs (Deering & Sá, 2014; Jaquette et al., 2018). This notion suggests 
that RCM is implicitly guided by the economic theory of the firm which contends that 
for-profit firms seek to maximize profit (i.e., maximize revenues and minimize costs). 
However, because most higher education institutions are non-profit organizations, the 
notion of cost minimization that implicitly guides RCM, is contrary to how scholars 
(Brinkman, 1990; Clotfelter, 1996; Martin, 2011; Winston, 1999) have described the 
behavior of colleges and universities. However, using PAT as a guide, I argue that the use 
of RCM serves as the contract that binds the principal-agent relationship of central 
administration and deans to guide cost minimization. Specifically, under RCM, deans 
possess the financial authority to make revenue and cost-related decisions. Deans are 
disincentivized to allow their college’s expenditures to exceed revenues because RCM 
requires deans to carry over budget deficits from year to year. Multiple years of budget 
deficits may not be well received by the central administration, thus further 
disincentivizing deans to overspend. In the context of PAT, the use of disincentives under 
RCM may mitigate shirking among deans and allow the academic units (and university 
by extension) to minimize costs.  
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Revenue Theory of Cost 
 Bowen’s (1980) Revenue Theory of Cost (RTC) is also used to guide this study. 
As discussed previously, RTC posits that colleges and universities function with the goal 
of maximizing their prestige, excellence, and influence. To carry out their goals with 
regard to prestige maximization, RTC suggests that institutions of higher education raise 
as much money as they can and then spend all of the money they raise (Bowen, 1980). 
Moreover, because there is no discernable way to identify when an institution has 
maximized its prestige, excellence, or influence, Bowen (1980) further posits that 
spending is incessant. This further suggests two notions: (a) not-for-profit colleges and 
universities are not cost minimizers; and (b) cost escalation in higher education 
institutions is the result of institutional choice.  
 As noted in a previous section of this study, higher education scholars have used 
RTC to guide inquiry into studies on higher education costs (Archibald & Feldman, 2008; 
Martin & Hill, 2014; Leslie et al., 2012). Archibald and Feldman (2008) tested cost 
disease theory with RTC to elucidate which theory better described cost escalation in 
higher education. The scholars found more evidence to support cost disease theory, 
arguing that higher education costs have risen mostly as a result of external market 
pressures from other industries versus internal choices made by higher education 
institutions (Archibald & Feldman, 2008). Martin and Hill (2014) found the opposite 
conclusion in a study that also tested cost disease and RTC. Leslie et al. (2012) found 
evidence that revenues impact costs differently across public and private universities. 
Specifically, with regard to RTC, Leslie et al. (2012) revealed that private universities 
expended resources in a prestige-maximizing manner – specifically, private institutions 
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allocated larger shares of their revenue for scholarships and research compared to public 
institutions (Leslie et al., 2012). 
Although the scholars did not reveal that public universities expended revenues in 
a prestige-maximizing manner, Leslie et al. (2012) did show that revenues impacted costs 
at public universities. For example, Leslie et al. (2012) found that for each dollar increase 
in tuition revenue received by public institutions, they spent almost 46 cents on 
instruction and 11 cents on scholarships.  
Based on the evidence that revenues impact costs, RTC is utilized in the context 
of this study to theoretically frame the impact of revenues on costs. Specifically, this 
study incorporates variables on college and university revenue sources because RTC 
suggests that colleges and universities raise revenue and spend it all (i.e., revenues impact 
costs).  
 
Addressing the Methodological Limitations of Previous Research 
 This study overcomes several methodological limitations of previous research by 
employing a research design that addresses the challenges outlined in the Gaps and 
Limitations section above. On one hand, previous literature on RCM is heavily composed 
of single-institution case studies. As a consequence, our knowledge of RCM has been 
limited and highly context specific. On the other hand, previous scholarship on higher 
education cost is heavily quantitative, with the majority of studies examining costs across 
hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of colleges and universities. As a result, no known 
research has explored costs in a small-sample and contextualized manner. Specifically, 
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researchers have not investigated costs across a small sample of colleges and universities 
using a quantitative technique while also providing context on the institutions.  
This study utilizes the synthetic control method (SCM) to address the research 
question and limitations of previous literature (Abadie et al., 2010). Specifically, SCM is 
a quantitative method developed in economics to estimate the causal effects of policy, 
idiosyncratic events, or interventions. SCM is used in single-case or multiple-case studies 
to estimate the treatment effects of some policy, event, or intervention by comparing the 
outcomes of each case to the estimated outcomes of a synthetic version of each case. (A 
thorough discussion of SCM will be described in Chapter 3: Methodology.) Specifically, 
this study explores the effect of RCM on total operating costs at the University of New 
Hampshire (UNH) and the University of Arizona (UofA). These universities were 
selected for several reasons: (1) the leaders of each of these institutions cited (among 
others) that their motivation to implement RCM was to incentivize cost minimization 
across their respective institutions; (2) there was adequate public data available with 
regard to how both UNH and UofA operate their RCM models unlike other institutions 
that use RCM; (3) as illustrated in Table A2, each of these universities has different 
levels of experience with RCM – specifically, UNH adopted RCM in the year 2000 and 
UofA adopted RCM in 2015; (4) each university implements RCM differently – that is, 
they employ different funding formulas and allocation rules; and (5) the synthetic control 
method (the method used in this study) allows the researcher to assess the treatment 
effects of one unit (i.e., university) at a time. 
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University of New Hampshire 
Founded in 1866, the University of New Hampshire (UNH) is a public research 
university located in Durham, New Hampshire. UNH is the state flagship institution and 
currently enrolls over 13,000 undergraduates and over 2,000 graduate students across 13 
colleges and schools (UNH Facts and Figures, 2019). Additionally, UNH manages an 
operating budget of nearly $600 million and offers associate’s degrees, baccalaureate 
degrees, and graduate degrees across 200 academic programs. UNH boasts an 18:1 
student-faculty ratio (UNH Facts and Figures, 2019). 
Motivations for Adopting RCM. UNH implemented RCM on July 1, 2000, after 
an 18-month RCM exploration study was conducted at the request of the then university 
president Joan Leitzel. President Leitzel cited five reasons for moving the campus to 
RCM. Among them she noted “[t]here will be stronger incentives for cost effectiveness 
and revenue generation” (Joan Leitzel, personal communication, January 14, 2000) 
because the university had experienced significant changes in enrollment, total operating 
costs, and total revenue prior to the implementation of RCM.  
Leading up to the implementation of RCM at UNH, members of the RCM 
steering committee, including the then provost and vice president for finance and 
administration wrote articles (Corvey, 1999; Hiley, 1999) to the campus community 
explaining the implementation process and providing insight regarding their intentions 
and rationale for adopting RCM. The tenor and focus of these articles centered on key 
motivations for adopting RCM that were in large part around the desire for cost control 
and to grow revenue. For example, in describing decision-making under UNH’s 
centralized budget model, the then provost David Hiley noted “[i]t is insufficiently 
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flexible, often too removed from where the action is in the institution and offers too few 
incentives for cost control and revenue enhancement” (Hiley, 1999, para. 3). Candace 
Corvey, the then vice president of finance and administration, wrote that “[t]he risk of not 
moving to RCM is that we will retard institutional evolution and progress, because we 
will not be as facile, cost-effective, entrepren[e]urial or forward-thinking as possible” 
(Corvey, 1999, para. 4). 
Student Enrollment and Financial Context Prior to RCM. As noted above, 
UNH experienced changes in enrollment, operating costs, and revenue prior to the 
implementation of RCM. For example, between 1980 (the earliest year for which data are 
available) to 1999 (the year prior to the implementation of RCM) the number of 
undergraduate students increased by only six percent, but the number of graduate 
students increased by 86%. As suggested by previous research on higher education costs, 
the cost of graduate education, on average, is higher than undergraduate education. Thus, 
the significant increase in graduate students between 1980 and 1999 may have influenced 
cost increases at UNH.  
Indeed, between 1980 and 1999, total operating costs increased by 71% (after 
adjusting for inflation in 1999 dollars). In 1999, the total expenditures at UNH were 
approximately $300 million, and instructional costs represented about 24% of total 
expenditures, auxiliary enterprises accounted for 20%, and research expenditure 
represented about 18% of total expenditures. Academic support, student services, and 
institutional support represented six, three, and six percent of total revenue, respectively 
in 1999.  
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Total revenue, on the other hand, increased by 74% between 1980 and 1999. 
Tuition and fee revenue represented the largest source of revenue; it increased from 28% 
of total revenue in 1980 to 34% in 1999. Consistent with other public institutions during 
this time period, state appropriations as a percentage of total revenue declined from 22% 
in 1980 to 16% in 1999. Thus, the leaders of UNH sought to generate additional revenue 
and control costs as the institution became more reliant on tuition revenue versus public 
funding.  
Reviews and Evaluations of RCM at UNH. Since RCM was implemented in 
2000, UNH has formally reviewed its RCM model internally three times: in 2006, 2009, 
and 2015. However, none of the internal reviews have explicitly examined the extent to 
which RCM impacted cost control at UNH. More specifically, the scope of each of the 
internal reviews differs based on the level of priority at the time of the review. For 
example, the 2006 review sought to “analyze the extent to which UNH has or has not 
achieved greater efficiency and effectiveness in curriculum, research/outreach, and 
administration under RCM” (UNH, 2006, para. 4). However, the only major finding from 
the 2006 review suggested that RCM had not harmed the academic quality of programs at 
UNH. The review committee did not provide any evidence to show if UNH controlled or 
reduced costs after RCM had been implemented.  
Similarly, the 2009 review did not reveal evidence to show that the institution had 
become more cost efficient since the implementation of RCM (UNH, 2009). Although, 
several changes were made to UNH’s RCM model as a result of the 2009 review 
including (a) how the RCM allocation rules funded central administrators, moving from a 
general assessment to a percentage share of revenues between the central administration 
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and responsibility centers; (b) the adjustment of how overhead revenues are allocated 
from grant funds received (i.e., facilities and administration) – specifically, UNH 
removed the vice president for research out of the allocation; and (c) UNH began using 
state appropriations to fund a portion of financial aid for New Hampshire resident 
students (UNH RCM Operating Manual, 2017). 
In the most recent review (i.e., the 2015 review) the budget committee surveyed 
the campus community on several issues related to the UNH’s budget model and how it 
was working. Nearly one-third of the respondents reported “no understanding” of RCM; 
two-thirds indicated that they do not believe that RCM encourages innovation and 
revenue growth; and nearly 61% reported that they did not believe that RCM encourages 
efficiency and effectiveness (UNH, 2015, p. 7). However, because RCM was 
implemented, in part, to address escalating costs at UNH, and because the internal 
reviews of RCM did not consider costs in their analysis, this study seeks to elucidate 
RCM’s effect on total operating costs. 
 
University of Arizona 
Located in Tucson, Arizona, the University of Arizona (UofA) was established in 
1885 and serves as the state of Arizona’s flagship university. UofA is a public research 
university that enrolls over 45,000 undergraduate and graduate students across 40 
colleges and schools, including two hospitals (University of Arizona,  2019). In 2018, the 
campus managed a nearly $2.4 billion operating budget (University of Arizona, 2019).  
Student Enrollment and Financial Context Prior to RCM. RCM was fully 
operational beginning July 1, 2015. Between 2003 and 2014 (the year before RCM was 
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implemented), UofA experienced a 34% decline in state appropriations (after adjusting 
for inflation in 2014 dollars). Despite these substantial decreases in state appropriations, 
undergraduate enrollment increased by 16%, and graduate enrollment rose by eight 
percent between 2003 and 2014. Tuition revenue helped to offset the loss in state 
appropriations, growing by nearly 152% between this time period. Total expenses, on the 
other hand, rose by nearly 30% between 2003 and 2014 – pacing at nearly the same rate 
as revenue growth during this period. This changing financial picture at UofA prompted 
administrators to consider adopting RCM in 2015.  
Motivations for Adopting RCM and RCM Timeline. Consistent with all RCM 
adoptions, the adoption of RCM at the UofA came at the request of the university 
president – then president Ann Hart. President Hart convened a steering committee to 
investigate the feasibility of implementing RCM in 2012 (University of Arizona, 2017, 
2019). The steering committee was composed mostly of faculty and administrators from 
all areas of the campus, and even included one student leader. The steering committee 
was further divided into nine sub-committees for various aspects of RCM – ranging from 
the subcommittee on undergraduate tuition to the subcommittee on facilities and space 
(University of Arizona, 2017, 2019). Between fall 2012 and fall 2013, the steering 
committee met to develop the guiding principles for RCM and identify key personnel and 
campus units to ensure RCM’s success (University of Arizona, 2019). By the spring of 
2014, the UofA began testing components of RCM on a small scale and by the fall of 
2014, UofA operated concurrent budgets – one using the old system and the other using a 
prototype of RCM. After testing had been completed, the steering committee formally 
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recommended to the president of UofA that RCM be fully implemented beginning July 
2015. 
Two of the three motivating factors listed in UofA’s RCM implementation 
website illustrate the institution's desire to increase transparency around revenues and 
costs,  and the desire to grow revenue while also becoming more cost effective in the 
wake of significant financial changes at the university. The UofA conducted a three-year 
internal review of RCM in 2018 but no report has been furnished publicly. As a 
consequence, we cannot discern whether, or to what extent the reviewers considered 
RCM’s impact on costs at UofA. This study investigates if and to what extent RCM 
impacted operating costs at the UofA.  
 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter highlighted how scholars have considered RCM and higher 
education costs in the extant literature. Notable among the many lessons revealed 
throughout the RCM and higher education cost literature is that academics have not yet 
considered a study on RCM in relation to costs. Moreover, the lack of theoretical 
perspectives and quantitative research on RCM has limited the field’s knowledge of 
RCM’s impact broadly. This chapter describes how this dissertation study approached 
RCM with regard to its impact on costs at two public research universities. Chapter 3: 
Methodology further describes how this study examines the influence of RCM on cost 




Chapter 3: Methodology 
Introduction 
            The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of RCM on total operating costs 
at two public research universities in the United States. Specifically, this study uncovers 
the extent to which RCM as a budget model and management tool impacted operating 
costs at the University of New Hampshire and the University of Arizona. This study is 
guided by the following research question: What is the impact of RCM on total operating 
costs at two public research universities in the United States?  
The synthetic control method (SCM) is employed to address the research 
question. For clarity and ease of understanding, I first describe SCM conceptually, 
followed by a mathematical illustration of its key components. Next, I discuss how SCM 
is an appropriate method for addressing the research question relative to other methods. 
Thereafter, I describe how in this study, I employed the SCM to address the research 
question. This includes a discussion of the pertinent data, variables, sample periods, and 
the procedures I underwent to generate results. I then conclude this chapter with some 
limitations of the SCM.  
 
Research Design 
Overview of Synthetic Control Methodology 
 The SCM is a quantitative, data-driven method developed in economics to 
estimate the causal effects of policies, programs, idiosyncratic events (e.g., natural 
disasters, terrorism, etc.), or interventions (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie, 
Diamond, & Hainmueller, 2010, 2015). SCM has been employed by scholars mostly in 
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economics but also in other fields such as public health, criminal justice, and higher 
education (Becker & Klobner, 2016; Krief, Grieve, Hangartner, Turner, Nikolova, & 
Sutton, 2016; Liu, 2015). For example, in economics, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) 
employed SCM to estimate the economic effects of terrorism in the Basque Country. 
Becker and Klobner (2016) used SCM to approximate the Mafia’s impact on per capita 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Italy. Similarly, Adhikari, Duval, Hu, and Loungani 
(2018) employed SCM to reveal the effect of economic reforms on per capita GDP in 
New Zealand, Australia, The Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, and Germany. Additionally, 
in a study estimating the effect of tourism taxation on tourism demand in Villasimius. 
Biagi, Brandano, and Pulina (2016) used SCM. Abadie et al. (2010) investigated the 
extent to which California’s Proposition 99 affected tobacco cessation using SCM. 
Additionally, SCM was employed by Abadie et al. (2015) to estimate the effect of the 
1990 German reunification on per capita GDP in West Germany. Barone and Mocetti 
(2014) used SCM to investigate the impact of natural disasters on per capita GDP in two 
Italian regions.  
At least one study from public health (i.e., Krief, Grieve, Hangartner, Turner, 
Nikolova, & Sutton, 2016) used SCM. Specifically, Krief et al (2016) used SCM to 
evaluate the impact of a pay-for-performance initiative on health outcomes at hospitals 
that implemented the initiative. Likewise, at least one criminal justice study (Rydberg, 
McGarrell, Noris, & Circo, 2018) has utilized SCM – specifically to evaluate the impact 
of a place-based police patrol intervention on violent crimes in Flint, Michigan.   
 Applied to higher education, researchers (Bonander, Jakobsson, Podesta, 
Svensson, 2016; Hinrichs, 2012; Liu, 2015; Jaquette et al., 2018) have employed SCM in 
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at least four studies. For example, Hinrichs (2012) used SCM to examine the extent to 
which California’s ban on affirmative action in college admissions impacted enrollment 
at the University of California (UC) campuses. Liu (2015) employed SCM to investigate 
the effects of the Morrill Act of 1862 (i.e., the land-grant program) on local economies 
between 1860 and 1940. Specifically, Liu (2015) examined the extent to which 
universities who received land-grant designation (as a result of the Morrill Act) impacted 
the population density of counties where the institutions are located. In a similar study, 
Bonander et al. (2016) used SCM to estimate the effects of two Swedish universities that 
were granted university rights in 1999 on regional per capita GDP. Finally, Jaquette et al. 
(2018) employed SCM to examine the effect of RCM on tuition revenue at four public 
research universities in the United States.  
To describe SCM’s procedure, utility, and appropriateness for a study on RCM, a 
simple illustration that depicts the pre-treatment and post-treatment concepts underlying 
SCM is provided in Figure A1. Thereafter, the mathematical representation of SCM is 
discussed.  
SCM Procedure 
The synthetic control method aims to estimate treatment effects through a data-
driven statistical process known as the root mean square prediction error (RMSPE). The 
purpose of the RMSPE is twofold: (a) to first construct the synthetic control unit (defined 
below); and (b) to use the synthetic control unit to estimate the post-treatment 
counterfactual (defined below).  
The synthetic control unit is an estimation of the control group (i.e., a group of 
“comparable” comparison units that did not receive the treatment). As illustrated in 
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Figure A1, the purpose of the synthetic control unit (i.e., the dotted blue line) varies 
between the pretreatment period of the study (i.e., the period before the treatment 
occurred), and the post-treatment period of the study (i.e., the period after the treatment 
occurred).  
In the pretreatment period, the synthetic control unit is approximated using a set 
of predictor variables (described below) to statistically resemble the treated unit (i.e., 
possess nearly identical characteristics, statistically speaking). The characteristics for 
colleges and universities could be: enrollment, the number of academic programs, the 
number of faculty and staff, and the operating budget, to name a few. In the pretreatment 
period, the SCM minimizes the distance (i.e., differences) between the synthetic control 
unit and the treated unit (i.e., the dotted blue line and the solid red line shown in Figure 
A1). The extent to which the treated unit and the synthetic control unit resemble one 
another impacts the estimation of the counterfactual (defined below). 
In the post-treatment period of the study, the purpose of the synthetic control unit 
is to estimate the post-treatment counterfactual using the RMSPE. The counterfactual is 
defined as the post-treatment outcome of the treated unit in the absence of the treatment 
(Krief et al., 2016). This is also illustrated in Figure A1. The post-treatment 
counterfactual is used to assess treatment effects (if any) by subtracting the post-
treatment outcome of the treated unit (i.e., the solid red line after the treatment year in 
Figure A1) from the post-treatment outcome of the counterfactual (i.e., the dotted blue 
line after the treatment year in Figure A1). Treatment effects are assessed at each interval 
in the post-treatment period. Therefore, as illustrated in Figure A1, treatment effects 
119 
 
would be assessed for 2003, 2004, and 2005. (Further discussion on these concepts is 
below.) 
Estimating a Synthetic Control Unit  
As described above, the purpose of the synthetic control unit varies between the 
pretreatment period of the study (i.e., the period before the treatment occurred) and the 
post-treatment period of the study (i.e., the period after the treatment occurred). In the 
pretreatment period, the purpose of the synthetic control unit is to statistically resemble 
the treated unit. Two elements are required to estimate a synthetic control unit in the 
pretreatment period: (1) a donor pool of “comparable” untreated units from which to 
statistically resemble the treated unit; and (2) predictors variables gleaned from theory or 
prior research that impact (or are related to) the outcome variable.  
Donor Pool. The donor pool (i.e., the group of “comparable” untreated units) is 
used to create a synthetic control unit that best resembles the treated unit during the 
pretreatment period. As suggested by Abadie et al. (2015):  
[it is important to restrict the donor pool] to units with outcomes that are thought 
to be driven by the same structural process as for the unit representing the case of 
interest and that are not subject to structural shocks to the outcome variable 
during the sample period of the study (p. 497). 
This means that researchers should develop a donor pool that includes untreated units that 
are “comparable” to the treated unit.  
Predictor variables. After the donor pool is selected, the SCM estimates a 
synthetic control unit (in the pretreatment period) using predictor variables (also called 
covariates) to predict the outcome variable under consideration (i.e., the dependent 
variable) (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). The predictor 
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variables are selected by the researcher and can come from theory and prior research on 
the outcome variable of interest (i.e., the dependent variable). The SCM procedure 
generates weights for each of the untreated units from the donor pool (based on the extent 
to which the predictor variables of the untreated units resemble the predictor variables of 
the treated unit). The SCM also assigns weights to each of the predictor variables (based 
on the extent to which the predictor variables explain the outcome variable). In both 
cases, the SCM assigns weights that range from zero to one and sum to one (Abadie et 
al., 2010, 2015). For example, untreated units from the donor pool with predictor 
variables that have weights closer to one possess more predictive power (and more 
closely resemble the treated unit in the pretreatment period) than untreated units with 
predictor variables that are weighted closer to zero. Likewise, predictor variables with 
weights closer to one have higher predictive power than those closer to zero. This 
procedure is done by minimizing the difference between the pretreatment characteristics 
of the treated unit and the pretreatment characteristics of the untreated units (i.e., the 
RMSPE) (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). Theoretically, this 
means that the treated unit and the synthetic control unit should possess nearly the same 
characteristics (i.e., predictor and outcome variables) in the pretreatment period.  
With regard to the number and type of predictor variables, Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003) note that the SCM is not stifled by the number of predictor variables. 
Moreover, SCM is not hindered by predictor variables that are unrelated to the dependent 
variable. Specifically, the SCM would assign lower weights (or weights of zero if they 
are unrelated) to variables that are unrelated (i.e., do not help to predict) the outcome 
variable (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003). This is one of the many benefits of SCM over 
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traditional regression techniques that will be discussed further below. In addition, SCM 
allows for the inclusion of lagged (i.e., pretreatment) outcome variables as predictor 
variables (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). Including predictor 
variables and isolating specific years in the analysis helps to decrease the pretreatment 
RMSPE, which in turn, helps to increase confidence in the post-treatment counterfactual 
(discussed in the next section). 
Assessing Treatment Effects 
After the synthetic control unit is generated, the SCM estimates a post-treatment 
counterfactual for each of the periods (e.g., years) in the post-treatment period. 
Specifically, the SCM approximates what would have been observed by the treated unit if 
the treatment had not occurred (i.e., the counterfactual). This, in turn, allows the 
researcher to assess the impact of a treatment (i.e., the treatment effect) after the 
treatment has occurred. This process is done by subtracting the outcome of the treated 
unit from the estimated post-treatment outcome of the synthetic control unit (Abadie & 
Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). A post-treatment outcome is estimated 
separately for each period in the post-treatment period. Thus, if there are three post-
treatment periods, then there will be three estimated post-treatment outcomes.  
Placebo Tests and Inference in SCM 
The aim of establishing causality is to minimize bias by testing alternative 
explanations for a treatment’s effect on a given outcome. In SCM, this is done through 
placebo tests and sensitivity analyses. Inference under SCM is different from inference in 
traditional regression techniques. As noted by Abadie et al. (2015):  
The use of statistical inference in comparative case studies is difficult because of 
the small-sample nature of the data, the absence of randomization, and the fact 
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that probabilistic sampling is not employed to select sample units. These 
limitations complicate the application of traditional approaches to statistical 
inference (p. 499). 
 
However, SCM procedures account for these limitations through the use of falsification 
exercises called “placebo studies” (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 
2015). These falsification exercises are akin to permutation tests. As noted by Cavallo, 
Galiani, Noy, and Pantano (2010), the quality of inference resulting from the placebo 
tests increases with the number of donor units or the number of pretreatment periods in 
the study. Placebo studies (or tests) are of at least two types: in-time placebo tests and in-
place placebo tests.  
In-time placebo tests enable the researcher to test the time-effects of treatment by 
allowing the researcher to artificially change the time in which an intervention actually 
takes place by replacing it with a time that the intervention did not take place (Abadie et 
al., 2015). The purpose of the in-time placebo test is to determine the extent to which the 
SCM results based on an artificial change in the time  an intervention might vary from the 
SCM results of when the intervention actually took place (i.e., the original SCM results). 
If the results of the in-time placebo tests reveal different results than the actual treatment 
effect, then confidence in the treatment effect is increased. However, if the results of the 
in-time placebo test are similar to the actual treatment effect, then confidence in the 
finding is diminished.  
The in-space (across unit) placebo test allows the researcher to artificially assign 
the treatment to each of the untreated units that make up the donor pool. The purpose of 
this test is to discern the probability of obtaining a placebo effect (i.e., the treatment 
effect of an untreated unit) that is at least as large as the treatment effects as the main 
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results. Specifically, using randomization inference, the in-space placebo test allows the 
researcher to estimate the cumulative distribution of "placebo" effects for each post-
treatment period. Thereafter, the researcher can calculate the probability of obtaining a 
placebo effect that is greater than or equal to the actual treatment effect for each post-
treatment period. The probability of obtaining placebo effects equal to or greater than the 
treatment effect is illustrated using p-values. As noted by Abadie et al. (2015): 
As in traditional statistical inference, a quantitative comparison between the 
distribution of placebo effects and the synthetic control estimate can be 
operationalized through the use of p-values. In this context, a p-value can be 
constructed by estimating in-space placebo effects for each unit in the sample and 
then calculating the fraction of such effects greater than or equal to the effect 
estimated for the treated unit (p. 500).  
 
Specifically, these p-values represent the probability of obtaining a placebo effect at least 
as large as the treated unit when the treatment is arbitrarily re-assigned to all non-treated 
units in the dataset. P-values closer to zero indicate greater confidence in the treatment 
effect for each period. Conversely, high p-values (i.e., those closer to one) suggest lower 
confidence in the treatment effect for that period. (A mathematical calculation of p-values 
generated from the in-place placebo test is below.)  
P-values in SCM are based on randomization inference, as noted above. Scholars 
who have employed SCM (Adhikari & Alms, 2016; Barone & Mocetti, 2014; Jaquette et 
al., 2018) determine significance based on an arbitrary threshold of the p-value  – similar 
to researchers who employ regression techniques (which determine significance based on 
hypothesis tests and confidence intervals). Specifically, scholars who have employed 
SCM have considered a treatment effect to be causally significant if the estimated p-
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values≤ 0.10. This means that a causally significant treatment effect would represent at 
most a 10% probability of the treatment effect occurring by chance. A p-value of 10% 
also represents a 90% probability that the treatment effect did not occur by chance. P-
values above 10% may indicate that a treatment had an impact on a given outcome, 
however, higher p-values include a higher probability of bias.  
Mathematical Representation of SCM 
The notation in this section to explain SCM mathematically is adopted from 
Abadie et al. (2010). Suppose there are 𝑗 + 1 units, with 𝑗 = 1serving as the treated unit 
(i.e., the unit that experienced the policy, event, or treatment) and 𝑗 = 2, . . . , 𝐽 + 1serving 
as the untreated units in the donor pool (as described above). Let the total number of 
observed pretreatment periods 𝑇0 
and the number of post-treatment periods be 𝑇1such that the total sample period is𝑇 =
𝑇0 + 𝑇1. Let 𝛼𝑗𝑡be the causal effect for unit j at time t and be expressed as:  
𝛼𝑗𝑡 = 𝑌𝑗𝑡 − 𝑌𝑗𝑡
∗   (1)  
𝑌𝑗𝑡 =  𝑌𝑗𝑡
∗ + 𝛼𝑗𝑡𝐷𝑗𝑡(2), 
where 𝑌𝑗𝑡is the observed outcome (i.e., the treated unit), 𝑌𝑗𝑡
∗ is the counterfactual, and 
𝐷𝑗𝑡is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for the treated unit after 𝑇0and takes 
the value of zero otherwise. The counterfactual is an estimation of the post-treatment 
outcome of the treated unit in the absence of the treatment. The counterfactual𝑌𝑗𝑡
∗can be 
expressed mathematically as:  
𝑌𝑗𝑡 
∗ = 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡𝛧𝑗  +  𝜆𝑡𝜇𝑗  +  𝑗𝑡 (3), 
where 𝛿𝑡 is a time fixed effect, 𝛧𝑗 is a (r ×1) vector of time-invariant covariates (not 
impacted by the treatment), 𝜃𝑡is a (1 ×r ) vector of time-varying coefficients, 𝜆𝑡is a 
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(1×F) vector of unobserved time-varying coefficients,𝜇𝑗is a (F ×1) vector of time-
invariant unobserved predictor variables, and the error terms 𝑗𝑡are unobserved transitory 
shocks across units with a mean of zero (Krief et al., 2016).   
To estimate the causal effect(s) 𝛼1𝑡  = 𝛼1𝑇0+1, . . . . , 𝛼1𝑇 for 𝑡 > 𝑇0, the SCM first 
approximates a synthetic control unit that best resembles the pretreatment characteristics 
of the treated unit𝑌𝑗𝑡and then estimates the counterfactual 𝑌𝑗𝑡
∗ for each post-treatment 
period, as shown in equation (1).  
Estimating a Synthetic Control Unit. The SCM aims to estimate the 
unobserved𝑌𝑗𝑡
∗to generate a synthetic control unit that best resembles the treated unit in 
the pretreatment period. The synthetic control unit is estimated through a data-driven 
process that assigns a weight 𝑤𝑗to each potential synthetic control (i.e., each untreated 
unit in the donor pool). The synthetic control unit can be expressed as a (𝐽 𝑥 1)vector of 
weights 𝑊 = (𝑤2, . . . , 𝑤𝐽+1)′ with 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑗 ≤ 1for 𝑗 = 2, . . . , 𝐽 + 1and 𝑤2+. . . +𝑤𝑗+1 = 1. 
Each weight within the vector W represents a potential synthetic control (i.e., untreated 
units from the donor pool) for the synthetic control unit. Specifically, the weights in W 
range from one to zero and sum to one. Synthetic controls with weights closer to zero 
have lower explanatory power compared to synthetic controls with weights closer to one. 
Applied to equation (3), the value of the outcome variable for each synthetic control is 
indexed in W and can be expressed as:  
∑𝐽+1𝑗=2 𝑤𝑗𝑌𝑗𝑡 
∗ = 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 ∑
𝐽+1
𝑗=2 𝑤𝑗𝛧𝑗  +  𝜆𝑡 ∑
𝐽+1
𝑗=2 𝑤𝑗𝜇𝑗  + ∑
𝐽+1
𝑗=2 𝑤𝑗  𝑗𝑡 (4) 
 As noted by Abadie et al. (2015) and Fremeth et al. (2016), a donor pool may 
contain heterogeneity based on the pretreatment predictor variables used to create the 
synthetic control unit. However, researchers should not select synthetic controls (i.e., 
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untreated units from the donor pool) to be a part of the synthetic control unit if those units 
do not have relatively high weights, 𝑊(Abadie et al., 2010). The data-driven process to 
estimate the synthetic control unit is called the root mean square prediction error 
(RMSPE).  
In the pretreatment period, the RMSPE allows researchers to select untreated units 
to be a part of the synthetic control unit based on the weights generated by the 
calculation. Using the RMSPE, SCM chooses 𝑊to minimize the weighted difference 
between the treated unit and synthetic control unit based on the values of the pre-
treatment predictor variables of the outcome variable (i.e., the dependent variable). The 





𝑡=1 (𝑌1𝑡 − ∑
𝐽+1
𝑗=2 𝑤𝑗 𝑌𝑗𝑡 
∗ ) 2      
As discussed previously, the set of predictor variables can include lagged outcome 
variables, as well as predictor variables in specific years. The predictor variables that 
have a strong relationship to the outcome variable receive higher weights in determining 
𝑊compared to predictor variables that do not have strong predictive power (Abadie & 
Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015).  
The process of selecting 𝑊is based on the pretreatment predictor variables 𝑘. Let 
𝑋1be a (𝑘 𝑥 1)vector containing the values of the pretreatment variables for the treated 
unit and let 𝑋0be a 𝑘 𝑥 𝑗 matrix containing the values of the pretreatment variables for the 
untreated units 𝑗 = 2, . . . , 𝐽 + 1. 𝑊minimizes the difference between the pretreatment 
variables of the treated unit 𝑋1and the pretreatment variables of the synthetic control unit 
𝑋0𝑊. This process can be expressed as:  




where 𝑣𝑚represents the weight that reflects the predictive power of variable 𝑚on the 
outcome variable and 𝑉represents a non-negative, diagonal matrix whose elements sum 
to one. As mentioned previously, predictors with higher explanatory power have values 
𝑣𝑚closer to one and those with minimal or no explanatory power have values 𝑣𝑚closer to 
zero.  
 Assessing Treatment Effects. After the synthetic control unit is estimated – 
using the appropriate untreated units (from the donor pool) whose pretreatment predictor 
variables closely resemble the pretreatment variables of the treated unit – researchers can 
then estimate the treatment effect using the post-treatment RMSPE. Specifically, the 
post-treatment RMSPE approximates a counterfactual for each of the post-treatment 
periods in the study. Treatment effects are estimated by simply taking the difference 
between the outcome of the treated unit from the counterfactual (i.e., the outcome of the 
synthetic control unit in the absence of the treatment). Therefore, to estimate the causal 
effect(s) 𝛼1𝑡  = 𝛼1𝑇0+1, . . . . , 𝛼1𝑇 for 𝑡 > 𝑇0, mathematically, this process can be 
expressed as: 
𝛼1𝑡 = 𝑌1𝑡 − 𝑌1𝑡
∗ = 𝑌1𝑡 − ∑
𝐽+1
𝑗=2 𝑤𝑗 𝑌1𝑡 
∗     (5), 
where 𝑌1𝑡represents the outcome of the treated unit, 𝑤𝑗  represents the weights of the 
synthetic controls 𝑗 = 2, . . . , 𝐽 + 1at time 𝑡 for the counterfactual 𝑌1𝑡 
∗ . The treatment 
effect must be calculated separately for each time 𝑡 of the posttreatment. Placebo tests, as 
described above, are conducted to test for the robustness of the findings.  
 Placebo Tests and Inference. SCM employs a series of falsification tests (similar 
to permutation tests) to examine the quality and robustness of the estimated treatment 
effects (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010; Cavallo et al., 2010). 
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Specifically, the in-space (across unit) placebo test is an iterative test that arbitrarily re-
assigns the treatment to each of the untreated units in the donor pool. This placebo test 
allows the researcher to identify whether the estimated effect of the actual treatment is 
large relative to the cumulative distribution of the estimated “treatment” effects of the 
untreated units (i.e., placebo effects).  
P-values in SCM are probabilities based on the extent to which the distribution of 
placebo effects reveals more effects that are larger than the actual treatment effect. Using 
the in-space placebo test as an example, Galiani & Quistorff (2016) show two 
calculations for p-values. The first (illustrated below) is a two-sided p-value:  
𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑃𝑟(|𝛼1𝑡
𝑃𝐿| ≥ | 𝛼1𝑡|)  =  




𝑃𝐿is the specific placebo effect of the number of possible placebo averages,𝛼1𝑡 is 
the actual treatment effect at time t, and J is the total number of donors. The p-value in 
SCM should be interpreted as the proportion of control units that have an estimated 
placebo effect that is at least as large as the actual treatment. P-values indicate the extent 
to which the actual treatment occurred by chance. Therefore, p-values closer to zero 
indicate greater confidence in the actual treatment effects. Specifically, low p-values 
suggest a low probability that the actual treatment effect occurred by chance. Conversely, 
high p-values (i.e., those closer to one) suggest lower confidence in the actual treatment 
effects, suggesting a higher probability that the actual treatment effects occurred by 
chance. 
Appropriateness of SCM 
 As has been described, SCM has been viewed by researchers as an appropriate 
technique to analyze the effect of policies, programs, events, interventions, and rare 
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idiosyncratic phenomena. Specifically, SCM can estimate an appropriate counterfactual 
when other statistical methods fall short (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 
2010, 2015). Indeed, researchers have used other quasi-experimental techniques, the most 
common being the difference-in-differences (DID) technique, to estimate treatment 
effects. The DID approach approximates a counterfactual based on the behavior of a set 
of comparison units, similar to SCM. However, the DID technique is limited in ways that 
make it inappropriate for a study on RCM for several reasons worth noting.  
First, the DID approach is limited because it cannot account for the effects of 
time-variant unobserved variables on the dependent variable (Abadie et al., 2010). 
Specifically, this means that the DID technique would produce a biased comparison 
group and a biased counterfactual (i.e., what would have been observed by the treated 
unit in the absence of the treatment) by extension (Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). With 
respect to this limitation, the DID approach would not be appropriate for a study RCM 
for three reasons: (1) RCM is a very nuanced budget model such that no one institution 
operates it the same way; (2) universities may modify their RCM models during a sample 
period of a study; and (3) RCM has been adopted across various years (Hearn et al., 
2006; Jaquette et al., 2018). Specifically, each of these three reasons may affect the time-
variant unobserved factors that may impact a given outcome variable. Therefore, the 
inability of DID to account for unobserved variables over time will likely bias the 
comparison group and post-treatment counterfactual.  
A key feature of SCM can address this limitation of DID, however. Specifically, 
SCM allows the effects of observed and unobserved variables to vary over time (Abadie 
et al., 2010). With regard to a study on RCM – as evidenced by Jaquette et al. (2018) – 
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this feature of SCM is attractive because it allows the researcher to approximate a reliable 
control group and post-treatment counterfactual by extension.  
The DID technique is also limited because it estimates average treatment effects. 
This feature of DID is particularly not useful for a study on RCM because there are so 
few known colleges and universities that have implemented RCM relative to the total 
number of colleges and universities. For example, as noted by Curry et al. (2013) and 
Jaquette et al. (2018), there are fewer than 60 known colleges and universities that have 
fully adopted RCM. In that respect, the DID technique would be inappropriate for a study 
on RCM because an average treatment effect of RCM may likely be biased toward zero. 
For example, the treatment effect of “good” RCM models (where there may be positive 
effects) may be overrun by the effect of ineffective RCM models (where there may be 
negative treatment effects) after computing the average treatment effect over a relatively 
small number of institutions that use RCM (Jaquette et al., 2018). This limitation extends 
to other quasi-experimental approaches, such as propensity score matching and 
instrumental variables (IV) regression – both of which also estimate average treatment 
effects.   
However, with regard to this limitation of DID and other quasi-experimental 
approaches, two key features of SCM make it more attractive for a study on RCM. First, 
SCM calls for smaller sample sizes and allows the researcher to select the treated and 
untreated units without random or probabilistic sampling techniques (Abadie & 
Gardeazabal; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). Specifically, due to the small number of 
institutions that have adopted RCM, DID would perhaps produce more accurate results 
(i.e., average treatment effects) if there are more RCM institutions in the study. 
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Specifically, there would be more institutions with which to estimate an average 
treatment effect. Additionally, the second notable feature of SCM is that it estimates the 
treatment effects of one case at a time (Adhikari et al., 2018). This feature is particularly 
useful for studies on RCM due to the relatively few institutions that have adopted it. 
Specifically, by estimating the treatment effects of one case at a time, SCM would 
estimate the actual treatment effect versus an average treatment effect (Abadie et al., 
2010; Adhikari et al., 2018). Therefore, the results of a SCM analysis would be more 
precise than the DID approach.  
Additionally, the DID technique is limited in its ability to approximate the extent 
to which the comparison unit (i.e., the control group) resembles the treated unit in the 
pre-treatment period (i.e., prior to the treatment). Theoretically, using DID, this suggests 
that a researcher could produce a biased control group and therefore estimate a biased 
average treatment effect. This limitation is inappropriate for a study on RCM due to the 
variability that exists among institutions that use RCM, noted above. However, unlike 
DID, the SCM technique can account for this limitation. Specifically, the SCM generates 
weights that illustrate the extent to which untreated units and their corresponding 
predictor variables resemble the treated unit and its corresponding predictor variables 
(Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). In other words, SCM provides 
the researcher with information on how well the set of comparison units resemble the 
treated unit in the pretreatment period and what variables possess the most explanatory 
power (Abadie et al., 2015).  
The DID approach is also limited as a consequence of one of its key assumptions 
– that is, the parallel trends assumption. This assumption requires the difference between 
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the treated unit and the post-treatment counterfactual to be constant over time. This 
feature of DID is particularly not appropriate for a study on RCM because year-to-year 
differences between the treated unit and the post-treatment counterfactual are possible. 
Specifically, in a study on RCM’s impact on tuition revenue, Jaquette et al. (2018) 
revealed different year-to-year treatment effects for three of the four institutions in the 
study. This would violate the parallel trends assumption of the DID approach. However, 
SCM does not possess the same assumption or restriction as shown by researchers using 
SCM to estimate multi-year treatment effects.  
In addition to the DID approach and other quasi-experimental methods, traditional 
regression techniques also are inappropriate for a study on the effects of RCM on total 
operating costs. For example, in a study on the effects of Proposition 99, a tobacco 
control program implemented in California in 1988, Abadie et al. (2010) used SCM to 
estimate that by the year 2000, per-capita cigarette sales were 26 packs lower than what 
they would have been in the absence of Proposition 99. A similar study on Proposition 99 
was conducted by Fichtenberg and Glantz (2000) using least-squares regression. 
Fitchenberg et al. (2000) found that smoking consumption had been reduced after 
Proposition 99 at a rate of 0.67 fewer packs per year between 1993 and 1997. This would 
translate to about 14 fewer packs per year by the year 2000, which is substantially below 
what Abadie and colleagues found. Abadie et al. (2010) suggest that the resulting 
difference in their finding and that of Fitchenberg et al. (2000) was due to the inability of 
regression to appropriately generate a comparison group. As described above, SCM 
generates weights that range from zero to one and sum to one based on the extent to 
which untreated units resemble the treated unit in the pretreatment period. This allows the 
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researcher to appropriately select a viable comparison group and counterfactual by 
extension.  
However, in generating a comparison group, regression techniques do not restrict 
the linear combination of coefficients (i.e., covariates/predictor variables) to remain 
between zero and one, nor do they sum to one (Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). This, in turn, 
requires the regression model to extrapolate beyond the available data to generate a 
comparison group and it does not allow the researcher to discern which comparison units 
(and predictor variables) possess the most explanatory power (Abadie et al., 2015). 
Considering the importance of generating a viable control group when estimating 
treatment effects, as explained above, regression techniques, too, are not appropriate for a 
study on the effects of RCM. 
 
Methodological Approach in Context 
Theoretical Framework 
 This study is guided by two theoretical frameworks: principal-agent theory (PAT) 
and Bowen’s (1980) revenue theory of cost, as described in Chapter 2: Literature 
Review. Using the SCM procedure, these theoretical perspectives guided the selection of 
data, including the predictor variables used to generate a synthetic control unit for each of 
the two universities in this study, as well as the explanation of how RCM impacted total 
operating costs at each of the two universities in the study.  
PAT frames the principal-agent relationship between central administration and 
deans (i.e., the leaders of academic responsibility centers) at two public research 
universities that have adopted RCM – consistent with previous research (Jaquette et al., 
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2018). Specifically, I argue that under RCM, the goal of principals (i.e., central 
administration), in addition to increasing revenue (as has been explored by scholars), is 
also to minimize costs (Deering & Sá, 2014; Jaquette et al., 2018).  
Bowen’s (1980) revenue theory of costs theoretically frames the impact of 
revenues on costs. Specifically, this study incorporated variables on college and 
university revenue sources because RTC suggests that colleges and universities raise 
revenue and spend it all (i.e., revenues impact costs).  
Sample Selection  
The University of New Hampshire (UNH) and the University of Arizona (UofA) 
were selected for several reasons. First, the leaders of each of these institutions cited 
(among others) that their motivation to implement RCM was to incentivize cost 
minimization across their respective institutions. Because universities that use RCM have 
cited different reasons for implementing it, the intent of university leaders at UNH and 
UofA to implement RCM as a means to minimize costs was a key factor in selecting 
them. Secondly, these institutions were selected because there was adequate public data 
available with regard to how both UNH and UofA operate their RCM models. 
Additionally, there was sufficient public record available on each of the institutions’ 
websites to understand the context in which these universities operated when they 
implemented RCM. An adequate public record was not available on the websites or in the 
records of other universities that were considered for this study. Third, as illustrated in 
Table A2, each of these institutions has different levels of experience with RCM – 
specifically, UNH adopted RCM in the year 2000 and UofA adopted RCM in 2015. 
Fourth, each university implements RCM differently – that is, they employ different 
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funding formulas and allocation rules. Finally, the synthetic control method (the method 
used in this study) allows the researcher to assess the treatment effects of one unit (i.e., 
university) at a time. Therefore, the number of cases that are selected by the researcher is 
inconsequential (i.e., there is no minimum or maximum number required). 
Data and Variables 
 This study utilizes two institution-level datasets (one for each university in the 
study) to address the research question. Two institution-level datasets were used to 
account for the different sample periods (described below) of UNH and the UofA. The 
outcome variable is total operating costs and is defined as the sum of expenditures on 
academic administration, institutional administration, instruction, and student services. 
The predictor variables in this study have been adopted from previous research on higher 
education costs (see Table A3). Specifically, these empirical studies (e.g., Archibald & 
Feldman, 2018; Brinkman, 1981, 2000, 2006; Cohn, et al., 1989; deGroot et al., 1991; 
Doyle, 2015; Laband & Lentz, 2003; Robst, 2001; Sav, 2004; Titus et al., 2017) have 
revealed several determinants of costs (e.g., institutional size, institution scope, 
undergraduate versus graduate education costs (i.e., level of instruction), academic 
program mix, and revenues) that are used in this study. Specifically, to represent 
institutional size, institution scope, and level of instruction (as described in Chapter 2: 
Literature Review), the following variables were gleaned from previous research: full-
time equivalent undergraduate enrollment, graduate headcount, the number of full-time 
faculty, research expenditures, and the average faculty salary. Additionally, to represent 
academic program mix, the proportion of students graduating with degrees in science, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) out of the total number of graduates 
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was included. Finally, to understand the relationship between revenue and costs, as 
guided by Bowen’s (1980) revenue theory of costs, the following revenue variables were 
included: tuition and fee revenue, state appropriations, private gifts, grants, and contracts, 
the proportion of tuition and fee revenue out of total revenue, and the proportion of state 
appropriation revenue out of total revenue.  
As illustrated by Table A3, the primary source of these data is from the National 
Center for Education Statistics Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 
(IPEDS). Secondarily, information about the RCM funding formulas and historical 
accounts of RCM at the two respective public research universities in this study came 
from publicly available reports, letters, and websites.  
Lastly, for the purposes of generating a viable donor pool (and synthetic control 
unit by extension) for each of the universities in the study, I excluded all universities 
suggested by Jaquette et al. (2018). Specifically, I excluded from the donor pool all 
institutions that have adopted RCM (see Table A1), including the universities in states 
that experienced “idiosyncratic shocks” such as all public research universities in 
Louisiana as a result of Hurricane Katrina, all public research universities in Colorado 
due to the state’s change in how public higher education is funded, and Arizona State 
University was excluded due to the institution’s expansion of the “New American 
University” initiative. The purpose of excluding these institutions was to ensure the donor 
pool, synthetic control unit, and post-treatment counterfactual were not biased.  
Procedure 
 As described above, the SCM procedure is conducted as follows: (1) estimate a 
synthetic control unit based on the weights of the untreated units in the donor pool; (2) 
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assess the treatment effects (if any) by generating a counterfactual for each time period in 
the post-treatment period and subtracting the outcome of the treated unit from the 
outcome of the synthetic control unit; and (3) and conduct placebo tests to discern the 
robustness of the findings. However, prior to SCM analysis, I first prepared the data by 
building two separate datasets – one for each of the universities in this study. Thus, the 
procedure that is described below was conducted twice – once for each of the two 
institutions in this study. 
Prepare the Data for Analysis. First, to generate a donor pool, I accessed IPEDS 
and extracted the data to include all public universities in the United States that possess a 
doctoral university Carnegie classification with moderate research activity, higher 
research activity, and highest research activity. The Carnegie classification for selecting 
doctoral universities to be a part of the donor pool differs for UNH and UofA to account 
for the different sample periods.  
Specifically, the Carnegie classification for selecting doctoral universities for the 
UNH dataset is based on the 2000 classification. This generated an original list (i.e., 
before data cleaning) of 165 institutions, including UNH. The Carnegie classification for 
the UofA dataset is based on the 2015 classification. This generated an original list (i.e., 
before data cleaning) of 195 institutions, including UofA. Thereafter, I selected the 
appropriate variables in the study as listed in Table A3 from the sample years for each 
university in this study (described below).  
Sample Periods. The University of New Hampshire officially implemented RCM 
in 2000. The entire sample period for UNH is 1989-90 to 2004-2005. The pre-treatment 
period begins in 1989-90 and ends the year prior to RCM implementation at UNH, 1998-
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99. The post-treatment period includes each year after RCM implementation for five 
years. A five-year post-treatment period is selected for two reasons: (a) consistent with 
prior research (Hearn et al., 2006; Jaquette et al., 2018); and (b) the UNH reviewed and 
modified its original RCM formulas and policies after the fifth year. Therefore, for 
consistency, I evaluated the treatment effects of RCM on total operating costs in 2000-01, 
2001-02, 2002-03, 2003-04, and 2004-05. 
The University of Arizona implemented RCM in 2015. Thus, the RCM model is 
relatively new and does not have many post-treatment observations due to data 
availability. The overall sample period begins in 1989-90 and ends in 2017-18 (the most 
recently available data in IPEDS). The pre-treatment period extends from 1989-90 and 
ends in 2013-14 (i.e., the year prior to RCM implementation). The treatment effects were 
evaluated for three years: in 2015-16, 2016-17, and 2017-18. Three years of post-
treatment analysis was sufficient to assess robust treatment effects, as will be described in 
Chapter 4: Results.  
Data Cleaning. After downloading the data from IPEDS into Microsoft Excel, I 
used the criteria listed by Jaquette et al. (2018) (described above) for excluding 
institutions from the donor pool. Additionally, I excluded institutions that were missing 
data for any of the variables across the sample years in the study. As described by Abadie 
et al. (2010, 2015) and Galiani and Quistorff (2016), SCM requires a strongly balanced 
dataset to create a viable synthetic control unit and counterfactual by extension. For 
UNH, these data cleaning exercises reduced the dataset from 165 institutions to 133 
institutions, including UNH. With regard to UofA, these exercises reduced the dataset 
from 195 institutions to 127 institutions.  
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Lastly, I imported the data from Microsoft Excel to the statistical software Stata. 
The data were transformed from a wide format to a long format to allow for the analysis 
of the cross-sectional time-series data. Using the tsset command in Stata, I declared the 
data to be time-series data – a requirement to conduct the SCM analysis (described 
below). After declaring the dataset as time-series (i.e., the tsset command in Stata), I 
conducted the data analysis.  
Data Analysis. The data were analyzed in three phases: descriptive analysis, 
SCM analysis, and placebo tests, and sensitivity analysis for robustness. First, I 
conducted some descriptive data analysis by generating the means, standard deviations, 
ranges, medians, and percentiles of all variables in the dataset for each of the institutions 
in this study and across each of their respective sample periods.  
Next, using the synth command and syntax in Stata, I conducted a SCM analysis 
to generate a synthetic control unit. The synth command is a user-written command 
developed by Abadie, Hainmuller, and Diamond (2011). It allows the researcher to 
declare the dependent variable, the predictor variables, the treated unit, and the treatment 
period to generate the pre-treatment RMSPE and the synthetic control unit. The results of 
this command generated a list of the universities that make up the synthetic control unit, 
as well as their corresponding weights. The pre-treatment RMSPEs of each predictor 
variable also shows the extent to which each predictor variable of the synthetic control 
unit resembles the characteristics of the treated unit (see Table A3).  
After the synthetic control unit was estimated using the synth command, I 
analyzed the treatment effects of RCM on total operating costs using the synth_runner 
command in Stata. The synth_runner command was developed by Galiani et al. (2016) 
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and allows the researcher to run multiple synthetic control estimations, calculate the 
treatment effects of multiple post-treatment years, and conduct in-space placebo tests 
simultaneously.  
After running the synth_runner command, which provided the treatment effects 
for each year of the post-treatment period and in-place (across-unit) placebo test results, I 
conducted sensitivity analysis called the leave-one-out test. The leave-one-out test 
allowed me to remove the most critical synthetic control (i.e., the university with the 
highest weight w) from the synthetic control unit and rerun the synth_runner command. 
I compared the line plots of the cost trends and post-treatment RMSPE generated by the 
synth_runner command from the original SCM analysis with the line plots of the cost 
trends and post-treatment RMSPE of the sensitivity analysis to make a determination on 
the robustness of the findings. The mains results of the study are discussed in the next 
chapter; the sensitivity analysis is depicted in Appendix B. 
 
Limitations 
This study was designed to shed light on RCM’s effect regarding total operating 
costs at two public research universities in the United States. However, this study is 
limited with regard to data availability and with regard to the methodological approach.  
Regarding data availability, this study is limited because data at the academic-unit 
(e.g., college or school) level are unavailable. Due to the lack of available data at the 
academic unit level, this study cannot reveal how RCM might have impacted operating 
costs at the colleges and schools within the universities in the study. As has been noted, 
RCM incentivizes (among other goals) cost minimization at the academic unit level (e.g., 
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schools, colleges, and departments) through the use of funding formulas and devolved 
financial responsibility (Curry et al., 2013; Strauss & Curry, 2002; Whalen, 1991). 
However, because academic-unit level data are reported in aggregate, this study assumes 
implicitly that the impact of RCM on total operating costs are revealed in the aggregate 
as well. 
In addition to data availability at the academic-unit level, this study is limited due 
to the lack of data that defines which institutions have fully implemented RCM. This 
limitation has methodological implications as well. Specifically, this study excludes 
institutions from the donor pool that have fully implemented RCM under a formal review 
process commissioned by the president or provost of the university. However, as 
described above, the SCM technique requires the researcher to identify a donor pool of 
untreated units in order to generate a viable synthetic control unit. Because there is no 
central database of institutions that use RCM, it is possible that the donor pools that were 
used to generate a synthetic control unit for each of the two universities in this study 
included some institutions that use RCM. This could potentially produce biased 
estimates. To mitigate the possibility, all known RCM universities were excluded from 
the donor pool. The list of known RCM universities was developed by Curry et al. 
(2013), adopted by Jaquette et al. (2018), and supplemented using reports and websites 
(see Table A1). 
In addition to the data limitations, this study is limited methodologically for at 
least two reasons. First, the synthetic control method cannot account for idiosyncratic 
shocks that may occur around the treatment date for a unit under investigation (Adhikari, 
Duval, Hu, & Loungani, 2018). As noted previously, all untreated units could, 
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theoretically, be removed from the donor pool to improve the estimation of pretreatment 
and post-treatment counterfactual. However, any shocks caused by random events to the 
treated unit cannot be controlled for using SCM. Secondly, SCM is limited because it 
does not address all sources of endogeneity such as reverse causality (Adhikari et al., 
2018). Indeed, one of the key assumptions in SCM is that all predictor variables are both 
independent of the treatment and independent of the error term. However, Abadie et al. 
(2010) proved that SCM can substantially reduce endogeneity caused by omitted variable 
bias. Specifically, SCM (as noted above) can take into account time-varying unobserved 
confounders when estimating an appropriate synthetic control unit and counterfactual by 
extension. Despite these limitations, however, SCM is the most appropriate technique to 
address the research question, as shown in the Appropriateness section above.    
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Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
 This study examines the impact of Responsibility Center Management (RCM) on 
costs at two public research universities in the United States: the University of New 
Hampshire and the University of Arizona. These two institutions of higher education 
sought and implemented RCM for several reasons, however, the most salient among them 
was to minimize costs. This chapter describes the results of the synthetic control analysis 
that was conducted to investigate the extent to which RCM impacted total operating 
costs. The analysis and results will be discussed below.  
 
Findings 
University of New Hampshire 
Founded in 1866, the University of New Hampshire (UNH) is a public research 
university located in Durham, New Hampshire. UNH is the state flagship institution and 
currently enrolls over 13,000 undergraduates and over 2,000 graduate students across 13 
colleges and schools (UNH Facts and Figures, 2019). UNH implemented RCM on July 1, 
2000, after an 18-month RCM exploration study was conducted at the request of the then 
university president Joan Leitzel. President Leitzel cited five reasons for moving the 
campus to RCM. Among them she noted “[t]here will be stronger incentives for cost 
effectiveness and revenue generation” (Joan Leitzel, personal communication, January 
14, 2000) because the university had experienced significant changes in enrollment, total 




Table 4.1A illustrates descriptive statistics of key variables of the University of 
New Hampshire over the pretreatment period of the study (i.e., 1990-1999). Table 4.1B 
shows the values of each variable during the treatment period (i.e., the year 2000) and 
each of the post-treatment periods (i.e., 2001 through 2005). As shown in Table 4.1A, the 
average total operating costs over the pretreatment period was $98.26 million and ranged 
from $76.27 million to $116.69 million. In the treatment year, as illustrated in Table 
4.1B, operating costs were $120.09 million. Operating costs rose in current dollars (i.e., 
not adjusted for inflation) each year after RCM had been implemented. Specifically, after 
the first year of RCM implementation, operating costs rose to $125.41 million and 
continued to rise thereafter. For example, operating costs went from $139.13 million in 
2002 to $167.86 million in 2005.  
The average number of full-time equivalent (FTE) undergraduate students was 
10,776 and ranged from 9,914 to 11,496 in the pretreatment period (see Table 4.1A). 
During the treatment- and post-treatment periods, the number of FTE undergraduate 
students increased each year between 2000 and 2004 (see Table 4.1B). Specifically, FTE 
undergraduates rose from 10,878 in 2000 to 11,692 in 2004. However, undergraduate 
enrollment decreased between 2004 and 2005.  
The number of graduate students ranged from 1,960 to 2,936 and averaged at 
2,936 over the pretreatment period of the study (see Table 4.1A). UNH enrolled 2,784 
graduate students when RCM was implemented in 2000. Similar to undergraduate 
enrollment, the number of graduate students fluctuated over the post-treatment period. 
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Despite fluctuating enrollment between this period, UNH enrolled more graduate 
students in 2005 than in 2001.  
Between 1990 and 1999, the average number of faculty at UNH was 589. As 
shown in Table 4.1B, the number of full-time faculty grew from 592 in 2000 to 665 in 
2005. Similarly, the average nine-month equated faculty salary was $46,464 in the pre-
treatment period and increased each year after RCM had been implemented. Specifically, 
the average faculty salary rose in current dollars from $56,072 in 2000 to $75,273 in 
2005.  
The average research expenditures at UNH was $41.99 million prior to RCM 
implementation. Indeed, research expenditures ranged from $27.91 million to $53.36 
million over the pretreatment period. Research expenditures increased each year in 
current dollars between 2000 and 2004, peaking at $93.89 million in 2004.  
Nearly 28% of bachelor’s degrees conferred by UNH between 1990 and 1999 
were from a science, technology, engineering, and/or mathematics (STEM) field on 
average. This percentage ranged from 25% to 30.8% over the pretreatment period. The 
percentage of STEM bachelor’s degrees conferred fluctuated between 2000 and 2005. 
Specifically, the percentage of STEM degrees decreased from 27.4% in 2000 to 23.8% in 
2003 but increased from 2003 to 2004. Between 2004 and 2005, the percent of STEM 
degrees decreased again from 26.2% to 24.6% respectively.  
Similar to the variables for enrollment, faculty, and the number of STEM degrees 
conferred, the revenue predictor variables fluctuated over the study period. The average 
tuition and fee revenue in the pretreatment period was $85.68 million. Tuition revenue 
represented 34.7% of total revenue at UNH over the same period. Both tuition and fee 
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revenue and the proportion of tuition and fee revenue out of total revenue increased 
between 2000 and 2005. Specifically, tuition and fee revenue rose in current dollars from 
$114.18 million in 2000 to $146.14 million in 2005. This corresponded with an increase 
in the proportion of tuition and fee revenue out of total revenue from 33.9% in 2000 to 
35.1% in 2005.  
Revenue from state appropriations also increased over the study period. For 
example, during the pretreatment period, the average state appropriation was $42.78 
million and ranged from $35.31 million to $48.81 million. State appropriations increased 
in current dollars from $51.14 million in 2000 to $58.24 million in 2005, after RCM had 
been implemented. However, the proportion of state appropriations out of total revenue 
decreased. The average proportion of state appropriations from total revenue at UNH was 
about 17.5% over the pretreatment period. After RCM was implemented, the proportion 
of state appropriations decreased from 15.2% in 2000 to 13.8% in 2005. 
Lastly, revenue from private grants, gifts, and contracts ranged from $8.84 million 
to $19.13 million throughout the pretreatment period of the study. After RCM was 
implemented in 2000, revenue from private grants, gifts, and contracts decreased in 






































10 2,468 369 1,960 2,181 2,364 2,894 2,936 
Full-time Faculty 
 










10 $46,464 $15,809 $3,043 $46,194 $51,252 $53,346 $57,740 
Percent (%) of 
STEM bachelor’s 
degrees produced 
out of total 
conferred 
 
10 27.6 2.2 25.0 25.2 27.5 29.3 30.8 





























Percent (%) of 
Tuition and Fee 
Revenue out of 
Total Revenue 
 
10 34.7 0.9 33.3 34.3 34.7 35.1 36.4 
Percent (%) of 
State 
Appropriation 
Revenue out of 
Total Revenue 
10 17.5 1.2 16.0 16.6 17.3 18.0 19.8 
 
Table 4.1B Descriptive Statistics – University of New Hampshire (Treatment and Post-
treatment Periods) 
 Treatment Period Post-Treatment Period 
Variable 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total Operating Costs 
(outcome variable) (in 
millions) 
 









2,784 2,790 2,707 2,884 3,018 2,988 
Full-time Faculty 
 




$64.49 $72.94 $75.10 $83.02 $93.89 $89.02 
Average Faculty Salary 
(9-month equated salary) 
 
$56,072 $61,417 $66,762 $69,895 $71,513 $75,273 
Percent  (%) of STEM 
bachelor’s degrees 
produced out of total 
conferred  
 
27.4 26.0 24.7 23.8 26.2 24.6 
Tuition and Fee Revenue 
(in millions) 
 
$114.18 $120.56 $126.92 $134.25 $146.14 $146.14 
State Appropriation 
Revenue (in millions) 
 
 
$51.14 $53.75 $56.47 $57.22 $56.76 $58.24 
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 Treatment Period Post-Treatment Period 
Variable 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Revenue from Private 
Gifts, Grants, and 
Contracts (in millions) 
 
$23.40 $23.75 $10.95 $9.59 $9.25 $9.02 
Percent (%)  of Tuition 
and Fee Revenue out of 
Total Revenue 
 
33.9 33.8 35.2 36.6 35.6 35.1 
Percent (%) of State 
Appropriation Revenue 
out of Total Revenue 
15.2 15.1 15.6 15.6 13.8 13.8 
 
 
Synthetic University of New Hampshire 
Using the synthetic control method, specifically the synth command in Stata, I 
estimated a control group known as the synthetic control unit by identifying donor units 
(untreated units) from the donor pool who’s predictor variables best resembled the 
pretreatment characteristics (predictor variables) of the treated unit. Specifically, the 
synthetic control method assigned a weight (w) to each of the units in the donor pool. The 
weights ranged from zero to one and summed to one. Donor units with weights above 
zero were selected to be a part of the synthetic control unit. 
Table 4.2 shows the composition of the synthetic control unit for UNH. The 
synthetic control unit was estimated using the synth command in Stata. Hereafter the 
synthetic control unit for UNH is referred to as Synthetic University of New Hampshire 
or Synthetic UNH. Synthetic UNH is composed of seven universities: University of 
Vermont, Montana State University, Central Michigan University, North Dakota State 
University, College of William and Mary, Mississippi State University, and the 
University of Massachusetts Lowell. The weighted characteristics (predictor variables) of 
Synthetic UNH were used to estimate a pretreatment root mean square prediction error 
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(RMSPE) and a post-treatment counterfactual for each period after RCM was 
implemented.  
The University of Vermont possesses the most predictive power (over 47%) for 
operating costs at UNH because the University of Vermont’s pretreatment characteristics 
most closely resemble those of UNH. This means, for example, that the predictor 
variables for the University of Vermont will provide the most influence on estimating the 
pretreatment RMSPE and the post-treatment counterfactual for each period. Below, I 
describe the pretreatment data analysis and treatment effects.   
 
Table 4.2 Synthetic Control Unit for University of New Hampshire (Synthetic UNH) 
UnitID Institutions (synthetic controls) State Weight (w) 
231174 University of Vermont VT 0.471 
180461 Montana State University MT 0.197 
169248 Central Michigan University MI 0.12 
200332 North Dakota State University-Main Campus ND 0.087 
231624 College of William and Mary VA 0.081 
176080 Mississippi State University MS 0.022 
166513 University of Massachusetts-Lowell MA 0.021 
 
 
Analysis of Pre-treatment Data 
After the synthetic control unit was estimated, I used the SCM to approximate: (1) 
the predictor variable values for the synthetic control unit that produced the lowest 
pretreatment root mean square prediction error (RMSPE) and (2) the weights (𝑣𝑘) of each 
predictor variable in the analysis. Table 4.3 illustrates the predictor variable values for the 
University of New Hampshire and the estimated predictor variable values for Synthetic 
UNH (i.e., the control group). The predictor variable values for Synthetic UNH were 
estimated based on the weights (w) from each synthetic unit (i.e., each university that is 
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part of Synthetic UNH). All predictor variables, including the outcome variable, total 
operating cost, were included over two different periods: 1991 and 1999. Consistent with 
other studies that employ SCM (Barone & Mocetti, 2014; Eren & Ozbeklik, 2016; 
Jaquette et al., 2018; Liu, 2015), year-specified variables were included in the analysis to 
produce the lowest possible pretreatment RMSPE. Possessing a low pretreatment 
RMSPE minimizes the difference between the treated unit and the synthetic control unit. 
In theory, the pretreatment predictor variables of UNH and Synthetic UNH two should be 
nearly identical. This, in turn, increases confidence in the post-treatment counterfactual.  
The specific years of 1991 and 1999 were selected after a series of iterative 
exercises were conducted. Specifically, I included a year-specified variable for all 
predictor variables in the year preceding the treatment (i.e., 1999). Next, I used the synth 
command in Stata to identify which combination of other variables would produce the 
lowest pretreatment RMSPE. After testing over 20 different combinations of variables 
across different years, I concluded that including all predictor variables in 1991 and 1999 
produced the lowest pretreatment RMSPE. Specifically, the pretreatment RMSPE 
produced by this set of predictor variables was 3.84. This means that the average 
difference in total operating costs between the treated unit and the synthetic control unit 
(Synthetic UNH) in the pre-treatment period is $3.84 million. This pretreatment RMSPE 
represents less than four percent of UNH's pretreatment average total operating costs. 
Thus, the difference in operating costs between the treated unit (UNH) and the synthetic 
control unit (Synthetic UNH) is trivial. This suggests a good pretreatment fit and 
increases confidence in the estimated synthetic control unit (i.e., Synthetic UNH).   
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Table 4.3 also shows the average predictor variable values of the unweighted 
donor pool. The donor pool predictor variable values are shown in Table 4.3 to illustrate 
that the synthetic control unit is a better control group than the unweighted donor pool. 
For example, by comparing the values of the predictor variables for UNH to the 
estimated predictor variables of Synthetic UNH and the predictor variables of the 
unweighted donor pool, it is clear that the Synthetic UNH is a better control group than 
the unweighted donor pool. For example, the outcome variable for total operating costs in 
1991 is $82.06 million for UNH, $82.87 million for Synthetic UNH, and $129.50 million 
for the donor pool. Therefore, the donor pool, if used as the control group for UNH, 
would produce a poor pretreatment fit (and post-treatment counterfactual by extension).  
Table 4.3 also shows the weights (𝑣𝑘) of each predictor variable in the analysis. 
Each weight (𝑣𝑘) describes how well each predictor variable predicts the outcome 
variable (total operating costs). The value of the weights (𝑣𝑘) ranges from zero to one and 
sum to one. Predictor variables with weights closer to one possess higher predictive 
power than those closer to zero. As shown in Table 4.3, the outcome variables for total 
operating costs possessed the most predictive power over the pretreatment period: 0.408 
(40.8%) for 1991 and 0.541 (54.1%) for 1999. The amount of research expenditures is the 
next best predictor of total operating costs. However, research expenditures, as well as 
the remaining predictor variables, including the financial variables (e.g., tuition and fee 
revenue, state appropriations, and private gifts, grants, and contracts) each represent less 






















Total Operating Cost (USD in 
millions) (1991) 
 
$82.06 $82.87 $129.50 0.4080 
Total Operating Cost (USD in 
millions) (1999) 
 
$116.69 $118.26 $186.83 0.5410 




10,197 8,838 12,843 0.0050 












2,718 2,087 4,009 0.0000 
Percent  (%) of STEM 
bachelor’s degrees produced 
out of total conferred (1991)  
 
25.0 26.9 25.1 0.0000 
Percent  (%) of STEM 
bachelor’s degrees produced 
out of total conferred (1999)  
 
27.8 28.0 27.1 0.0000 
Full-time Faculty (1991) 
 
558 538 770 0.0020 
Full-time Faculty (1999) 
 
609 514 760 0.0040 
Average Faculty Salary (9-
month equated salary) (1991) 
 
$44,849 $42,602 $44,483 0.0010 
Average Faculty Salary (9-
month equated salary) (1999) 
 
$56,725 $53,453 $56,908 0.0010 
Percent (%) of State 
Appropriation Revenue out of 
Total Revenue (1991)  
 
19.0 26.2 41.3 0.0000 
Percent (%) of State 
Appropriation Revenue out of 
Total Revenue (1999)  

















Percent (%) of Tuition and Fee 
Revenue out of Total Revenue 
(1991) 
 
33.3 28.6 17.8 0.0000 
Percent (%) of Tuition and Fee 
Revenue out of Total Revenue 
(1999) 
 
34.3 32.2 21.3 0.0010 
Research Expenditures (USD in 
millions) (1991) 
 
$32.85 $25.08 $44.08 0.0070 
Research Expenditures (USD in 
millions) (1999) 
 
$53.36 $38.55 $66.61 0.0070 
Revenue from Private Gifts, 
Grants, and Contracts (USD in 
millions) (1991) 
 
$11.67 $12.74 $14.51 0.0040 
Revenue from Private Gifts, 
Grants, and Contracts (USD in 
millions) (1999) 
 
$18.72 $19.42 $25.68 0.0020 
State Appropriation Revenue 
(USD in millions) (1991) 
 
$36.99 $38.32 $107.71 0.0020 
State Appropriation Revenue 
(USD in millions) (1999) 
 
$48.81 $44.47 $137.22 0.0020 
Tuition and Fee Revenue (USD 
in millions) (1991) 
 
$64.60 $53.67 $42.90 0.0010 
Tuition and Fee Revenue (USD 
in millions) (1999) 




 The University of New Hampshire implemented RCM in the year 2000. 
Treatment effects on the impact of RCM on total operating costs at UNH were assessed 
each year for five years after RCM had been implemented. Figure 4.1 was generated 
using the synth command in Stata. Figure 4.1 illustrates the actual total operating costs at 
UNH and the estimated total operating costs for Synthetic UNH. As shown in Figure 4.1, 
total operating costs at UNH increased after RCM was implemented in the year 2000. 
The synthetic control analysis was used to determine whether the increase in total 
operating costs at UNH was caused by RCM. Specifically, the synthetic control method 
estimated a post-treatment counterfactual (i.e., what would have occurred at UNH in the 
absence of RCM) for each year of the post-treatment period. Synthetic UNH in the post-
treatment period represents what would have occurred at UNH if RCM had not been 
implemented. As shown in Figure 1.1, the estimated total operating costs at Synthetic 
UNH decreased initially after RCM had been implemented and then increased in the year 
2004.  
The treatment effects of RCM’s impact on total operating costs at UNH were 
estimated using the synth_runner command in Stata. Treatment effects are the difference 
between the actual total operating costs at UNH and the estimated total operating costs of 
Synthetic UNH. As illustrated in Table 4.4, the magnitude of the treatment effects ranged 
from $600,000 to $28.17 million over the five-year post-treatment period. Specifically, 
the results after the first year of RCM implementation show that total operating costs 
were $600,000 higher than they would have been if RCM had not been implemented. 
However, in 2002, the magnitude of the treatment effect increased substantially. 
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Specifically, Table 4.4 illustrates that total operating costs were $19.15 million higher at 
UNH compared to Synthetic UNH. This suggests that if RCM had not been adopted at 
UNH, total operating costs would have been lower.  
The magnitude of the treatment effect increased between 2002 and 2003. 
Specifically, total operating costs at UNH increased from $139.13 in 2002 to $144.69 in 
2003. However, the estimated total operating costs at Synthetic UNH decreased from 
nearly $120 million in 2002 to $116.5 million in 2003. This resulted in a larger difference 
in operating costs between UNH and Synthetic UNH. That is, the magnitude of the 
treatment effect increased from $19.15 million in 2002 to $28.17 million in 2003. Again, 
the results suggest that RCM caused total operating costs to increase at UNH.  
Between 2004 and 2005, the results also indicate that RCM impacted total 
operating costs, making them higher than they would have been if RCM had not been 
implemented. However, over the same period, the magnitude of the treatment effects 
declined. Specifically, between 2004 and 2005, the treatment effect of RCM on total 
operating costs decreased from $16.49 million to $15.69 million. While these results 
suggest generally that RCM positively impacted total operating costs, the declining 
magnitude of the treatment effects between 2004 and 2005 may suggest that total 
operating costs are shrinking as a result of RCM. However, an analysis of the magnitude 
of the treatment effects was not considered and go beyond the scope of this study. To 
assess the significance of the results, a series of placebo tests and sensitivity analyses 






Figure 4.1 Graph of Treatment Effects of RCM’s Impact on Operating Cost at University 
of New Hampshire 
 
Table 4.4 Treatment Effects of RCM’s Impact on Operating Cost at University of New 
Hampshire 







Treatment Effect (UNH 
- Synthetic UNH) 
P-Value 
1 2001 $125.41 $124.81 $0.60 0.939 
2 2002 $139.13 $119.99 $19.15 0.227 
3 2003 $144.69 $116.52 $28.17 0.212 
4 2004 $162.25 $145.77 $16.49 0.417 
5 2005 $167.86 $152.16 $15.69 0.432 
 
 
Placebo Tests and Inference 
A series of in-place (across-unit) placebo tests were conducted to obtain the p-
values for each post-treatment period (see Table 4.4). Specifically, the synth_runner 
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command artificially reassigned the RCM "treatment" to each of the 132 units in the 
donor pool and calculated a "placebo" effect for each donor unit across each post-
treatment period. This means that 132 different placebo effects were estimated across 
each of the five years of the post-treatment period. Thereafter, the synth_runner 
command estimated a cumulative distribution of "placebo" effects for each post-treatment 
year. Next, the analysis calculated the probability of obtaining a placebo effect that was 
greater than or equal to the actual treatment effect for each year. The results of these 
calculations are illustrated in Table 4.4.  
P-values closer to zero indicate greater confidence in the treatment effect for each 
period. Conversely, high p-values (i.e., those closer to one) suggest lower confidence in 
the treatment effect for that period. As noted in Chapter 3: Methodology, p-values at or 
below the 10% threshold suggest that the treatment (i.e., implementation of RCM) had a 
significant causal effect on the outcome variable (i.e., total operating costs).  
With regard to the UNH, none of the p-values reached a level of significance to 
conclude that RCM had a significant causal effect on total operating costs (p≤0.10). For 
example, the estimated p-value after year one of RCM implementation is 0.939. This 
means that there is a 93.9% probability of obtaining a placebo effect that is as large or 
larger than the treatment effect after the first year of RCM implementation. Specifically, 
this means that there is a 93.9% probability that RCM's impact on total operating costs 
occurred by chance. Put another way, this p-value suggests that there is a 6.1% 
probability that the treatment effect of RCM did not occur by chance. Therefore, 
confidence is significantly lessened in the result for the first year after RCM had been 
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implemented. Specifically, this suggests that RCM did not cause total operating costs to 
be higher than they would have been if RCM had not been implemented.   
Similarly, the p-values did not reach significance for the remaining years 
following RCM implementation. However, the p-values for these years (i.e., years two 
through five) show greater confidence that RCM impacted total operating costs compared 
to the first year. With regard to the second post-treatment period, the p-value suggests 
that there is a 27.7% probability that the treatment effect of RCM occurred by chance. In 
other words, there is a 72.3% probability that the treatment effect of RCM did not occur 
by chance. The p-value for period three suggests that there is a 21.2% probability that the 
treatment effect of RCM's impact on cost occurred by chance. Put another way, there is a 
78.8% probability that the treatment effect of RCM did not occur by chance. The p-value 
for year four indicates that there is a 41.7% probability that the treatment effect of RCM's 
impact on cost occurred by chance. In other words, there is a 58.3% probability that the 
treatment effect of RCM did not occur by chance. Likewise, the p-value for period five 
suggests that there is a 43.2% probability that the treatment effect of RCM's impact on 
cost occurred by chance. This indicates that there is a 56.8% probability that the 
treatment effect of RCM did not occur by chance. 
  These results suggest that RCM positively impacted total operating costs but did 
cause total operating costs to be higher than if RCM had not been implemented. 
Sensitivity analysis (i.e., the leave-one-out test) was conducted next to discern the 




The leave-one-out test was conducted to elucidate the robustness of the results. 
The leave-one-out test allows the researcher to remove a control (i.e., in this case, a 
university) from the synthetic control unit to determine if the main results hold (i.e., are 
the same) thereafter (Abadie et al., 2015; Jaquette et al., 2018; Krief et al., 2016). Ideally, 
the removal of any one control from the synthetic control unit should not significantly 
change the SCM results (e.g., the pretreatment estimation of the synthetic control unit, 
the post-treatment counterfactual(s), and treatment effects). However, if the results of the 
leave-one-out test are different from the main results, such that the main results were 
sensitive to the exclusion of any one control unit, then confidence in the main results is 
diminished. Conversely, if the results of the leave-one-out test are similar to the main 
findings, then confidence in the main findings is increased.  
To conduct the leave-one-out test, I removed the most influential control unit 
from Synthetic UNH – specifically, the University of Vermont – and used the synth and 
synth_runner commands in Stata to rerun the analysis. As described in Table 4.2, the 
University of Vermont possessed over 47% of explanatory power for UNH.  
As illustrated in Appendix B, the leave-one-out analysis revealed that the main 
results of the study on UNH were not robust after the University of Vermont was 
removed from Synthetic UNH. Specifically, after the University of Vermont was 
excluded, the Synthetic UNH provided a poor pretreatment estimation of the treated unit. 
For example, as illustrated in Table B2 in Appendix B, a comparison of the pretreatment 
estimates of UNH, Synthetic UNH (with University of Vermont), and Synthetic UNH 
(without University of Vermont) illustrate that Synthetic UNH (without University of 
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Vermont) is a poor predictor of operating costs for UNH. This is further underscored by 
Figure B1 in Appendix B. Specifically, the difference in total operating costs between 
UNH and Synthetic UNH (with the University of Vermont removed) is significantly 
different from Figure 1.1 (without the University of Vermont removed). More 
specifically, the pretreatment RMSPE increased from $3.84 million (without the 
University of Vermont removed) to $15.6 million (with the University of Vermont 
removed).  
Recall that the pretreatment RMSPE illustrates the average difference in operating 
costs between the treated unit and the synthetic control unit. Because $15.6 million 
represents nearly 16% of the average pretreatment operating costs at UNH, it suggests a 
poor pretreatment fit – that is, the new Synthetic UNH (with the University of Vermont 
removed) does not provide an appropriate pretreatment estimation of UNH. As a 
consequence, confidence is diminished in the estimations of the post-treatment 
counterfactuals and treatment effects of both the leave-one-out test and the main SCM 
analysis (which includes the University of Vermont as part of Synthetic UNH). 
The treatment effects that were estimated by the leave-one-out test are illustrated 
in Table B3 in Appendix B. Similar to the main findings of SCM analysis (which 
includes the University of Vermont as part of Synthetic UNH), the treatment effects 
estimated after the leave-one-out test suggest that RCM impacted total operating costs but 
not to a high enough level to infer causality. These treatment effects ranged from $13.89 
million to $36.34 million and are consistent with the main SCM analysis.  
However, although the treatment effects assessed by the leave-one-out test are 
similar to the main SCM results for UNH (which includes the University of Vermont), 
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the treatment effects of the leave-one-out should be interpreted with extreme caution 
because Synthetic UNH (with University of Vermont removed) represents a poor 
pretreatment fit as shown by Figure B1 and Table B2. Therefore, it is difficult to discern 
with confidence the extent to which there are similarities and differences between the 
treatment effects of the leave-one-out tests and the main SCM analysis.  
The overall results of the leave-one-out test suggest that the University of 
Vermont is an influential control unit, such that when it is excluded from the synthetic 
control unit for UNH, it produces a poor pretreatment approximation of UNH. This 
implies that the main results regarding RCM’s impact on total operating costs (which 
includes the University of Vermont) are sensitive to the exclusion of the University of 
Vermont as a predictor. Therefore, confidence in the main findings is diminished and 
should be interpreted with caution. A summary of these findings will be discussed at the 
end of the chapter.  
 
University of Arizona 
Located in Tucson, Arizona, the University of Arizona (UofA) was established in 
1885 and serves as the state of Arizona’s flagship university. UofA is a public research 
university that enrolls over 45,000 undergraduate and graduate students across 40 
colleges and schools, including two hospitals (University of Arizona,  2019). In 2018, the 
campus managed a nearly $2.4 billion operating budget (University of Arizona, 2019). 
After over two years of feasibility testing between 2012 and 2014, RCM was fully 
implemented beginning in July 2015. Two of the three motivating factors listed in 
UofA’s RCM implementation website illustrate the institution's desire to increase 
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transparency around revenues and costs, and the desire to grow revenue while also 
becoming more cost effective in the wake of significant financial changes at the 
university. The analysis below reveals evidence regarding RCM’s impact on total 
operating costs. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.5A illustrates descriptive statistics of key variables of the University of 
Arizona over the pretreatment period of the study (i.e., 1990-2014). Table 4.5B shows the 
values of each variable during the treatment period (i.e., the year 2015) and each of the 
post-treatment periods (i.e., 2016 through 2018). As shown in Table 4.5A, the average 
total operating costs over the pretreatment period was $466.83 million and ranged from 
$277.31 million to $881.36 million. In the treatment year, as illustrated in Table 4.5B, 
operating costs were $956.56 million. Operating costs rose in current dollars (i.e., not 
adjusted for inflation) after RCM had been implemented. Specifically, operating costs 
rose from $956.56 million in 2015 to approximately $1.08 billion in 2016. In 2017 and 
2018, total operating costs were about $1.07 billion and $1.16 billion, respectively.  
The average number of FTE undergraduate students was 25,231 and ranged from 
22,615 to 29,491 in the pretreatment period (see Table 4.5A). During the treatment- and 
post-treatment periods, the number of FTE undergraduate students fluctuated (see Table 
4.5B). Specifically, FTE undergraduates rose from 30,629 in 2015 to 30,842 in 2016. 
However, undergraduate enrollment decreased between 2016 and 2017 but increased 
again between 2017 and 2018.  
The number of graduate students ranged from 6,870 to 8,951 and averaged at 
7,616 over the pretreatment period of the study (see Table 4.5A). UofA enrolled 9,249 
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graduate students when RCM was implemented in 2015. Unlike undergraduate 
enrollment, the number of graduate students increased each year over the post-treatment 
period. Specifically, between 2016 and 2018, the number of graduate students rose from 
9,264 to 9,650.  
Between 1990 and 2014, the average number of faculty at UofA was 1,455. As 
shown in Table 4.5B, the number of full-time faculty grew from 1,583 in 2015 to 1,710 in 
2018. The average nine-month equated faculty salary was $70,474 in the pre-treatment 
period and increased each year after RCM had been implemented. Specifically, the 
average faculty salary rose in current dollars from $92,727 in 2015 to $98,087 in 2018.  
The average research expenditures at UofA were $292.37 million and ranged 
from $140.84 million to $486.27 million over the pretreatment period. Research 
expenditures continued to rise in current dollars each year between RCM implementation 
in 2015 and 2018, three years after RCM had been implemented. Specifically, research 
expenditures rose from $476.55 in 2015 to $497.69 in 2018.  
Moreover, nearly 27.4% of bachelor’s degrees conferred by UofA between 1990 
and 2014 were from STEM fields. This percentage ranged from 24.2% to 31.2% over the 
pretreatment period. The percentage of conferred STEM bachelor’s degrees fluctuated 
between 2015 and 2018 but generally increased. Specifically, the percentage of STEM 
degrees conferred increased from 31.2% in 2015 to 33.0% in 2016 but decreased from 
2016 to 2017. Between 2017 and 2018, the percent of conferred STEM degrees increased 
again from 32.3% to 34.2% respectively.  
Similar to the variables for enrollment, faculty, and the number of STEM degrees 
conferred, the revenue predictor variables fluctuated over the study period. The average 
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tuition and fee revenue in the pretreatment period was $263.75 million. Tuition revenue 
represented 21.4% of total revenue at UofA over the same period. Both tuition and fee 
revenue and the proportion of tuition and fee revenue out of total revenue increased 
between 2015 and 2018. Specifically, tuition and fee revenue rose in current dollars from 
$$749.41 million in 2015 to $867.56 million in 2018. This corresponded with an increase 
in the proportion of tuition and fee revenue out of total revenue from 36.7% in 2015 to 
40.9% in 2018.  
Revenue from state appropriations fluctuated over the study period. For example, 
during the pretreatment period, the average state appropriations was $312.32 million and 
ranged from $230.68 million to $445.02 million. By the time RCM had been 
implemented at UofA, state appropriations were $294.48 million, which was lower than 
the average state appropriations over the pretreatment period. State appropriations to 
UofA declined again from 2015 to 2016, but increased in current dollars from 2016 to 
2018, as shown in Table 4.5B. Despite subtle fluctuations in the amount of state 
appropriations to UofA, the proportion of state appropriations out of total revenue 
decreased over the study period. The average proportion of state appropriations from total 
revenue at UofA was about 30% and ranged from 15.3% to 37.5% over the pretreatment 
period. After RCM was implemented, the proportion of state appropriations decreased 
from 14.4% in 2015 to 13.3% in 2018. 
Lastly, revenue from private grants, gifts, and contracts ranged from $35.41 
million to $96.2 million throughout the pretreatment period of the study. After RCM was 
implemented in 2015, revenue from private grants, gifts, and contracts decreased in 




Table 4.5A Descriptive Statistics – University of Arizona (Pre-treatment Period 1990-
2014) 






















25 7,616 605 6,870 7,118 7,450 7,759 8,951 
Full-time Faculty 
 










25 $70,476 $16,462 $37,356 $58,552 $72,045 $86,448 $92,880 
Percent  (%) of 
STEM bachelor’s 
degrees produced out 
of total conferred  
 
25 27.4 1.9 24.2 26.1 27.5 28.9 31.2 









25 $312.32 $56.84 $230.68 $272.32 $314.08 $349.11 $445.02 
Revenues from 
Private Gifts, Grants, 
and Contracts (in 
millions) 
 
25 $60.69 $17.88 $35.41 $45.17 $56.80 $75.61 $96.20 
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Percent (%) of 
Tuition and Fee 
Revenue out of Total 
Revenue 
 
25 21.4 7.0 15.0 16.9 17.4 22.4 36.6 
Percent (%) of State 
Appropriation 
Revenue out of Total 
Revenue 
25 30.0 6.7 15.3 29.2 32.1 34.9 37.5 
  
 
Table 4.5B Descriptive Statistics – University of Arizona (Treatment and Post-treatment 
Periods) 
  Treatment 
Period 
Post-Treatment Period 
Variable N 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Total Operating Costs (outcome 






Full-time Equivalent (FTE) 
Undergraduate Enrollment 
 
1 30,629 30,842 30,664 30,917 
Graduate Enrollment (headcount) 
 
1 9,249 9,264 9,467 9,650 
Full-time Faculty 
 
1 1,583 1,591 1,654 1,710 
Research Expenditures (in 
millions) 
 
1 $476.55 $452.40 $457.57 $497.69 
Average Faculty Salary (9-month 
equated salary) 
 
1 $92,727 $94,491 $97,444 $98,087 
Percent  (%) of STEM bachelor’s 
degrees produced out of total 
conferred  
 
1 31.2 33.0 32.3 34.2 
Tuition and Fee Revenue (in 
millions) 
 
1 $749.41 $805.14 $854.29 $867.56 
State Appropriation Revenue (in 
millions) 
 
1 $294.48 $265.31 $271.76 $282.53 
Revenue from Private Gifts, 
Grants, and Contracts (in millions) 
1 $89.98 $80.89 $80.06 $81.75 
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  Treatment 
Period 
Post-Treatment Period 
Variable N 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Percent (%) of Tuition and Fee 
Revenue out of Total Revenue 
 
1 36.7 39.5 40.5 40.9 
Percent (%) of State Appropriation 
Revenue out of Total Revenue 
1 14.4 13.0 12.9 13.3 
 
Synthetic University of Arizona 
Following the same procedure as the analysis of the UNH, I used the synth 
command in Stata to estimate a control group known as the synthetic control unit by 
identifying donor units (untreated units) from the donor pool who’s predictor variables 
best resembled the pretreatment characteristics (predictor variables) of the treated unit. 
Specifically, the synthetic control method assigned a weight (w) to each of the units in the 
donor pool. The weights ranged from zero to one and summed to one. Donor units with 
weights above zero were selected to be a part of the synthetic control unit. 
Table 4.6 shows the composition of the synthetic control unit for the University of 
Arizona (hereafter referred to as Synthetic University of Arizona or Synthetic UofA). 
Synthetic UofA is composed of ten universities: University of Georgia, University of 
California-Berkeley, University of South Carolina-Columbia, Florida International 
University, University of California-San Diego, Michigan State University, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, The University 
of Texas at Austin, and Texas A&M University-College Station. The weighted 
characteristics (predictor variables) of Synthetic UofA were used to estimate a 
pretreatment root mean square prediction error (RMSPE) and a post-treatment 
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counterfactual for each period after RCM was implemented. Below, I describe the 
pretreatment data analysis and treatment effects.  
The University of Georgia possesses the most predictive power (nearly 26%) for 
operating costs at UofA because the University of Georgia’s pretreatment characteristics 
most closely resemble those of UofA. This means, for example, that the predictor 
variables for the University of Georgia will provide the most influence on estimating the 
pretreatment RMSPE and the post-treatment counterfactual for each period. Below, I 
describe the pretreatment data analysis and treatment effects.   
 
Table 4.6 Synthetic Control Unit for University of Arizona (Synthetic UofA) 
UnitID Institutions (synthetic controls) State Weight (w) 
139959 University of Georgia GA 0.257 
110635 University of California-Berkeley CA 0.168 
218663 University of South Carolina-Columbia SC 0.127 
133951 Florida International University FL 0.11 
110680 University of California-San Diego CA 0.098 
171100 Michigan State University MI 0.094 
240444 University of Wisconsin-Madison WI 0.075 
233921 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University 
VA 0.032 
228778 The University of Texas at Austin TX 0.022 
228723 Texas A & M University-College Station TX 0.017 
 
Analysis of Pre-treatment Data  
After the synthetic control unit was estimated, I used the SCM to approximate: (1) 
the predictor variable values for the synthetic control unit that produced the lowest 
pretreatment root mean square prediction error (RMSPE) and (2) the weights (𝑣𝑘) of each 
predictor variable in the analysis. Table 4.7 illustrates the predictor variable values for the 
University of Arizona and the estimated predictor variable values for Synthetic UofA 
(i.e., the control group). The predictor variable values for Synthetic UofA were estimated 
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based on the weights (w) from each synthetic unit (i.e., each of the ten universities that 
are a part of Synthetic UofA). All predictor variables, including the outcomes variable, 
total operating cost, were specified in the analysis over three different periods: 2000, 
2009, and 2014. Consistent with other studies that employ SCM (Barone & Mocetti, 
2014; Eren et al., 2016; Jaquette et al., 2018; Liu, 2015), year-specified variables were 
included in the analysis to produce the lowest possible pretreatment RMSPE. Possessing 
a low pretreatment RMSPE minimizes the difference between the treated unit and the 
synthetic control unit. In theory, the pretreatment predictor variables (i.e., pretreatment 
characteristics) of the University of Arizona and Synthetic UofA two should be nearly 
identical. This, in turn, increases confidence in the post-treatment counterfactual.  
The specified years of 2000, 2009, and 2014 were selected after a series of 
iterative exercises were conducted. Specifically, I included a variable for all predictor 
variables in the year preceding the treatment (i.e., 2014). Next, I used the synth command 
in Stata to identify which combination of other year-specified variables, when included in 
the analysis with variables from the year 2014, would produce the lowest pre-treatment 
RMSPE. After testing over 20 different combinations of variables across different years, I 
concluded that variables specified in 2000 and 2009 produced the lowest pre-treatment 
RMSPE.  
The pretreatment RMSPE produced by this set of predictor variables was 17.63. 
This means that the average difference in total operating costs between the treated unit 
and the synthetic control unit (Synthetic UofA) in the pre-treatment period is $17.63 
million. This pretreatment RMSPE represents less than four percent of UofA's pre-
treatment average total operating costs. Thus, the difference in operating costs between 
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the treated unit (UofA) and the synthetic control unit (Synthetic UofA) is trivial. This 
suggests a good pre-treatment fit and increases confidence in the estimated synthetic 
control unit (i.e., Synthetic UofA). 
Table 4.7 illustrates the predictor variable values for the University of Arizona 
and the estimated predictor variable values for Synthetic UofA (i.e., the control group). 
Table 4.7 also shows the average predictor variable values of the unweighted donor pool. 
The donor pool predictor variable values are shown in Table 4.7 to illustrate that the 
synthetic control unit is a better control group than the unweighted donor pool. For 
example, by comparing the values of the predictor variables for UofA to the estimated 
predictor variables of Synthetic UofA and the predictor variables of the unweighted 
donor pool, it is clear that the Synthetic UofA is a better control group than the 
unweighted donor pool. For example, the outcome variable for total operating costs in 
2000 is $400.73 million for UofA, $404.65 million for Synthetic UofA, and $182.23 
million for the unweighted donor pool. It is clear that Synthetic UofA is a more precise 
control group. Specifically, the unweighted donor pool, if used as the control group for 
UofA, would produce a poor pre-treatment fit (and post-treatment counterfactual by 
extension).  
Table 4.7 also shows the weights (𝑣𝑘) of each predictor variable in the analysis. 
Each weight (𝑣𝑘) describes how well each predictor variable predicts the outcome 
variable (total operating costs). The value of the weights (𝑣𝑘) ranges from zero to one and 
sum to one. Predictor variables with weights closer to one have higher predictive power 
than those closer to zero. As shown in Table 4.7, the outcome variables for total operating 
costs possessed the most predictive power over the pretreatment period. Specifically, 
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total operating costs from the year 2000 accounted for 0.305 (or 30.5%) of the predictive 
power. Operating costs from 2009 accounted for 0.199 (or 19.9%) of the predictive 
power. Finally, operating costs from 2014 (i.e., the year preceding RCM implementation) 
made up 0.308 (or 30.8%) of the predictive power.  
The next strongest predictors were: research expenditures from 2009 (which 
possessed  2.7% of predictive power); tuition and fee revenue from 2009 (2.6%); tuition 
and fee revenue from 2014 (2.5%); state appropriations from 2009 (1.4%); research 
expenditures from 2014 (1.2%); and tuition and fee revenue from 2000 (1.1%). The 
remaining predictor variables possessed predictive power of less than one percent.   
   
















Total Operating Cost (USD in 
millions) (2000) 
 
$400.73 $404.65 $182.23 0.305 
Total Operating Cost (USD in 
millions) (2009) 
 
$576.43 $604.75 $304.02 0.199 
Total Operating Cost (USD in 
millions) (2014) 
 
$881.36 $865.98 $412.73 0.308 
Full-time Equivalent (FTE) 
Undergraduate Enrollment (2000) 
 
23,155 21,558 12,421 0.002 
Full-time Equivalent (FTE) 
Undergraduate Enrollment (2009) 
 
27,215 25,033 14,863 0.006 
Full-time Equivalent (FTE) 
Undergraduate Enrollment (2014) 
 
29,491 27,190 16,120 0.004 
Graduate Enrollment (headcount) 
(2000) 
 
6,944 6,387 3,687 0.001 
Graduate Enrollment (headcount) 
(2009) 


















Graduate Enrollment (headcount) 
(2014) 
 
8,951 8,984 4,959 0.004 
Percent  (%) of STEM bachelor’s 
degrees produced out of total 
(2000) 
 
26.4 28.3 26.6 0.000 
Percent  (%) of STEM bachelor’s 
degrees produced out of total 
(2009) 
 
28.9 27.9 25.7 0.001 
Percent  (%) of STEM bachelor’s 
degrees produced out of total 
(2014) 
 
31.2 33.2 29.7 0.000 
Full-time Faculty (2000) 
 
1,348 1,384 722 0.005 
Full-time Faculty (2009) 
 
1,593 1,538 872 0.004 
Full-time Faculty (2014) 
 
1,561 1,676 913 0.002 
Average Faculty Salary (9-month 
equated salary) (2000) 
 
$67,451 $70,858 $58,356 0.001 
Average Faculty Salary (9-month 
equated salary) (2009) 
 
$87,187 $92,385 $76,615 0.003 
Average Faculty Salary (9-month 
equated salary) (2014) 
 
$92,880 $99,577 $80,692 0.001 
Percent (%) of State Appropriation 
Revenue out of Total Revenue 
(2000) 
 
34.2 36.3 37.0 0.000 
Percent (%) of State Appropriation 
Revenue out of Total Revenue 
(2009) 
 
25.5 25.2 27.9 0.001 
Percent (%) of State Appropriation 
Revenue out of Total Revenue 
(2014) 
 
15.7 17.7 22.5 0.000 
Percent (%) of Tuition and Fee 
Revenue out of Total Revenue 
(2000) 
 


















Percent (%) of Tuition and Fee 
Revenue out of Total Revenue 
(2009) 
 
25.9 27.2 29.8 0.004 
Percent (%) of Tuition and Fee 
Revenue out of Total Revenue 
(2014) 
 
36.6 34.6 34.9 0.001 
Research Expenditures (USD in 
millions) (2000) 
 
$235.74 $231.00 $64.14 0.007 
Research Expenditures (USD in 
millions) (2009) 
 
$385.47 $344.42 $110.36 0.027 
Research Expenditures (USD in 
millions) (2014) 
 
$451.27 $460.12 $139.90 0.012 
Revenue from Private Gifts, 
Grants, and Contracts (USD in 
millions) (2000) 
 
$75.61 $82.07 $24.76 0.001 
Revenue from Private Gifts, 
Grants, and Contracts (USD in 
millions) (2009) 
 
$78.16 $73.69 $21.06 0.002 
Revenue from Private Gifts, 
Grants, and Contracts (USD in 
millions) (2014) 
 
$78.29 $95.69 $30.35 0.003 
State Appropriation Revenue 
(USD in millions) (2000) 
 
$320.91 $328.77 $134.08 0.009 
State Appropriation Revenue 
(USD in millions) (2009) 
 
$371.49 $344.61 $169.08 0.014 
State Appropriation Revenue 
(USD in millions) (2014) 
 
$287.49 $303.55 $165.30 0.008 
Tuition and Fee Revenue (USD in 
millions) (2000) 
 
$160.65 $162.14 $73.65 0.011 
Tuition and Fee Revenue (USD in 
millions) (2009) 
 
$377.35 $369.23 $173.37 0.026 
Tuition and Fee Revenue (USD in 
millions) (2014) 




The University of Arizona implemented RCM in the year 2015. Due to the 
availability of existing data, treatment effects on the impact of RCM on total operating 
costs at UofA were assessed each year for three years after RCM had been implemented. 
Figure 4.2 was generated using the synth command in Stata. Figure 4.2 illustrates the 
total operating costs at UofA and the estimated total operating costs at Synthetic UofA. 
After RCM was implemented in the year 2015, total operating costs at UofA increased. 
The synthetic control analysis was used to determine whether the increase in total 
operating costs at UofA inferred causality as a result of RCM implementation. 
Specifically, the synthetic control method estimated a post-treatment counterfactual (i.e., 
what would have occurred at UofA in the absence of RCM) for each year of the post-
treatment period. Synthetic UofA in the post-treatment period represents what would 
have occurred at UofA if RCM had not been implemented. As shown in Figure 4.2, the 
estimated total operating costs at Synthetic UofA increased each year after RCM had 
been implemented, however, the estimates did not exceed the total operating costs at 
UofA. This suggests that in the absence of RCM, total operating costs at UofA would 
have been lower.  
To determine whether RCM had a significant causal effect on total operating 
costs, treatment effects of RCM’s were estimated using the synth_runner command in 
Stata. Treatment effects are the difference between the actual total operating costs at 
UofA and the estimated total operating costs at Synthetic UofA. As illustrated in Table 
4.8, the magnitude of the treatment effects of RCM on total operating costs at UofA 
ranged from $52.79 million to $108.51 million over the three-year post-treatment period. 
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For example, after the first year of RCM implementation, the results inferred causality 
that RCM increased total operating costs by $108.51 million more than if RCM had not 
been implemented. However, the magnitude of the treatment effects declined after the 
first year. Specifically, in 2017, the results suggest that RCM increased operating costs by 
$52.79 million more than it would have been in the absence of RCM. This shows a 
decline in the magnitude of the treatment effect between 2016 and 2017. Additionally, in 
2018, the results indicate that RCM increased total operating costs by $52.14 million 
more than costs would have been if RCM had not been implemented. These results 
suggest overall that RCM increased total operating costs at UofA. To assess the 
significance and robustness of the results, a series of placebo tests and sensitivity 
analyses were conducted. The results of the placebo tests and leave-one-out test are 
discussed next. 





Table 4.8 Treatment Effects of RCM’s Impact on Operating Cost at University of 
Arizona 








(UofA - Synthetic 
UofA) 
P-Value 
1 2016 $1,077.51 $969.00 $108.51 0.063 
2 2017 $1,073.27 $1,020.48 $52.79 0.190 
3 2018 $1,157.84 $1,103.70 $54.14 0.238 
 
Placebo Tests and Inference 
A series of in-place (across-unit) placebo tests were conducted to obtain the p-
values for each post-treatment period. Specifically, the synth_runner command 
artificially reassigned the RCM "treatment" to each of the 126 units in the donor pool and 
calculated a "placebo" effect for each donor unit across each post-treatment period. This 
means that 126 different placebo effects were estimated across three years. Thereafter, 
the synth_runner command estimated a cumulative distribution of "placebo" effects for 
each post-treatment year. Next, the analysis calculated the probability of obtaining a 
placebo effect that was greater than or equal to the actual treatment effect for each year.  
The results of these calculations are illustrated in Table 4.8. Only one p-value 
(i.e., from the first year of RCM implementation) reached a level of significance to 
conclude that RCM had a significant causal effect on total operating costs (p≤0.10). 
Specifically, after the first year of RCM implementation, the estimated p-value is 0.063. 
This means that there is a 6.3% probability that RCM's impact on total operating costs 
occurred by chance. Put another way, this p-value suggests that there is a 93.7% 
probability that the treatment effect of RCM did not occur by chance. These results 
indicate that RCM caused total operating costs to be $108.51 million higher than costs 
would have been if RCM had not been implemented. 
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The p-values for the second and third years after RCM implementation suggest 
that RCM positively impacted total operating costs but not enough to infer causality. 
Specifically, the p-value for the second year after RCM implementation indicates that 
there is a 19% probability that the treatment effect of RCM occurred by chance. 
Additionally, the p-value for period three suggests that there is a 23.8% probability that 
the treatment effect of RCM's impact on cost occurred by chance. Both p-values are 
above the 10% threshold needed to conclude that RCM caused total operating costs to be 
higher than they would have been in the absence of RCM. Put another way, the results 
indicate that RCM impacted total operating costs. However, for these two years, we 
cannot conclude that RCM caused total operating costs to be higher than they would have 
been if RCM had not been implemented. Sensitivity analyses were conducted next to 
discern the robustness of the results.  
Leave-One-Out Test 
The leave-one-out test was conducted to investigate the robustness of the results. 
To conduct the leave-one-out test, I utilized the same strategy as I did with UNH by 
removing the most influential control (i.e., university) from the synthetic control unit. 
Specifically, I removed the University of Georgia from Synthetic UofA and used the 
synth and synth_runner commands in Stata to rerun the analysis. As shown in Table 4.6, 
the University of Georgia possessed nearly 26% of explanatory power for UofA.  
The leave-one-out analysis revealed that the main results of the study on UofA 
were robust after the University of Georgia was removed from Synthetic UofA. 
Specifically, after the University of Georgia was removed, the pretreatment estimation of 
the treated unit was not severely weakened. For example, as illustrated in Table B5 in 
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Appendix B, a comparison of the pretreatment estimates of UofA, Synthetic UofA (with 
University of Georgia), and Synthetic UofA (without University of Georgia) illustrate 
that Synthetic UofA (without University of Georgia)  provided an adequate pretreatment 
estimation of UofA. This is underscored by Figure B2 in Appendix B. Specifically, the 
difference in total operating costs between UofA and Synthetic UofA (with the 
University of Georgia removed) is not substantially different from Figure 2 (without the 
University of Georgia removed). More specifically, the pretreatment RMSPE, which is a 
measure of the goodness of fit, increased from $17.6 million (without the University of 
Georgia removed) to $19.6 million (with the University of Georgia removed). Because 
$19.6 million represents about four percent of the average pretreatment operating costs at 
UofA, it suggests a good pretreatment fit – that is, the new Synthetic UofA (with the 
University of Georgia removed) is an appropriate pretreatment estimation of UofA. 
Therefore, confidence is strengthened in the estimations of the treatment effects for both 
the leave-one-out test as well as the main SCM analysis. 
The treatment effects that were estimated by the leave-one-out test are illustrated 
in Table B6 in Appendix B. Similar to the main findings (which include the University of 
Georgia as a part of Synthetic UofA), the treatment effects estimated after the leave-one-
out test suggest that RCM positively impacted total operating costs. However, the p-
values estimated after the leave-one-out test are all higher than the 10% threshold needed 
to infer causality. Specifically, after the first year of RCM implementation, the results 
show that total operating costs would have been $156.89 higher than if RCM had not 
been implemented. The p-value is 0.556. Additionally, after the second year of RCM, the 
estimated treatment effects indicate that RCM positively impacted total operating costs to 
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be $115.76 greater than they would have been in the absence of RCM. The p-value is 
0.778. These results, although not the same as the main SCM results (which include the 
University of Georgia as part of Synthetic UofA), increase confidence in the main 
findings. Specifically, the estimated treatment effects for the first and second post-
treatment periods assessed as part of the leave-one-out test show that RCM impacted total 
operating costs to increase (see Table B6 in Appendix B). However, the p-values for 
periods one and two are below the 10% threshold to conclude that RCM had a causal 
effect on total operating costs. 
The estimated treatment effect for year three as part of the leave-one-out test 
departs from the results of the main findings (which include the University of Georgia as 
part of Synthetic UofA). Specifically, the treatment effect for year three assessed as part 
of the leave-one-out test indicates that RCM negatively impacted total operating costs– 
suggesting that total operating costs would have been nearly $40.3 million lower than if 
RCM had not been implemented. The p-value is 1, which suggests that RCM did not 
impact total operating costs. As a consequence, confidence in the main finding for year 
three is diminished.  
The overall results of the leave-one-out test suggest that the University of Georgia 
is an influential control unit; however, the exclusion of the University of Georgia from 
the analysis does not significantly change the treatment effects for the first two years of 
RCM implementation. However, the treatment effects of the third year should be 
interpreted with caution due to the differences between the treatment effects of the leave-
one-out test and the main SCM analysis. A summary of these findings will be discussed 
at the end of the chapter.  
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Summary of Results 
This study examined the impact of RCM on costs at two public research 
universities in the United States: the University of New Hampshire and the University of 
Arizona. Using the synthetic control method, this study elucidates several key findings 
worth noting. First, with regard to the University of New Hampshire, which implemented 
RCM in the year 2000, the results of the synthetic control analysis reveal varying levels 
of evidence that RCM impacted total operating costs between 2002 and 2005. However, 
the estimated p-values across the post-treatment period indicate that RCM may have 
impacted costs but not enough to infer causality. Additionally, the results of the 
sensitivity analysis show that the findings should be interpreted with caution.  
Between 2002 and 2005, the results suggest that RCM positively impacted total 
operating costs (i.e., costs were higher than they would have been if RCM had not been 
implemented). Indeed, the magnitude of the effects range from $15.69 million to $28.17 
million between 2002 and 2005. However, after a series of placebo tests, the results with 
the greatest confidence are from 2002 and 2003. Specifically, in these years, RCM 
positively impacted total operating costs to be $19.15 million (2002) and $28.17 million 
(2003) higher than they would have been if RCM had not been implemented. However, 
confidence in these findings was severely weakened after placebo tests were conducted. 
The lowest p-value was 0.212 in 2003 and the highest was 0.939 in 2001. Because each 
of these p-values is not at or below 10%, it indicates that RCM did not have a significant 
causal effect on total operating costs at UNH.  
With regard to the University of Arizona, which implemented RCM in 2015, the 
results show that RCM caused total operating costs to increase after the first year of 
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implementation. Specifically, total operating costs were $108.51 million higher than they 
would have been if RCM had not been implemented. A series of placebo tests confirmed 
with high confidence that this result did not occur by chance (p-value = 0.063). 
Additionally, the results reveal that RCM positively impacted costs in the second and 
third years after RCM had been implemented. However, after a series of placebo tests, 






Chapter 5: Discussion and Recommendations 
Introduction 
 This study examined the impact of Responsibility Center Management (RCM) on 
costs at two public research universities in the United States: the University of New 
Hampshire (UNH) and the University of Arizona (UofA). The implementation of RCM at 
each university in this study is considered the treatment. The UNH implemented RCM in 
the year 2000 and the UofA implemented RCM in 2015. This study used two institution-
level panel datasets (one for each university to account for the different sample periods) 
and employed the synthetic control method (SCM) to conduct the analysis. The dataset 
for the UNH contained data on 133 public research universities across 16 years (1990-
2005). The dataset for the UofA contained data on 127 public research universities across 
29 years (1990-2018). The datasets contain an outcome variable and several predictor 
variables. The outcome variable is total operating costs and is defined as the sum of 
expenditures on academic administration, institutional administration, instruction, and 
student services. The predictor variables in this study were adopted from previous higher 
education cost research and were used in this study to estimate the synthetic versions of 
UNH and UofA – specifically, to predict what total operating costs would have been at 
UNH and UofA if RCM had not been implemented. These predictor variables include 
full-time equivalent undergraduate enrollment, graduate headcount, the number of full-
time faculty, research expenditures, the average faculty salary, the proportion of students 
graduating with degrees in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 
out of the total number of graduates, tuition and fee revenue, state appropriations, private 
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gifts, grants, and contracts, the proportion of tuition and fee revenue out of total revenue, 
and the proportion of state appropriation revenue out of total revenue.  
The results of the study, as presented in the previous chapter, show that both the 
UNH and UofA increased total operating costs after RCM was implemented. With regard 
to UNH, the results indicate that RCM positively impacted total operating costs between 
2001 and 2005. However, after a series of placebo tests, the results indicate that RCM 
positively impacted costs but not enough to infer causality. With regard to the UofA, the 
results indicate that RCM caused total operating costs to increase in the first year of 
implementation. However, after a series of placebo tests, the results indicate that RCM 
positively impacted total operating costs in years two and three but not enough to infer 
causality. 
The purpose of this chapter is severalfold. First, this chapter discusses the findings 
with respect to each university in the study. Next, the chapter discusses the significance 
of the findings in the context of the extant literature. Third, this chapter describes how the 
findings of this study contribute to research and practice. Thereafter, this chapter 
identifies and explains the implications for policy, research, and theory. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with recommendations to guide future research.  
 
Discussion 
University of New Hampshire 
Prior to the implementation of RCM at UNH in the year 2000, the institution 
experienced changes with regard to total operating costs. Indeed, between 1980 and 1999, 
total operating costs increased by 71% (after adjusting for inflation in 1999 dollars). After 
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an 18-month exploration study was conducted by UNH’s RCM Steering Committee, the 
then-President Joan Leitzel furnished a memo on January 14, 2000 to the campus citing 
five reasons for moving the campus to RCM. Among them, she noted, “[t]here will be 
stronger incentives for cost effectiveness and revenue generation” (Joan Leitzel, personal 
communication, January 14, 2000). However, as shown in the previous chapter of this 
study (Chapter 4: Results), total operating costs rose in current dollars (i.e., not adjusted 
for inflation) each year after RCM had been implemented. Specifically, after the first year 
of RCM implementation in the year 2000, operating costs rose from $120.09 million to 
$125.41 million and continued to rise thereafter.  
Moreover, after employing the synthetic control method to estimate the treatment 
effects of RCM’s impact, the results of this study revealed that the magnitude of the 
effects of RCM on total operating costs at UNH ranged from $600,000 to $28.17 million 
and differed across each year between 2001 and 2005. After a series of placebo tests were 
conducted, the analysis revealed that RCM did not have a significant causal effect on 
total operating costs — specifically, the estimated p-values across the study period were 
not low enough to infer causality (p≤0.10). 
As illustrated in the previous chapter (Chapter Four: Results), the estimated 
treatment effect of RCM on total operating costs was $600,000 after the first year of 
RCM implementation. The magnitude of the treatment effects increased between the first 
and third years following the implementation of RCM. Specifically, after the second year 
in which RCM was implemented, the magnitude of the treatment effect of RCM was 
$19.15 million. This suggests that total operating costs were $19.15 million higher. 
Similarly, the magnitude of the treatment effect of RCM on total operating costs 
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increased in the third year following RCM implementation. More specifically, after the 
third year of RCM implementation, the results indicate that RCM positively impacted 
total operating costs to be $28.17 million higher. However, the magnitude of the 
treatment effect of RCM on total operating costs decreased thereafter. For example, the 
magnitude of the treatment effect decreased from an additional $28.15 million in 2003 
(year three) to an additional $16.19 million in 2004 (year four). The magnitude of the 
treatment effect decreased from an additional $16.19 million in 2004 (year four) to an 
additional $15.69 million in 2005 (year five). The positive effect of RCM on total 
operating costs declined over the five-year post-treatment period. 
These findings, although they do not provide causal evidence that RCM increased 
total operating costs at UNH, are important for several reasons. First, these findings 
indicate that RCM at UNH did not achieve the goal of decreasing costs as was originally 
intended. Second, the findings show that leaders at UNH should have evaluated RCM’s 
impact on costs in the first internal review of RCM in 2006. Specifically, since the 
implementation of RCM at UNH in the year 2000, the UNH’s RCM model and allocation 
formulae have been reviewed and modified at least three times: in 2006, 2009, and 2015. 
The 2006 internal review (which considered the first five years of RCM) focused on 
curriculum, research/outreach, and administration under RCM – not operating costs 
(UNH, 2006). The other internal reviews also did not explicitly examine the extent to 
which RCM impacted operating costs either (UNH, 2009; 2015). If university leaders had 
reviewed RCM’s impact on total operating costs in the first internal review, perhaps then 
they would have been able to incorporate changes to the RCM model and allocation 
formulae beginning in the 2006 fiscal year. More research regarding the changes to 
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UNH’s RCM model would be necessary to discern if, and to what extent, total operating 
costs changed as a result of the modifications to the model.  
Third, the results are important because they illustrate that the magnitude of the 
treatment trended downward after the fourth year. Specifically, the magnitude of the 
treatment effects increased between the first and third years and then decreased 
thereafter. This suggests that the initial costs of operating RCM were perhaps higher at 
the outset of the implementation of RCM compared to after RCM had been in place for 
three years. This may indicate that university leaders became more accustomed to the 
new budget model over time. Additionally, the decrease in the magnitude of the treatment 
effect may suggest that the embedded incentives in RCM with regard to costs (i.e., the 
decentralization of budget authority and the carry forward principle) were better utilized 
over time. Despite a decrease in the magnitude of the effects of RCM on total operating 
costs by year four, total operating were still higher than they would have been if RCM 
had not been implemented.   
Finally, despite the lack of evidence to conclude that RCM had a significant 
causal impact on total operating costs at UNH, the results still call into question the 
worthwhileness of the implementation of RCM at UNH. As noted previously, the 
university undertook an 18-month study to examine the feasibility and need for 
implementing RCM, having realized challenges with operating costs leading up to the 
implementation. 
Because the analysis did not conclude that RCM had a significant causal impact 
on total operating costs at UNH, there are a few alternative explanations that may have 
contributed to the increase in operating costs over the post-treatment period. For example, 
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over the post-treatment period (between 2000 and 2005): a) the number of full-time 
faculty members grew by nearly 11%; b) the average faculty salary rose by more than 
34% (in current dollars);  c) research expenditures increased in current dollars from 
$64.49 million to $89.02 million (i.e., a 38% increase); and d) the amount of tuition and 
fee revenue collected by UNH increased by approximately 28% (in current dollars). 
Previous scholarship on higher education cost has conclusively shown positive 
relationships between costs and the number of full-time faculty, average faculty salary, 
research expenditures, and revenue (deGroot et al., 1991; Leslie et al., 2012; Koshal & 
Koshal, 1999; Robst, 2001; Titus et al., 2017).   
University of Arizona 
The University of Arizona experienced financial changes prior to the 
implementation of RCM in 2015. Between 2003 and 2014 (the year before RCM was 
implemented), UofA experienced a 34% decline in state appropriations (after adjusting 
for inflation in 2014 dollars) and total costs rose by nearly 30%. In the fall of 2012, the 
UofA provost convened a steering committee to investigate the feasibility of 
implementing RCM. After more than two years of feasibility testing, RCM was 
implemented to increase transparency around revenues and costs and to grow revenue 
while also becoming more cost effective in the wake of significant financial changes at 
the university (University of Arizona, 2017). However, as shown in the previous chapter 
of this study (Chapter 4:Results) total operating costs rose in current dollars (i.e., not 
adjusted for inflation) after RCM had been implemented and each year thereafter. 
Specifically, operating costs rose from $956.56 million in 2015 to approximately $1.08 
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billion in 2016. In 2017 and 2018, total operating costs were about $1.07 billion and 
$1.16 billion, respectively.  
After employing the synthetic control method to estimate the treatment effects of 
RCM’s impact, the results revealed that the magnitude of the effects of RCM on total 
operating costs at UofA ranged from $52.79 million to $108.51 million between 2016 
and 2018. Specifically, after the first year of RCM implementation, the results show that 
RCM caused total operating costs to be $108.51 million higher than if RCM had not been 
implemented (p≤0.10). However, after a series of placebo tests on the remaining years of 
the post-treatment period, the results did not show that RCM had a significant causal 
effect on total operating costs.  
Additionally, the magnitude of the treatment effects declined after the first year. 
For example, after the second year, the magnitude of the treatment effect of RCM was 
$52.79 million. This suggests that RCM positively impacted total operating costs to be 
$52.79 million higher. It also illustrates a steep decline in the magnitude of the treatment 
effect between the first and second years. Similarly, after the third year following RCM 
implementation, the magnitude of the treatment effect was $54.14 million. The 
magnitude of treatment effect for the third year was again lower than the first year and 
not much different than the second year of RCM implementation.  
As similarly described in the UNH case, the results of this study with regard to 
UofA are important. First, these findings indicate that RCM at UofA did not achieve the 
goal of controlling costs as was originally intended. Second, the results illustrate that the 
magnitude of the treatment effect of RCM on total operating costs declined over the post-
treatment period. This may also suggest that the initial costs of implementing and 
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operating RCM were higher compared to the costs of operating RCM over time. 
Additionally, this may indicate that leaders at UofA became more experienced with RCM 
and better utilized the embedded incentives in RCM to curb costs over time compared to 
the first year after implementing RCM. However, despite a decline in the magnitude of 
the treatment effect of RCM, total operating costs were higher than they would have been 
if RCM had not been implemented. As a consequence, these results call into question the 
worthwhileness of the implementation of RCM at UofA. As noted above, the UofA 
conducted a multi-year study to develop and examine the feasibility of implementing 
RCM. Specifically, several committees were formed to build the RCM guiding 
principles, develop the budgetary infrastructure (i.e., aligning enterprise and data 
systems), and test the RCM model (University of Arizona, 2017). The UofA conducted a 
three-year internal review of RCM in 2018. However, no report has been furnished 
publicly to demonstrate the extent of the review or any changes that were recommended 
in response to their findings. Changes in senior leadership may have caused changes in 
the RCM model during the post-treatment period, and perhaps may have caused delays in 
the availability of the report. Additional research is necessary to understand if changes in 
leadership may have impacted the implementation of RCM in terms of emphasis; more so 
on increasing revenue than on decreasing costs at UofA. 
In addition to RCM’s impact on total operating costs at UofA, there are a couple 
of alternative explanations that may have contributed to the increase in operating costs 
over the post-treatment period. For example, the stated goals for implementing RCM at 
the UofA – specifically to grow revenue and control costs – were perhaps in conflict with 
one another. According to Bowen’s (1980) RTC, an increase in revenue corresponds with 
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an increase in costs. The largest source of revenue at UofA (i.e., tuition and fee revenue) 
rose in current dollars from $670.32 million in 2014 (the year prior to RCM 
implementation) to $805.14 million in 2016 (the first year following RCM 
implementation). The increase in tuition and fee revenue (by more than $135 million) 
between 2014 and 2016 may have impacted costs as well. Additionally, from an external 
perspective, the Arizona Board of Regents (ABOR) implemented an aggressive strategic 
plan for public universities in the state of Arizona over the post-treatment period of RCM 
at UofA. This strategic plan calls for Arizona universities to be entrepreneurial, 
accountable, and collaborative in the achievement of the statewide goals tied to several 
metrics that ranged from enrollment, retention, and degree production to research activity 
and public service (ABOR, n.d.). However, as mentioned above, state appropriations to 
the UofA have decreased considerably over the last decade. By 2018, state appropriations 
as a share of total revenue at UofA represented 13.3%, whereas revenue from tuition and 
fees represented more than 40% of total revenue. With the continuous decline in state 
support to UofA, it is possible that items listed in ABOR's strategic plan were not 
specifically tied to additional funding. This would, in turn, lead to higher spending over 
the post-treatment period, which conflicts with the goal of implementing RCM (i.e., to 
control costs).  However, further research is necessary to understand the extent to which 
the ABOR’s strategic plan impacted costs at UofA.  
Discussion of the Findings in the Context of Extant Literature 
Prior to this study, previous empirical research from the RCM literature and the 
higher education cost literature had not considered RCM with regard to its effect on 
costs. Thus, the results of this study cannot be directly compared with prior work. From 
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the RCM literature, researchers (Jaquette et al., 2018) noted the need to investigate 
RCM’s effect on costs due to the lack of empirical research and the abundance of non-
empirical publications that bolster RCM’s effects without appropriate substantiation (e.g., 
Attis et al., 2016; Curry et al., 2013; Strauss & Curry, 2002). To explain RCM’s potential 
effect on costs, Jaquette and associates (2018) hypothesized that RCM may cause costs to 
increase due to the administrative requirements for operating RCM. However, this was 
not the focus of their research.  
With regard to the higher education costs literature, there is no empirical study 
that examines RCM’s impact on costs with which to compare the results of this study. 
Despite the lack of research on RCM and costs, scholars have noted that a study was 
warranted because many public research universities adopted RCM as a means to control 
costs (Chestlock, 2016; Titus et al., 2017; Toutkoushian, 1999). As a consequence, the 
findings from this study with respect to RCM’s impact cannot be directly compared with 
previous research.  
Contributions to Research 
Because no previous study investigated the impact of RCM on costs, this study 
makes at least three distinct contributions to the literature. First, this study is the first to 
bridge the gap between the RCM literature and the higher education cost literature by 
providing empirical insight regarding RCM’s effect on total operating costs. Second, this 
study contributes to the use of theory in the RCM literature because it incorporates two 
theoretical frameworks to guide the research question: the principal-agent theory (PAT) 
and Bowen's (1980) revenue theory of cost (RTC). Only two previous studies (Cekic, 
2010; Jaquette et al., 2018) from the RCM literature were theoretically grounded. Cekic 
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(2010) used Bolman and Deal’s (2003) four frames of organizational culture (i.e., 
structural/rational, human resources, political, and symbolic) to explain how faculty and 
administrators interacted with the RCM budgeting and planning processes. Jaquette et. al 
(2018) incorporated principal-agent theory to explain how the principal-agent 
relationship between central administration (i.e., the principal) and deans (i.e., the agents) 
within RCM would impact tuition revenue.  
This study used PAT to explain RCM’s impact on costs by illustrating the 
principal-agent relationship between central administration (the principal) and deans (the 
agents). Specifically, in this study, the implementation of RCM (i.e., the treatment) 
served as the contract within the PAT framework that bounded the principal-agent 
relationship. RCM (i.e., the treatment and contract), in turn, allowed central 
administration (the principal) to incent cost control among deans (the agents). Based on 
the results of this study – specifically, the positive impact of RCM on total operating 
costs at both universities in the study – the embedded incentives within RCM around cost 
control (i.e., the carry forward principle and devolution of budget authority requiring 
deans to finance the full costs of their respective units) were perhaps ineffective. Indeed, 
the results suggest that there may have been misaligned goals between the principal and 
the agents at both universities in the study, due to the increase in total operating costs. 
The misalignment of goals has been described by scholars (Kivisto, 2005, 2008; Lane et 
al., 2008) as shirking behavior. This may mean, for example, that deans (the agents) at 
UNH and UofA acted upon their own self-interests (and the interests of their respective 
academic units) by increasing operating costs despite central administrations’ intent to 
control costs. However, because this study did not use academic-unit level data nor did it 
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interview deans, it is difficult to discern the extent to which there was a misalignment in 
the goals of the principal (central administration) with the agents (deans). For this reason, 
future research that incorporates academic-unit level data and interviews is necessary to 
properly employ PAT as a theoretical framework.  
The use of PAT was helpful in identifying other principal-agent relationships that 
may have also contributed to higher spending, specifically at the UofA. For example, as 
described above, the ABOR implemented an aggressive strategic plan for public 
universities in the state of Arizona over the post-treatment period of RCM at UofA. This 
introduced another principal-agent relationship into the study, specifically between 
ABOR (the principal) and UofA (the agent). In this case, the strategic plan became the 
contract that bound the ABOR and the UofA. However, as a consequence of decreased 
state funding to the UofA over the last decade, the goals of ABOR and the UofA’s 
implementation of RCM (i.e., to control costs) were perhaps in conflict. Specifically, 
many of the items in ABOR’s strategic plan were not tied to increased state 
appropriations to the UofA. This suggests that spending related to the achievement of the 
items in ABOR’s strategic plan would come from the UofA coffers. This, in turn, would 
lead to higher spending at UofA over the post-treatment period. 
With regard to Bowen’s (1980) RTC, this study incorporated university revenue 
data to theoretically frame the impact of revenues on costs. Bowen (1980) and many 
scholars (e.g., Brinkman, 1990; Clotfelter, 1996; Martin, 2011; Winston, 1999) have 
argued that colleges and universities are not cost minimizers, and have instead suggested 
that colleges and universities seek to maximize their prestige and influence. Indeed, these 
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scholars contend that colleges and universities, as a consequence of maximizing their 
prestige and influence, increase costs substantially.  
This study provides some support for RTC as it relates to the notion that colleges 
and universities are not cost minimizers. For example, based on the results of this study – 
specifically the increase in total operating costs caused by RCM at UNH – there is 
evidence to suggest that administrators at UNH increased spending after implementing 
RCM in order to maximize their prestige, excellence, and influence. For example, as 
noted earlier in this chapter, over the post-treatment period (between 2000 and 2005) at 
the UNH: a) the number of full-time faculty members grew by nearly 11%; b) the 
average faculty salary rose by more than 34% (in current dollars); c) research 
expenditures increased in current dollars from $64.49 million to $89.02 million (i.e., a 
38% increase); and d) the amount of tuition and fee revenue collected by UNH increased 
by approximately 28% (in current dollars). This could suggest that central administrators 
and deans at UNH individually or collectively increased costs by spending on activities 
and items that contributed to the prestige of the institution or each of their respective 
colleges and schools. This behavior, in turn, would have been at odds with the goal of 
implementing RCM (i.e., to control costs).  
Additionally, this study contributes to the literature because it overcame several 
methodological limitations of previous research by employing SCM to assess the causal 
effects of RCM’s impact. As described in Chapter 2: Literature Review, previous 
literature on RCM is limited methodologically for several reasons: first, due to the 
overuse of qualitative methods (Cekic, 2010; Courant & Knepp, 2002; Deering & Sá, 
2014, 2018; Gros Louis & Thompson, 2002; Lang, 2002); second, due to the use of 
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qualitative methods to describe the quantitative effects of RCM (Lang, 2002); and third, 
due to the use of inappropriate quantitative techniques to reveal RCM’s impact on 
quantifiable outcomes (Hearn et al., 2006; McBride et al., 2000; Rutherford & Rabovsky, 
2017). As a consequence, our empirical knowledge of RCM has remained relatively 
limited. 
Employing SCM in this study addressed each of the previously mentioned 
methodological limitations of prior research. First, the use of SCM contributes to the 
limited and mostly qualitative extant body of scholarship on RCM. Moreover, this study 
is one of few (e.g., Bonander et al., 2016; Hinrichs, 2012; Liu, 2015; Jaquette et al., 
2018) that have employed SCM in the higher education literature domain. Second, the 
use of SCM in this study did not rely on qualitative methods to describe the quantitative 
effects of RCM. For example, in a previously discussed qualitative case study on the 
University of Toronto-Scarborough's (UTS) experience with RCM, Lang (2002) noted 
that UTS had accumulated a $5.5 million debt two years after RCM had been fully 
implemented. However, the scholar did not conduct a quantitative or quasi-experimental 
analysis to attribute the $5.5 million debt to RCM. The use of SCM would have been 
more appropriate to make such a claim regarding UTS’s case.  
Furthermore, the use of SCM in this study permitted the analysis of if, and to 
what extent, total operating costs were different than they would have been if RCM was 
not implemented at UNH and UofA. For example, Hearn et al. (2006) used descriptive 
analysis to investigate the extent to which RCM impacted student enrollment and the 
number of credit hours taught across the colleges at the University of Minnesota-Twin 
Cities. The researchers did not employ a causal or quasi-experimental technique to 
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appropriately capture what would have occurred with regard to enrollment and the 
number of credit hours if RCM had not been implemented. Similarly, Rutherford et. al. 
(2017) employed regression analysis to examine RCM’s impact on degree production and 
graduation rates. However, the scholars did not develop a counterfactual to describe if, 
and to what extent, graduation rates or degree production might have been different if 
RCM had not been implemented. In both cases (e.g., Hearn et al., 2006 and Rutherford & 
Rabovsky, 2017) SCM would have been a more appropriate analytic technique from 
which to draw conclusions.  
The synthetic control method was the most appropriate quantitative technique to 
address the research question in this study for the reasons stated above. Implications and 
recommendations for future research regarding the use of SCM for studies on RCM will 
be discussed in the sections that follow in this chapter. 
Contributions to Practice 
In addition to research contributions, this study contributes to practice. Prior to 
this study, no such research existed regarding RCM’s impact on costs, and several pro-
RCM publications (Curry et al., 2013; Hanover Research, 2008; Strauss & Curry, 2002; 
Whalen, 1991) relied heavily on descriptive statistics and anecdotal evidence to make 
claims about RCM’s utility. The results of this study – specifically that RCM impacts 
total operating costs – balance previous anecdotal claims by providing empirical insight 
on RCM at UNH and UofA to guide future decision-making. More broadly, this study 
provides insight regarding RCM’s effect on total operating costs using two examples 
(i.e., UNH and UofA) to public policymakers and university administrators that may be 
considering RCM. Each of these cases (i.e., UNH and UofA) can be further studied by 
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policymakers and university administrators to provoke discussion about RCM’s utility 
with regard to costs. This is especially important given the financial changes in higher 
education described in Chapter 1: Introduction (e.g., declining state support, escalating 
costs, and rising tuition prices), as well as the recent attention and adoption of RCM as a 
strategy to minimize costs (among other goals).   
 
Implications 
 This study has implications for policy, research, and theory. With regard to 
policy, the results for UNH show that the first five years of RCM had the opposite effect 
of what was intended by university leaders with regard to costs. As noted above, the 
UNH formally reviewed its RCM model internally three times: in 2006, 2009, and 2015. 
However, none of the internal reviews considered operating costs. As a consequence, the 
findings from this study imply that university leaders at UNH should have enacted 
policies that better incentivized cost control. This could have entailed, for example, a 
review and modification of the RCM funding formulae and cost allocation policies to 
incentivize compliance for cost control among deans and other responsibility center 
leaders. There is no mention in the internal reviews (i.e., UNH, 2006; 2009; 2015) that 
modifications to UNH’s allocation formulas explicitly considered costs as the RCM 
model evolved.  
This policy implication applies similarly to the UofA. Specifically, the findings 
from this study suggest that RCM positively impacted total operating costs, despite 
university leaders’ intentions to harness costs using RCM, among other goals. Only one 
internal review of RCM has been conducted at the UofA since its implementation in 
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2015. However, we cannot discern if costs were considered in the internal review of 
RCM because the report is not publicly available. The findings from this study suggest 
that university leaders at UofA should consider reevaluating existing incentives for cost 
control to perhaps increase compliance. This could entail a review and modification of 
the current funding and cost allocation policies.  
Secondly, with regard to policy, university leaders should be aware that time and 
experience with RCM may affect its impact with regard to total operating costs. 
Specifically, the results of this study show that the magnitude of the treatment effects of 
RCM on total operating costs can diminish over time. Specifically, as it relates to UNH, 
the magnitude of the treatment effects increased initially and decreased by the fourth 
year. Moreover, regarding the UofA, the magnitude of the treatment effects decreased by 
the second year. Although in both cases, total operating costs were higher than they 
would have been if RCM had not been implemented, the decline in the magnitude of the 
treatment effect warrants additional research.  
Lastly, regarding policy, the results of this study could be used to help university 
leaders at UNH and UofA assess whether the implementation of RCM was worthwhile 
by balancing their intent to control costs with other motivations for adopting RCM. 
Including UNH and UofA, college presidents, provosts, and senior administrators at other 
institutions should closely examine their respective institutions' contexts to determine 
which motivations are most important for implementing RCM (e.g., to generate 
additional revenue and to create more flexibility in the budget process). Costs may not be 
the best impetus for implementing RCM compared to other motivations.  
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With regard to research, there are several implications worth noting. First, this 
study used institution-level data to conduct the analysis. While this level of data and 
analysis adequately addressed the research question regarding RCM’s impact on total 
operating costs, the disaggregation of total operating costs into its components (i.e., 
expenses on instruction, administration, and student services) would have provided 
additional details regarding which expenses were most impacted by RCM. For example, 
after the first year of RCM at the UofA, total operating costs were $108.51 million higher 
than if RCM had not been implemented. However, because the components of total 
operating costs are not disaggregated, it is unclear on which expenses among them (i.e., 
expenses on instruction, administration, and student services) were most affected. Future 
research investigating RCM’s impact on higher education costs should consider multiple 
outcome variables in this regard. This implication for research could, in turn, provide 
university leaders and policymakers with additional evidence to drive better 
recommendations.  
Secondly, with regard to data disaggregation and research implications, future 
research should consider academic unit-level data at UNH and the UofA, as well as for a 
study on any other university that employs RCM. Similar to the previous research 
implication, an analysis of data disaggregated at the academic unit level could provide 
university leaders and deans with greater insight on which colleges and schools were 
most compliant with controlling costs. For example, among the 13 colleges and schools 
at UNH, an analysis of RCM’s impact on costs using academic-level cost data could 
elucidate which units increased or decreased costs. This would entail an expansion of the 
IPEDS finance surveys for all postsecondary institutions. Again, this implication would 
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provide university leaders with additional evidence to make specific policy 
recommendations for whichever units increased costs the most.  
Lastly, regarding research implications, the use of disaggregated academic unit-
level data in conjunction with qualitative techniques, such as interviews, would have 
provided further insight into where (in which colleges and schools) and why RCM caused 
total operating costs to increase at UNH and UofA. Specifically, because RCM is both a 
management tool and budgeting system, it is difficult to discern or speculate regarding 
why the treatment effects ranged widely without further research (e.g., such as 
interviews). Was it due to the administrative requirements for operating RCM, as 
suggested by Jaquette and associates (2008)? Was it due to behavioral changes among 
university administrators? Or, was it a combination of both administrative requirements 
and behavioral changes? More research is necessary to uncover which components within 
total operating costs (e.g., expenses on instruction, administration, and student services) 
were most affected by RCM.  
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Because scholars have not yet developed a comprehensive body of empirical 
research on RCM, recommendations for future research abound. Previous literature on 
RCM has only two revealed two broad findings. Specifically, prior research (Deering & 
Sá, 2014; Jaquette et al., 2018) has shown that universities primarily implemented RCM 
to enhance their financial positions (i.e., to generate additional revenue and minimize 
costs). Moreover, previous studies (Deering & Sá, 2018; Gros Louis & Thompson, 2002; 
Hearn et al., 2006; Lang, 2002) show that institutions have realized mixed experiences 
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(i.e., positive and negative) with RCM. Additionally, due to the dearth of RCM 
scholarship, other findings regarding RCM have been institution-specific and 
unconnected to any systematic investigation of its impact. These findings include 
perceptions of RCM budgeting as a structural process (Cekic, 2010); RCM’s impact on 
faculty workload (McBride et al., 2000); and RCM’s impact on graduation rates 
(Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2017). This study contributes to the limited literature on RCM, 
revealing RCM’s impact on costs at two public research universities in the United States. 
However, the body of scholarship on RCM requires further development with regard to 
topics for exploration and methodological approaches.  
As it relates to topics for exploration, future research should consider at least three 
general areas. First, scholars should examine RCM’s impact on critical university 
outcomes, such as enrollment, profitability, administrative costs, the number of academic 
programs, donative revenue, and rankings. Within each of these outcomes, scholars 
should investigate how RCM’s effect may impact various campus communities (e.g., 
faculty, staff, students, and administrators) and programs. Previous research has not 
considered any of these outcomes explicitly. Given the substantial time and monetary 
investment it takes to implement RCM – as noted in this study with respect to UNH and 
the UofA and confirmed by scholars and practitioners (Curry et al., 2013; Jaquette et al., 
2018; Strauss & Curry, 2002; Whalen, 1991) – an examination of RCM’s impact on each 
of these topics could provide university administrators and policymakers with the 
evidence necessary to discern if the implementation of RCM is worthwhile. 
Second, with regard to future research topics, scholars should investigate and 
document the variability in RCM models across universities that employ RCM. For 
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example, researchers could consider differences in RCM models based on the length of 
time institutions have operated RCM (i.e., new versus old). Scholars could explore to 
what extent universities’ outcomes might be different based on the number of years 
operating RCM. Additionally, with regard to RCM model variability, scholars should 
examine differences in RCM models based on funding methodology. For example, a 
consulting report by Attis et al. (2016) described several ways in which some public 
research universities allocate funding. Iowa State University allocates undergraduate 
revenue to responsibility centers in a 75/25 fashion (i.e., 75% of revenue is allocated 
based on student credit hours and the remaining 25% is allocated based on program 
enrollment). The University of Michigan does so in a 50/50 fashion and the University of 
Minnesota does so in a 25/75 fashion. As noted in Chapter 1: Introduction, each of these 
funding methods provides different incentives for increasing program enrollment and 
course enrollment. However, what remains unknown is whether those incentives make a 
difference, and if so, to what extent. Finally, with regard to RCM model variability, 
researchers should consider differences in how universities operate RCM. For example, 
Deering and Lang (2017) suggest that some universities fail to fully implement RCM and 
instead use a hybrid approach. A hybrid model combines RCM with a centralized or 
other approach. Scholars should investigate differences in university outcomes, if any, 
based on the use of a pure RCM model (i.e., those that are fully implemented) compared 
to a hybrid model.  
With regard to methodological approaches, future research on RCM should 
employ quantitative techniques that yield generalizable results and techniques that 
combine qualitative and quantitative research designs. As it relates to the former, the lack 
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of generalizable knowledge regarding RCM is due to the inability of researchers to 
employ appropriate research methods to account for: a) the relatively small number of 
universities that use RCM; b) the variability in RCM models across universities; and c) 
the time differences in which universities adopted RCM. As a consequence, scholars have 
mostly investigated RCM in a case-by-case manner, with exception of Rutherford and 
Rabovsky (2017). This study is no different from previous research in that regard – 
specifically, this study examined RCM in a case-by-case manner for two research 
universities. The use of a quasi-experimental approach that could yield generalizable 
results, such as the generalized synthetic control method. The generalized synthetic 
control method can take into account multiple treated units (e.g., multiple universities 
that adopted RCM) and produce broader causal results regarding the effects of a 
treatment, policy, or intervention (Xu, 2017). Future research on RCM should incorporate 
the generalized synthetic control method to provide more conclusive evidence regarding 
its utility. This, in turn, could provide university administrators and policymakers with a 
better understanding of RCM’s impact and effectiveness.  
Finally, future research should use mixed methods research designs for studies on 
RCM. For example, in the context of this study, if qualitative interviews were used, they 
could have provided additional context around the principal-agent relationship between 
central administration and deans. Specifically, interviews with central administrators and 
deans might allow future researchers to understand the shirking behavior that may have 
occurred at UNH and UofA with respect to the increases in total operating costs. 
Additionally, with respect to Bowen’s RTC, interviews might reveal how additional 
revenue could influence costs. For example, it could be the case that RCM caused costs 
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to decrease in some areas, however, instead of saving the cost-savings, deans instead 
repurposed them to spend on other things, such as activities that increase the prestige and 
influence of the institution. Qualitative research is needed to substantiate this speculation. 
Ultimately, the use of SCM and interviews could elucidate a fuller picture of RCM and 







Table A1. Public Universities in the US that have Implemented RCM 
Institution Name RCM Implementation 
Year 
Indiana University - Bloomington 1988-89 
Indiana University of Pennsylvania - Main Campus 1988-89 
University of Pittsburgh - Pittsburgh Campus 1991-92 
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities 1995-96 
UCLA 1996-97 
Temple University 1996-97 
University of Michigan - Ann Arbor 1997-98 
University of Illinois - Urbana Champaign 1999-00 
University of New Hampshire - Main Campus 1999-00 
Ohio State University - Main Campus 2002-03 
Central Michigan University 2007-08 
University of Cincinnati - Main Campus 2008-09 
Iowa State University 2008-09 
University of Missouri Kansas City 2009-10 
Kent State University at Kent 2009-10 
University of Florida 2009-10 
University of Delaware 2009-10 
Texas Tech University 2011-12 
University of Oregon 2011-12 
University of Washington - Seattle 2011-12 
University of California Davis 2012-13 
University of New Mexico - Main Campus 2013-14 
University of South Dakota 2013-14 
University of Vermont 2014-15 
University of Virginia - Main Campus 2014-15 
Ohio University 2014-15 
University of Arizona 2015-16 
University of North Dakota 2015-16 
Rutgers University 2015-16 
East Tennessee State University 2016-17 
Tennessee Tech University 2016-17 
University of Louisville 2017-18 
Northern Kentucky University 2017-18 
Virginia Commonwealth University 2017-18 
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Institution Name RCM Implementation 
Year 
University of North Carolina Chapel Hill 2017-18 
University of Alabama Birmingham 2018-19 
University of South Carolina 2018-19 
Western Kentucky University 2018-19 
 
Table A2. Overview of RCM Operations at Institutions in the Study 
 University of New Hampshire - 
Main Campus 
University of Arizona 
First Year of RCM 
Implementation 
July 2000 July 2015 
Responsibility Centers Colleges (academic units); Research; 
and Auxiliaries 




& Support Centers 
 
Academic Affairs, Library, IT, 
General Administration, 
Advancement, Enrollment 




Services, Student Support, 
Research Support, Public 
Service, Facilities 
   
Undergraduate Tuition 
and Fee Revenue 
2% to Library; 15% to Division of 
Continuing Education; 83% to 
academic unit based on weighted 
credit hours taught (averaged over 2 
years and weighted based on expense 
per credit hour) 
Pooled; 75% student credit 
hour and 25% student's 
major 
 
Graduate Tuition and 
Fee Revenue 
 
2% to Library; 98% to an academic 
unit 
 
Student by student; 75% 





Program Allocation Units are funded 
first then the remaining is allocated as 
follows: 20% to Library; 30% to 
academic and research units based on 
faculty salaries (excluding grad 
students and extension faculty); the 
remaining funds are placed into a 
"hold harmless/strategic fund" 
 
Is the primary source of the 
subvention pool. Allocated 
to academic units, that when 
combined with other 
allocated funds, will provide 
colleges with a budget 
sufficient to cover their 
historical budget and the 




 University of New Hampshire - 
Main Campus 




13% to Principal Investigator; 66.5% 
to the research unit; 18.5% to VP of 
Research; 2% to Library 
 
100% Indirect credit 
recovery is returned to the 
college 
 
Funding Source of 
Subvention Pool 
 




Cost Allocation of 
Support Center Services 
 
Facilities Services is based on space 
allocations per square footage. Other 
overhead expenses are funded through 
two assessments: academic affairs and 
general. 
 
30.96% tax of 
undergraduate tuition; 
12.38% tax of graduate 
tuition; 2.75% tax of both 
tuitions for Strategic 
Initiative Fund; Annual 
facilities assessment fee 




Funded by the academic 
units/responsibility centers 
 
Funded by the academic 
units/responsibility centers 




Funded by the academic 
units/responsibility centers 
 
Funded by the academic 
units/responsibility centers 





Funded by the academic 
units/responsibility centers 
 
Funded by the academic 
units/responsibility centers 




Academic Affairs Assessment "tax" is 
paid by academic units. General 
Assessment "tax" is paid by all units. 
(assessments are based on 50% of 
personnel expenses and 50% of all 
revenues) 
 
Allocated from the 






The RCM allocation rules above are 
based on the first RCM model at UNH 
– fiscal years 2001-2006. (UNH RCM 






Table A3. Data and Variables in the Study 
Variable Name Description Sample Range Source 
Total Operating Costs 
(outcome variable) 
The sum of expenditures on 
administration, instruction, 
and student services. 
● UNH (1989-90) 
to 2004-05) 
● University of 
Arizona (1989-






The number of full-time 
undergraduate students plus 
one-third of part-time 
undergraduate students 
enrolled. 
● UNH (1989-90) 
to 2004-05) 
● University of 
Arizona (1989-





The number of graduate 
students enrolled. 
● UNH (1989-90) 
to 2004-05) 
● University of 
Arizona (1989-
90 to 2017-18) 
 
IPEDS 
Full-time Faculty The number of full-time 
faculty. 
● UNH (1989-90) 
to 2004-05) 
● University of 
Arizona (1989-
90 to 2017-18) 
 
IPEDS 
Research Expenditures The total dollars spent on 
research. 
● UNH (1989-90) 
to 2004-05) 
● University of 
Arizona (1989-





The average faculty salary. ● UNH (1989-90) 
to 2004-05) 
● University of 
Arizona (1989-




Conferred (a proxy for 
academic program 
mix) 
The proportion of students 
graduating with degrees in 
science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics 
out of the total number of 
bachelor’s degrees conferred. 
● UNH (1989-90) 
to 2004-05) 
● University of 
Arizona (1989-





Variable Name Description Sample Range Source 
Tuition and Fee 
Revenue 
Total dollars generated from 
tuition and fees. 
● UNH (1989-90) 
to 2004-05) 
● University of 
Arizona (1989-





Total dollars received from 
state appropriations. 
● UNH (1989-90) 
to 2004-05) 
● University of 
Arizona (1989-
90 to 2017-18) 
 
IPEDS 
Revenues from Private 
Gifts, Grants, and 
Contracts 
Total dollars received from 
private gifts, grants, and 
contracts.  
● UNH (1989-90) 
to 2004-05) 
● University of 
Arizona (1989-
90 to 2017-18) 
 
IPEDS 
Percent of Tuition and 
Fee Revenue out of 
Total Revenue 
The percent of tuition and fee 
revenue out of total revenue. 
● UNH (1989-90) 
to 2004-05) 
● University of 
Arizona (1989-
90 to 2017-18) 
 
IPEDS 
Percent of State 
Appropriation 
Revenue out of Total 
Revenue 
The percent of state 
appropriation revenue out of 
total revenue. 
● UNH (1989-90) 
to 2004-05) 
● University of 
Arizona (1989-





















Sensitivity Analysis (Leave-one-out Test Results) 
University of New Hampshire 
 
Table B1. Synthetic Control Unit for University of New Hampshire (Synthetic UNH with 
University of Vermont Removed) 
Synthetic Control Unit (synthetic UNH) 
UnitID Institutions (synthetic controls) State Weight (w) 
231624 College of William and Mary VA 0.456 
176080 Mississippi State University MS 0.438 
169248 Central Michigan University MI 0.105 
180461 Montana State University MT 0 
200332 North Dakota State University-Main 
Campus 
ND 0 
166513 University of Massachusetts-Lowell MA 0 
 
Table B2. Pre-treatment Estimates for University of New Hampshire (Synthetic UNH 














Total Operating Cost (USD in 
millions) (1991) 
$82.06 $82.87 $68.91 
 
Total Operating Cost (USD in 
millions) (1999) 
$116.69 $118.26 $110.04 
 
Full-time Equivalent (FTE) 
Undergraduate Enrollment 
(1991) 
10,197 8,838 8,753 
 
Full-time Equivalent (FTE) 
Undergraduate Enrollment 
(1999) 
























Percent  (%) of STEM 
bachelor’s degrees produced out 
of total conferred(1991)  
25.0 26.9 25.2 
 
Percent  (%) of STEM 
bachelor’s degrees produced out 
of total conferred (1999)  
27.8 28.0 29.0 
 
Full-time Faculty (1991) 
558 538 607 
 
Full-time Faculty (1999) 
609 514 667 
 
Average Faculty Salary (9-
month equated salary) (1991) 
$44,849 $42,602 $44,892 
 
Average Faculty Salary (9-
month equated salary) (1999) 
$56,725 $53,453 $56,677 
Percent (%) of State  
 
Appropriation Revenue out of 
Total Revenue (1991)  
19.0 26.2 34.3 
 
Percent (%) of State 
Appropriation Revenue out of 
Total Revenue (1999)  
16.0 19.0 29.6 
 
Percent (%) of Tuition and Fee 
Revenue out of Total Revenue 
(1991) 
33.3 28.6 20.8 
 
Percent (%) of Tuition and Fee 
Revenue out of Total Revenue 
(1999) 
34.3 32.2 24.5 
 
Research Expenditures (USD in 
millions) (1991) 
$32.85 $25.08 $31.69 
 
Research Expenditures (USD in 
millions) (1999) 
$53.36 $38.55 $46.67 
 
Revenue from Private Gifts, 
Grants, and Contracts (USD in 
millions) (1991) 
 
















Revenue from Private Gifts, 
Grants, and Contracts (USD in 
millions) (1999) 
 
$18.72 $19.42 $15.81 
State Appropriation Revenue 
(USD in millions) (1991) 
$36.99 $38.32 $59.74 
 
State Appropriation Revenue 
(USD in millions) (1999) 
$48.81 $44.47 $84.17 
 
Tuition and Fee Revenue (USD 
in millions) (1991) 
$64.60 $53.67 $31.31 
 
Tuition and Fee Revenue (USD 
in millions) (1999) 
$104.84 $87.17 $58.14 
 
 
Figure B1. Graph of Treatment Effects of RCM’s Impact on Operating Cost at University 




Table B3. Treatment Effects of RCM’s Impact on Operating Cost at University of New 
Hampshire (Leave-one-out Test) 











1 2001 $125.41 $111.52 $13.89 0.500 
2 2002 $139.13 $102.80 $36.34 0.167 
3 2003 $144.69 $118.93 $25.76 0.333 
4 2004 $162.25 $129.79 $32.47 0.333 
5 2005 $167.86 $137.76 $30.10 0.333 
 
 
University of Arizona 
 
Table B4. Synthetic Control Unit for University of Arizona (Synthetic UofA with 
University of Georgia Removed) 
Synthetic Control Unit (synthetic UofA) 
UnitID Institutions (synthetic controls) State Weight (w) 
171100 Michigan State University MI 0.35 
133951 Florida International University FL 0.219 
240444 University of Wisconsin-Madison WI 0.18 
218663 
University of South Carolina-
Columbia 
SC 0.171 
110680 University of California-San Diego CA 0.056 
110635 University of California-Berkeley CA 0.024 
233921 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University 
VA 0 
228778 The University of Texas at Austin TX 0 
228723 













Table B5. Pre-treatment Estimates for University of Arizona (Synthetic UofA with 
University of Georgia Removed) 












Total Operating Cost (USD in 
millions) (2000) 
 
$400.73 $404.65 $393.27 
Total Operating Cost (USD in 
millions) (2009) 
 
$576.43 $604.75 $629.08 
Total Operating Cost (USD in 
millions) (2014) 
 
$881.36 $865.98 $849.40 
Full-time Equivalent (FTE) 
Undergraduate Enrollment (2000) 
 
23,155 21,558 23,342 
Full-time Equivalent (FTE) 
Undergraduate Enrollment (2009) 
 
27,215 25,033 27,293 
Full-time Equivalent (FTE) 
Undergraduate Enrollment (2014) 
 
29,491 27,190 30,346 
Graduate Enrollment (headcount) 
(2000) 
 
6,944 6,387 6,981 
Graduate Enrollment (headcount) 
(2009) 
 
8,341 7,643 7,997 
Graduate Enrollment (headcount) 
(2014) 
 
8,951 8,984 9,880 
Percent  (%) of STEM bachelor’s 
degrees produced out of total 
conferred (2000) 
 
26.4 28.3 27.2 
Percent  (%) of STEM bachelor’s 
degrees produced out of total 
conferred (2009) 
 
28.9 27.9 25.7 
Percent  (%) of STEM bachelor’s 
degrees produced out of total 
conferred (2014) 
 
31.2 33.2 32.0 
Full-time Faculty (2000) 
 
1,348 1,384 1,344 
Full-time Faculty (2009) 1,593 1,538 1,600 
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Full-time Faculty (2014) 
 
1,561 1,676 1,720 
Average Faculty Salary (9-month 
equated salary) (2000) 
 
$67,451 $70,858 $66,114 
Average Faculty Salary (9-month 
equated salary) (2009) 
 
$87,187 $92,385 $87,581 
Average Faculty Salary (9-month 
equated salary) (2014) 
 
$92,880 $99,577 $94,361 
Percent (%) of State 
Appropriation Revenue out of 
Total Revenue (2000) 
 
34.2 36.3 34.2 
Percent (%) of State 
Appropriation Revenue out of 
Total Revenue (2009) 
 
25.5 25.2 23.3 
Percent (%) of State 
Appropriation Revenue out of 
Total Revenue (2014) 
 
15.7 17.7 14.6 
Percent (%) of Tuition and Fee 
Revenue out of Total Revenue 
(2000) 
 
17.1 17.4 20.0 
Percent (%) of Tuition and Fee 
Revenue out of Total Revenue 
(2009) 
 
25.9 27.2 31.5 
Percent (%) of Tuition and Fee 
Revenue out of Total Revenue 
(2014) 
 
36.6 34.6 36.3 
Research Expenditures (USD in 
millions) (2000) 
 
$235.74 $231.00 $206.46 
Research Expenditures (USD in 
millions) (2009) 
 
$385.47 $344.42 $322.75 
Research Expenditures (USD in 
millions) (2014) 
 
$451.27 $460.12 $419.22 
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Revenue from Private Gifts, 
Grants, and Contracts (USD in 
millions) (2000) 
 
$75.61 $82.07 $84.74 
Revenue from Private Gifts, 
Grants, and Contracts (USD in 
millions) (2009) 
 
$78.16 $73.69 $77.33 
Revenue from Private Gifts, 
Grants, and Contracts (USD in 
millions) (2014) 
 
$78.29 $95.69 $81.93 
State Appropriation Revenue 
(USD in millions) (2000) 
 
$320.91 $328.77 $287.84 
State Appropriation Revenue 
(USD in millions) (2009) 
 
$371.49 $344.61 $302.14 
State Appropriation Revenue 
(USD in millions) (2014) 
 
$287.49 $303.55 $255.36 
Tuition and Fee Revenue (USD in 
millions) (2000) 
 
$160.65 $162.14 $180.25 
Tuition and Fee Revenue (USD in 
millions) (2009) 
 
$377.35 $369.23 $401.59 
Tuition and Fee Revenue (USD in 
millions) (2014) 















Figure B2. Graph of Treatment Effects of RCM’s Impact on Operating Cost at University 
of Arizona (Leave-one-out Test) 
 
 
Table B6. Treatment Effects of RCM’s Impact on Operating Cost at University of 
Arizona (Leave-one-out Test) 














1 2016 $1,077.51 $920.62 $156.89 0.556 
2 2017 $1,073.27 $957.52 $115.76 0.778 








Abadie, A. & Gardeazabal, J. (2003). The economic costs of conflict: A case study of the 
Basque Country. American Economic Review, 93(1), 113-132. 
Abadie, A., Diamond, A., & Hainmueller, J. (2010). Synthetic control methods for 
comparative case studies: Estimating the effect of California’s tobacco control 
program. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 105(490), 493-505. 
Abadie, A., Diamond, A., & Hainmueller, J. (2011). Synth: An R package for synthetic 
control methods in comparative case studies. Journal of Statistical Software, 
42(13). 
Abadie, A., Diamond, A., & Hainmueller, J. (2015). Comparative politics and the 
synthetic control method. American Journal of Political Science, 59(2), 495-510. 
Agasisti, T. & Salerno, C. (2007). Assessing the cost efficiency of Italian universities. 
Education Economics, 15(4), 455-471. 
Archibald, R. B. & Feldman, D. H. (2008). Why do higher-education costs rise more 
rapidly than prices in general? Change,40(3), 25-31. 
Archibald, R. B. & Feldman, D. H. (2018). Drivers of the rising price of a college 
education. Midwestern Higher Education Compact. Minneapolis, MN. 
Arizona Board of Regents. (n.d.). Strategic plan. Retrieved from 
https://www.azregents.edu/board/abor-strategic-plan 
Adhikari, B. & Alm, J. (2016). Evaluating the economic effects of flat tax reforms using 
synthetic control methods. Southern Economic Journal, 83(2), 437-463. 
221 
 
Adhikari, B., Duval, R., Hu, B., & Loungani, P. (2018). Can reform waves turn the tide? 
Some case studies using the synthetic control method. Open Economies Review, 
29(4), 879-910. 
Askin, J. A. & Shea, B. (2016). What is the current state of economic sustainability of 
higher education in the United States, and how did we get here? Washington, DC: 
National Association of College and University Business Officers. 
Attis, D., Rosch, J. L., Jenkins, C., & Ho, M. (2016). Optimizing institutional budget 
models: Strategic lessons for aligning incentives and improving financial 
performance. Washington, DC: EAB.  
Balough, R. S. & Logue, R. L. (2013). Strategies for successful implementation of 
responsibility center budgeting in mid-sized universities. AAUA, 27(1), 131-147. 
Barone, G. & Mocetti, S. (2014). Natural disasters, growth and institutions: A tale of two 
earthquakes. Journal of Urban Economics, 84, 52-66. 
Baum, S. & Ma, J. (2012). Trends in college pricing 2012. Trends in Higher Education 
Series. College Board Advocacy & Policy Center. 
Baum, S., Ma, J., Pender, M, & Libassi, C. (2018). Trends in student aid 2018. New 
York, NY: The College Board.  
Baumol, W. J. & Bowen, W. G. (1966). Performing arts: The economic dilemma. New 
York: Twentieth Century Fund. 
Baumol, W. J., Panzar, J. C., & Willig, R. D. (1982). Contestable markets and the theory 
of industry structure. American Economic Review, 72. 
Becker, M. & Klößner, S. (2017). Estimating the economic costs of organized crime by 
synthetic control methods. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 32(7), 1367-1369. 
222 
 
Biagi, B., Brandano, M. G., & Pulina, M. (2016). The effect of tourism taxation: a 
synthetic control approach (No. 201609). Centre for North South Economic 
Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia. 
Bolman, L. G. & Deal, T. E. (2003). Reframing organizations: Artistry, choice, and 
leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Bonander, C., Jakobsson, N., Podestà, F., & Svensson, M. (2016). Universities as engines 
for regional growth? Using the synthetic control method to analyze the effects of 
research universities. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 60, 198-207. 
Bowen, H. R. (1980). The costs of higher education: How much do colleges and 
universities spend per student and how much should they spend?. San Francisco, 
CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Brinkman, P. T. (1981). Factors affecting instructional costs at major research 
universities. The Journal of Higher Education, 52(3), 265-279. 
Brinkman, P. T. (1990). Higher education cost functions. The Economics of American 
Universities, 107-128. 
Brinkman, P. T. (2000). The economics of higher education: Focus on cost. New 
Directions for Institutional Research, 27(2), 5-17. 
Brinkman, P. T. (2006). Using economic concepts in institutional research on higher 
education costs. New Directions for Institutional Research, 132, 43-58. 
Brinkman, P. T. & Leslie, L. L. (1986). Economies of scale in higher education: Sixty 
years of research. The Review of Higher Education, 10(1), 1-28. 
223 
 
Cekic, O. (2010). Exploring the relationship between incentives-based budgeting and 
organizational governance in higher education institutions: A case study of a 
public university. Journal of Social Science Institution, 3(1), 83-102. 
Cheslock, J. J., Ortagus, J. C., Umbricht, M. R., & Wymore, J. (2016). The cost of 
producing higher education: An exploration of theory, evidence, and institutional 
policy. In M. Paulsen (Ed.), Higher education: Handbook of theory and research 
(pp. 349-392). Springer International Publishing. 
Clotfelter, C. T. (1996). Buying the best: Cost escalation in elite higher education. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Cohn, E., Rhine, S. L., & Santos, M. C. (1989). Institutions of higher education as multi-
product firms: Economies of scale and scope. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 284-290. 
Corvey, C. (October 29, 1999). Trust, risk, and reward: Tenet of the responsibility center 
management plan. Retrieved from 
https://www.unh.edu/sites/www.unh.edu/files/departments/vice_president_for_fin
ance_administration/rcmimpementationarticles.pdf 
Courant, P. N. & Knepp, M. (2002). Activity-based budgeting at the University of 
Michigan. In D. M. Priest, W. E. Becker, D. Hossler, & E. P. St. John (Eds.), 
Incentive-based budgeting systems in public research universities (pp. 137-159). 
Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: E. Elgar Publishing.  
Courant, P. N., McPherson, M., & Resch, A. M. (2006). The public role in higher 
education. National Tax Journal, 291–318. 
224 
 
Curry, J. R., Laws, A. L., & Strauss, J. C. (2013). Responsibility center management: A 
guide to balancing academic entrepreneurship with fiscal responsibility. Second 
edition. Washington, DC: National Association of College and University 
Business Officers. 
Deering, D. & Lang, D. W. (2017). Responsibility center budgeting and management" 
lite" in university finance: why is RCB/RCM never fully deployed?. Planning for 
Higher Education, 45(3), 94. 
Deering, D. & Sá, C. (2018). Do corporate management tools inevitably corrupt the soul 
of the university? Evidence from the implementation of responsibility center 
budgeting. Tertiary Education and Management, 24(2), 115-127. 
Deering, D. & Sá, C. M. (2014). Financial management of Canadian universities: 
Adaptive strategies to fiscal constraints. Tertiary Education and Management, 
20(3), 207-224. 
deGroot, H., McMahon, W. W., & Volkwein, J. F. (1991). The cost structure of 
American research universities. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 424-431. 
Desrochers, D. M. & Hurlburt, S. (2014). Trends in College Spending: 2001-2011. A 
Delta data update. Delta Cost Project at American Institutes for Research. 
Doyle, W. (2015). Efficiency in degree production among public comprehensive 
universities. In M. Schneider & K. Deane (Eds.), The university next door: What 
is a comprehensive university, who does it educate, and can it survive (pp. 93-
120). New York, NY: Teachers College Press. 
Doyle, W. R. & Delaney, J. A. (2011). Bouncebacks in higher education funding: 
Patterns in length of time to recovery following cuts in state appropriations. 
225 
 
WISCAPE Policy Brief. Wisconsin Center for the Advancement of Postsecondary 
Education. 
Fremeth, A. R., Holburn, G. L., & Richter, B. K. (2016). Bridging qualitative and 
quantitative methods in organizational research: Applications of synthetic control 
methodology in the US automobile industry. Organization Science, 27(2), 462-
482. 
Galiani, S. & Quistorff, B. (2016). The Synth_runner Package: Utilities to automate 
synthetic control estimation. Retrieved from 
http://econweb.umd.edu/~galiani/files/synth_runner.pdf 
Goldstein, L. (2005). College & university budgeting: An introduction for faculty and 
academic administrators. Washington, DC: National Association of College and 
University Business Officers. 
Goldstein, L. (2012). A guide to college & university budgeting: Foundations for 
institutional effectiveness. Washington, DC: National Association of College and 
University Business Officers. 
Green, K. C., Jaschik, S., & Lederman, D. (2011). The 2011 Inside Higher Ed survey of 
college & university business officers. Inside Higher Ed. 
Gros Louis, K. R. & Thompson, M. (2002). Responsibility center budgeting and 
management at Indiana University. In D. M. Priest, W. E. Becker, D. Hossler, & 
E. P. St. John (Eds.), Incentive-based budgeting systems in public research 




Hanover Research Council. (2008). Responsibility Center Management at Major Public 
Universities. Washington, DC. 
Harris, B. H. & Shadunsky, Y. (2013). State and local governments in economic 
recoveries: This recovery is different. Washington, DC: Urban-Brookings Tax 
Policy Center. 
Hearn, J. C., Lewis, D. R., Kallsen, L., Holdsworth, J. M., & Jones, L. M. (2006). 
Incentives for managed growth: A case study of incentives-based planning and 
budgeting in a large public research university. The Journal of Higher Education, 
77(2), 286-316. 
Heller, D. E. (Ed.). (2001). The states and public higher education policy: Affordability, 
access, and accountability. JHU Press. 




Hillman, N. W. (2012). Tuition discounting for revenue management. Research in Higher 
Education, 53(3), 263-281. 
Hinrichs, P. (2012). The effects of affirmative action bans on college enrollment, 
educational attainment, and the demographic composition of universities. Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 94(3), 712-722. 
Jaquette, O. & Curs, B. R. (2015). Creating the out-of-state university: Do public 
universities increase nonresident freshman enrollment in response to declining 
state appropriations?. Research in Higher Education, 56(6), 535-565. 
227 
 
Jaquette, O., Kramer, D. A., & Curs, B. R. (2018). Growing the Pie? The Effect of 
Responsibility Center Management on Tuition Revenue. The Journal of Higher 
Education, 89(5), 637-676. 
Johnes, G. & Schwarzenberger, A. (2011). Differences in cost structure and the 
evaluation of efficiency: the case of German universities. Education Economics, 
19(5), 487-499. 
Kallsen, L. A., Oju, E. C., Baylor, L. M., & Bruininks, R. H. (2001). An RCM success 
story? Empirical results of responsibility centered management principles. In 
Annual Meeting of the Association for Institutional Research, Long Beach, CA. 
Kim, J. (2018). The functions and dysfunctions of college rankings: An analysis of 
institutional expenditure. Research in Higher Education, 59(1), 54-87. 
Kimball, B. A. & Luke, J. B. (2018). Historical Dimensions of the “Cost Disease” in US 
Higher Education, 1870s–2010s. Social Science History, 42(1), 29-55. 
Kivistö, J. (2005). The government‐higher education institution relationship: Theoretical 
considerations from the perspective of agency theory. Tertiary Education & 
Management, 11(1), 1-17. 
Kivistö, J. (2008). An assessment of agency theory as a framework for the government–
university relationship. Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 
30(4), 339-350. 
Koshal, R. K. & Koshal, M. (1999). Economies of scale and scope in higher education: a 




Koshal, R. K., Koshal, M., & Gupta, A. (2001). Multi-product total cost function for 
higher education: a case of bible colleges. Economics of Education Review, 20(3), 
297-303. 
Kosten, L. A. (2016). Outcomes-based funding and responsibility center management: 
Combining the best of state and institutional budget models to achieve shared 
goals. Lumina Issue Papers. Lumina Foundation. 
Kreif, N., Grieve, R., Hangartner, D., Turner, A. J., Nikolova, S., & Sutton, M. (2016). 
Examination of the synthetic control method for evaluating health policies with 
multiple treated units. Health Economics, 25(12), 1514-1528. 
Kuo, J. S. & Ho, Y. C. (2008). The cost efficiency impact of the university operation 
fund on public universities in Taiwan. Economics of Education Review, 27(5), 
603-612. 
Laband, D. N. & Lentz, B. F. (2003). New estimates of economies of scale and scope in 
higher education. Southern Economic Journal, 172-183. 
Lane, J. E. & Kivisto, J. A. (2008). Interests, information, and incentives in higher 
education: Principal-agent theory and its potential applications to the study of 
higher education governance. In J. C. Smart (Ed.), Higher Education: Handbook 
of Theory and Research (pp. 141-179). Springer, Dordrecht. 
Lang, D. W. (2002). Responsibility center budgeting at the University of Toronto. In D. 
M. Priest, W. E. Becker, D. Hossler, & E. P. St. John (Eds.), Incentive-based 
budgeting systems in public research universities (pp. 109-136). Cheltenham, UK; 
Northampton, MA: E. Elgar Publishing.  
229 
 
Layzell, D. T. (2007). State higher education funding models: An assessment of current 
and emerging approaches. Journal of Education Finance, 1-19. 




Leslie, L. L. & Slaughter, S. A. (1997). The development and current status of market 
mechanisms in United States postsecondary education. Higher Education Policy, 
10, 239–252. 
Leslie, L. L., Slaughter, S. A., Taylor, B. J., & Zhang, L. (2012). How do revenue 
variations affect expenditures within US research universities?. Research in 
Higher Education, 53(6), 614-639. 
Liu, S. (2015). Spillovers from universities: Evidence from the land-grant program. 
Journal of Urban Economics, 87, 25-41. 
Ma, J., Baum, S., Pender, M. & Libassi, C. (2018). Trends in college pricing 2018, New 
York: The College Board. 
Mamun, S. A. K. (2012). Stochastic estimation of cost frontier: Evidence from 
Bangladesh. Education Economics, 20(2), 211-227. 
Martin, R. E. (2011). The college cost disease: Higher cost and lower quality. 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Martin, R. E. & Hill, C. (2014). Baumol and Bowen cost effects in research universities. 
Available at: https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2153122. 
230 
 
Massy, W. (1996). Resource allocation in higher education. University of Michigan 
Press. 
Massy, W. & Zemsky, R. (1990). The lattice and the ratchet. Policy Perspectives, 2(4), 1-
8. 
McBride, A. B., Neiman, S., & Johnson, J. (2000). Responsibility-centered management: 
A 10-year nursing assessment. Journal of Professional Nursing, 16(4), 201-209. 
McFarland, J., Hussar, B., Wang, X., Zhang, J., Wang, K., Rathbun, A., & Mann, F. B. 
(2018). The condition of education 2018. NCES 2018-144. Washington DC: 
National Center for Education Statistics. 
Melguizo, T. & Strober, M. H. (2007). Faculty salaries and the maximization of prestige. 
Research in Higher education, 48(6), 633-668. 
Mitchell, M., Palacios, V., & Leachman, M. (2015). States are still funding higher 
education below pre-recession levels. Journal of Collective Bargaining in the 
Academy, (10), 71. 
Nelson, R. & Hevert, K. T. (1992). Effect of class size on economies of scale and 
marginal costs in higher education. Applied Economics, 24(5), 473-482. 
O’Meara, K. (2007). Striving for what? Exploring the pursuit of prestige. In J. C. Smart 
(Ed.). Higher Education: Handbook of Theory and Research (pp. 121-179). 
Springer: Dordrecht. 
O’Meara, K. & Meekins, M. (2012). Inside rankings: Limitations and possibilities 
(Working Paper, 2012 Series, Issue No. 1). Boston, MA: New England Resource 
Center for Higher Education. http://scholarworks.umb.edu/nerche_pubs/24/ 
231 
 
Priest, D. M., Becker, W., Hossler, D., & John, E. P. (2002). Incentive-based budgeting 
systems in public universities. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: E. Elgar 
Publishing. 
Priest, D. M. & St. John, E. P. (2006). Privatization and public universities. 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
Robossi, M. (2017). Agency costs in higher education: Evaluating an institution through 
a comprehensive framework. Higher Education Policy, 30, 319-339. 
Robst, J. (2001). Cost efficiency in public higher education institutions. The Journal of 
Higher Education, 72(6), 730-750. 
Rutherford, A. & Rabovsky, T. (2017). Does the motivation for market‐based reform 
matter? The case of responsibility‐centered management. Public Administration 
Review, 78(4), 626-639. 
Rydberg, J., McGarrell, E. F., Norris, A., & Circo, G. (2018). A quasi-experimental 
synthetic control evaluation of a place-based police-directed patrol intervention 
on violent crime. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 14(1), 83-109. 
Sav, G. T. (2004). Higher education costs and scale and scope economies. Applied 
Economics, 36(6), 607-614. 
Sav, G. T. (2017). Efficiency evaluations of US public higher education and effects of 
state funding and pell grants: Panel data estimates using two stage data 
envelopment analysis, 2004–2013 academic years. Journal of Education Finance, 
42(4), 357-385. 
Slaughter, S. A. & Leslie, L. L. (1997). Academic capitalism: Politics, policies, and the 
entrepreneurial university. The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
232 
 
Slaughter, S. A. & Rhoades, G. (2004). Academic capitalism and the new economy: 
Markets, state, and higher education. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
State Higher Education Executive Officers Association (2018). State higher education 
finance: FY 2017. Boulder, CO 
State Higher Education Executive Officers Association (2020). State higher education 
finance: FY 2019. Boulder, CO 
Strauss, J. C. & Curry, J. R. (2002). Responsibility Center Management: Lessons from 25 
Years of Decentralized Management. Washington, DC: National Association of 
College and University Business Officers. 
Tandberg, D. A., Fowles, J. T., & McLendon, M. K. (2017). The governor and the state 
higher education executive officer: How the relationship shapes state financial 
support for higher education. The Journal of Higher Education, 88(1), 110-134. 
Titus, M. A. (2009). The production of bachelor's degrees and financial aspects of state 
higher education policy: A dynamic analysis. The Journal of Higher Education, 
80(4), 439-468. 
Titus, M. A., Vamosiu, A., & McClure, K. R. (2017). Are public master’s institutions 
cost efficient? A stochastic frontier and spatial. Research in Higher Education. 
58(5), 469-496. 
Toutkoushian, R. K. (1999). The value of cost functions for policymaking and 
institutional research. Research in Higher Education, 40(1), 1-15. 




University of Arizona. (2019). RCM frequently asked questions. Retrieved from 
https://rcm.arizona.edu/faq-page 
University of New Hampshire. (2006). Five year review. Retrieved from 
https://www.unh.edu/sites/www.unh.edu/files/departments/vice_president_for_fin
ance_administration/2006review.pdf 
University of New Hampshire. (2009). 2009/2010 RCM review. Retrieved from 
https://www.unh.edu/sites/www.unh.edu/files/departments/vice_president_for_fin
ance_administration/2009review.pdf 
University of New Hampshire. (2015). Strategic plan refresh: Responsibility centered 




University of New Hampshire. (2017). RCM operating manual. Retrieved from 
https://www.unh.edu/sites/default/files/departments/vice_president_for_finance_a
dministration/may_2017_rcm_manual_update_v2.pdf 
University of New Hampshire. (2019). Facts and figures. Retrieved from 
https://www.unh.edu/main/facts-figures 
Vonasek, J. (2011). Implementing responsibility centre budgeting. Journal of Higher 
Education Policy and Management, 33(5), 497-508. 
Webber, D. A. (2017). State divestment and tuition at public institutions. Economics of 
Education Review, 60, 1-4. 
234 
 
West, J. A., Seidita, V., Di Mattia, J., & Whalen, E. L. (1997). RCM as a catalyst. 
Business Officer, 31(2), 24-28. 
Whalen, E. L. (1991). Responsibility Center Budgeting: An Approach to Decentralized 
Management for Institutions of Higher Education. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press. 
Winston, G. C. (1999). Subsidies, hierarchy and peers: The awkward economics of 
higher education. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13(1), 13-36. 
Xu, Y. (2017). Generalized synthetic control method: Causal inference with interactive 
fixed effects models. Political Analysis, 25(1), 57-76. 
Zierdt, G. L. (2009). Responsibility-centred budgeting: An emerging trend in higher 
education budget reform. Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 
31(4), 345-353. 
Zumeta, W. (2001). Public policy and accountability in higher education: Lessons from 
the past and present for the new millennium. In D. Heller (Ed.), The states and 
public higher education policy: Affordability, access, and accountability (pp. 155-
193). Baltimore, MD: JHU Press. 
Zumeta, W., Breneman, D. W., Callan, P. M., & Finney, J. E. (2012). Financing 
American higher education in the era of globalization. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Education Press. 
  
   
